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ONE 
Introduction: Sartre vivant 
Steven Churchill and Jack Reynolds 
Most philosophers live and die in relative obscurity. If they are both 
insightful and fortunate, they sometimes achieve a measure of fame 
and posterity afterwards. Jean-Paul Sartre (1905-80) bucked this trend. 
Perhaps no other philosopher was as famous in his own time as Sartre, 
or so we would claim. Fame, of course, does not entail or denote value, 
whether it be philosophical value or otherwise. It can also be fleeting, as 
the posthumous life of Henri Bergson showed, at least for quite some 
years. Sartre also seemed "dead" in academic circles, perhaps twenty 
years ago, and much earlier in France. Sartre hims.elf would no doubt 
have been unhappy to learn of this posthumous fate; after all, in his 
beautifully crafted autobiography, entitled Words (1964 ), he positioned 
his life's work as a writer as rooted in his desire to achieve a kind of 
immortality through his writings, which would survive him into poster-
ity. It became fashionable to declare that we have "been there and done 
that", as far as the study of Sartre's life and works are concerned, and 
have long since moved on. 
Yet those declaring that all there was to be known about Sartre had 
already been written (whether by Sartre himself or by others) were 
arguably doing so from a position of "bad faith", as Sartre might have 
said. Perhaps those dismissing Sartre as irrelevant had read and enjoyed 
some of Sartre's short stories, plays or novels, such as Nausea (La 
Nausee; Sartre 1938, 1965a). Maybe they had read Sartre's famous 
public lecture, Existentialism and Humanism (I..:Existentialisme est un 
humanisme; Sartre 1946b, 1973 ), or even thumbed their way through 
parts of Being and Nothingness (J.;Etre et le neant; Sartre 1943a, 1958a). 
Few, though, would have examined Sartre's earlier, psychologically 
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motivated philosophical works in any real depth, such as Imagina-
tion (!}Imagination; Sartre 1936, 1972a) or its sequel, The Imaginary 
(I:Imaginaire; Sartre 1940, 2004a); then there is The Transcendence 
of the Ego ("La Transcendance de l'ego"; Sartre 1936-7, 1957a) to 
be considered, not to mention his Sketch for a Theory of the Emo-
tions (Esquisse d'une theorie des emotions; Sartre 1939a, 2002). Fewer 
still have attempted to grapple with Sartre's later works, including 
his massive two-volume Critique of Dialectical Reason (Critique de la 
raison dialectique; vol. 1: Sartre 1960b, 1960c; vol. 2: Sartre 1985b, 
2006), or his multi-volume masterpiece, The Family Idiot ([_;Idiot de la 
famille; Sartre 1971-2, 1981c, 1987, 1989a, 1991a, 1993c). Indeed, 
parts of Sartre's body of work- particularly those projects that he had 
started but simply never finished - only appeared quite some years 
after his death; the Notebooks for an Ethics (Cahiers pour une morale; 
written during 194 7-8, but only published in 1983 in French, and in 
1992 in English translation), which Sartre composed while initially try-
ing to construct an ethical philosophy, provide an important example 
of the extent to which Sartre's body of work has continued to grow 
and develop, even in his absence. So, then, those claiming to have 
"exhausted" Sartre's body of work, thereby safely confining his intel-
lectual figure to a halcyon period, had typically read and understood 
only a fraction of his vast, and ongoing contributions, made across 
multiple fields of inquiry. 
Since Sartre's works have yet to be understood and appreciated in 
their full depth as the totality they represent, we would argue that Sartre 
is very much alive, particularly for those willing to resist these persistent 
claims of irrelevancy. Today, there are new biographies and scholarly 
interpretations that extend understanding of his thought into texts that 
simply never received the attention they deserved, there are reissues 
of his earlier works, and various books on Sartre and existentialism 
continue to appear. Recently, Les Temps modernes (Modern Times), the 
journal founded by Sartre and his life-long partner Simone de Beauvoir, 
published a special edition entitled The Readers of Sartre, intended to 
rebut the claim that Sartre is no longer read, either in France or else-
where. The current editorial director of Les Temps modernes, famed 
documentary filmmaker Claude Lanzmann (himself a close friend to 
Sartre), asserted that "it is simply not true" that Sartre has faded into 
obscurity. 
Despite these positive developments, much remains to be done in the 
field of Sartre scholarship. Perhaps the most important of these tasks is 
to try to grasp Sartre's works as the totality we have just now asserted 
they represent. While we do not claim in this concise volume to achieve 
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anything approaching a totalizing perspective on Sartre's works, we do 
seek to make a small start toward this immense project, by attempting 
to make Sartre's broader body of work accessible to a wider audience. 
By bringing together a diverse group of philosophers working across 
multiple disciplines, we hope to introduce those new to Sartre to works 
of his beyond those that appear regularly in the public domain, such as 
the Existentialism and Humanism lecture or Nausea. At the same time, 
we hope to provide those familiar with Sartre's works with a range of 
perspectives which may serve to spur new insights and further research. 
With these goals of achieving a balance of both breadth and depth in 
mind, we have sought to organize the essays in this volume thematically, 
rather than in terms of a strict chronology of Sartre's works. Neverthe-
less, the three parts may be loosely defined as representing Sartre's early 
philosophy (in Part I), Sartre's "middle period" as a mature thinker (in 
Part II) and, finally, Sartre's later thought (in Part III). 
Part I, Psychology, Psychoanalysis and Literature, deals primarily 
with Sartre's efforts to give an account of the human condition in terms 
of a phenomenological psychology and existential psychoanalysis. This 
part encompasses Sartre's early perspectives on the imagination, self-
hood, and the emotions and so on, as well as Sartre's dramatization of 
these themes in literary form in Nausea. 
Part II, Ontology: Freedom, Authenticity and Self-Creation, deals 
with the development of Sartre's early phenomenology into a mature 
phenomenological ontology, particularly as it appears in Being and 
Nothingness. The conceptual terrain covered here includes Sartre's 
conceptualizations of "bad faith", authenticity and the fundamental 
project, along with Sartre's account of inter-social relations via his 
notion of "the look". Part II concludes with an account of Sartre's 
intellectual trajectory from a relatively apolitical writer to a politically 
engaged provocateur par excellence. 
In Part III, Ethics and Politics, the overview of Sartre's political 
progression initially continues; particular attention paid to his post-
war works, including What Is Literature? (Qu'est-ce que la litterature?; 
Sartre 1948a, 1988), Anti-Semite and Jew (Reflexions sur la ques-
tion juive; Sartre 1946a, 1948b) and "Materialism and Revolution" 
("Materialisme et revolution"; Sartre 1946c, 1962a). Then, Sartre's 
theory of groups is considered, bringing to light Sartre's conceptuali-
zations of revolutionary praxis and institutional power, particularly in 
the Critique of Dialectical Reason, but also in The Family Idiot. Sartre's 
attempt to produce an ethics guided by his view of Marxian dialectics 
then follows, in which Sartre's concepts of "need" and "scarcity" serve 
as the main elements in his vision for an ethical society, under socialism. 
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Part III concludes with a perspective on Sartre's final efforts towards an 
ethics, as chronicled in his final interviews in 1980. Sartre's concepts of 
"need" and "scarcity" that featured in his dialectical ethics are comple-
mented in these interviews by his concept of "reciprocity" (alternatively 
described as an ethics of the "We"). Ethical action is driven here by the 
ideal that individuals may relate to each other in a way that positions 
the Other's interests and needs as continuous with one's own. In this 
"fraternal" mode of being-together, the objective of ending scarcity and 
lack would become goals shared in common by all of humanity, bringing 
about truly ethical relations between human beings. 
Although the essays in this volume are organized according to a the-
matic and loosely chronological order as we have noted, the essays may 
also be read as self-contained articles, should readers so desire. Soren 
Overgaard's chapter on "the look", for example, provides context on 
the development of Sartre's ontology, such that the central concept 
of the look is sufficiently explained, without the need to refer to sub-
sequent chapters. At the same time, though, each chapter is designed 
to build on the one that precedes it; suggested further readings at the 
end of each chapter are designed to both explore the ideas covered in 
a particular chapter, and to encourage further research and discovery. 
In his moving obituary for his friend and colleague Maurice Merleau-
Ponty (1908-61), entitled "Merleau-Ponty vivant" -that is, "Merleau-
Ponty alive", or "Merleau-Ponty Jives" -Sartre asserted that "Merleau 
is still too much alive for anyone to be able to describe him" (Sartre 
19 61). We assert that the same may be said of Sartre himself, even now, 
over three decades after his death. Even a volume many thousands of 
words longer than this collection would still leave something of Sartre 
fleeing beyond one's grasp, so to speak. Nevertheless, this posthumous 
elusiveness of Sartre is confirmation for us - and, no doubt, for the 
marvellous group of contributors appearing in this collection - of one 
thing: Jean-Paul Sartre vivant! 
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Life and works 
Gary Cox 
The keynote speaker at the 2011 UK Sartre Society Conference in Lon-
don was Annie Cohen-Solal, Sartre's foremost biographer and author 
of the magnificent jean-Paul Sartre: A Life (Cohen-Solal 2005). Her 
chosen theme was a series of public lectures Sartre gave in the early 
1930s, during his time as a school teacher in Le Havre. Sartre's time in 
Le Havre has been characterized as his wilderness years - the brilliant 
student of the prestigious Parisian Ecole Normale Superieure exiled 
to the provinces, unappreciated, unpublished and unhappy. Yet they 
were also hugely formative and creative years for Sartre: a nine-month 
sabbatical in Berlin in 1933 to study the phenomenology of Edmund 
Husserl and the incessant revising of a work on contingency that eventu-
ally became the classic existentialist novel Nausea (Sartre 1938, 1965a). 
Sartre's chosen theme for his public lectures was literature. Like 
his great friend and lifelong intellectual sparring partner, Simone de 
Beauvoir, Sartre was interested in contemporary English and American 
literature; in the novels of Virginia Woolf, James Joyce, Aldous Hux-
ley, John Dos Passos and William Faulkner. Sartre's original lecture 
notes are lost, but fortunately Cohen-Solal possesses photocopies of 
several pages of them. She told an enthralled conference how she was 
summoned one morning by de Beauvoir, who appeared at the door of 
her Paris apartment in one of her famous turbans. She did not invite 
Cohen-Solal in, but handed her a sheaf of papers with strict instructions 
to have the material back by the end of the day. Cohen-Sola! hastened 
to the nearest Xerox machine. 
The photocopies, a sample of which Cohen-Solal passed around 
the audience, show de Beauvoir's neat, clear handwriting on the left, 
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with Sartre's scribble on the right. De Beauvoir had clearly translated 
passages of the aforementioned novelists for Sartre to analyse. Sartre's 
lectures explore the techniques of these English and American novelists, 
particularly their use of "stream of consciousness" to reveal the depths 
of the unconscious mind. In his lectures Sartre philosophizes about 
literature and in so doing develops himself as a philosopher, novelist 
and literary critic. Not least, he sows the seeds of what later became 
his theory of existential psychoanalysis. 
Sartre is famous for his wide and copious reading. He devoured thou-
sands of texts in his lifetime, always looking to feed his own theories, 
and in his early days was capable of producing a new or modified theory 
on a daily or even thrice-daily basis. He had no respect for the con-
straints of the traditional divisions between philosophy, psychology and 
literature and tended to see each as somewhat retarded when isolated 
from the others. Always a supreme interdisciplinarian, he advocated a 
more philosophical psychology and a more literary philosophy. In his 
Sketch fora Theory of the Emotions (Sartre 1939a, 2002), for example, 
he argues that pure psychology will only make genuine progress when 
it takes on board the insights of philosophy, or, more specifically, phe-
nomenology. Meanwhile, Nausea demonstrates that some of the most 
profound philosophical insights into the human condition can only be 
achieved through literature, or more specifically the novel form. Sartre 
was a philosopher in the broadest, truest and best sense of the word: a 
lover of wisdom wherever and however expressed. 
Sartre succeeded in breaking down many traditional, stultifying bar-
riers between intellectual subjects and in so doing opened up many 
new territories to intellectual enquiry. It is this that is perhaps the most 
impressive feature of his life's work. The longer one studies him, the 
more territories appear. Perhaps these territories cannot be enumer-
ated because where Sartre did not explore a territory so thoroughly 
as to make it his own, he pointed the way towards it, either promising 
to reach it himself in due course or inviting others to investigate his 
sketchy insights. 
In a sense, the number of Sartre territories there are seems now to 
depend on which of his myriad insights Sartre scholars wish to pursue. 
There is much work to be done, for example, in developing the ethical 
aspects of Sartre's theory of authenticity in light of the posthumous 
publication of his Notebooks for an Ethics (Sartre 1983b, 1992). This 
research cannot ignore Sartre the post-Kantian, Sartre the Marxist, or 
even Sartre the post-Aristotelian virtue theorist. And whatever emerges 
from this particular intellectual labour must surely influence our under-
standing of Sartre's existential psychoanalysis and therefore the practice 
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of existential counselling. Today, to name just a few areas of enquiry, 
there are Sartre scholars exploring his ideas on ontology, consciousness, 
imagination, anti-Semitism, colonialism, revolution, biography, French 
literature, freedom and bad faith. One has only to consider the wide 
variety of themes explored in this present volume to be reminded of 
the extraordinary breadth of Sartre's thought. 
As already suggested, Sartre's many territories are not best seen as 
separate areas that he chose to explore at one time or another during 
his long career. His territories must instead be seen as integrated regions 
of a single, extensive landscape. Or, to employ a slightly different (and 
hopefully more revealing) topographical metaphor, his extensive writ-
ings seek to comprehensively schematize the complex landscape of the 
human condition with all the accuracy, honesty and attention to detail 
of an Ordnance Survey map. 
Sartre knew that the complex landscape of the human condition is 
best mapped out by writing in a variety of literary media. Straightfor-
ward philosophical writing may be best when it comes to pinning down 
the abstract fundamentals of a theory, but at other times only the novel, 
with its irony, its capacity for description, and its ability to capture 
ideas through atmosphere and action, is sufficiently subtle to do the 
job. Sometimes, a play or a film script may be more effective at saying 
what needs to be said than a novel, or a biography may serve better 
than a play and so on. Sartre was not a philosopher who happened to 
have a quirky sideline in short stories, novels, plays, biographies, diaries 
and film scripts. Each literary form makes a unique and indispensable 
contribution to the intricate and integrated whole that is his complex, 
multifaceted philosophy. If Sartre were alive today he would undoubt-
edly further enrich his oeuvre by blogging and tweeting. 
Sartre's compelling need to understand, theorize, explain and pro-
voke, in whatever literary media best served his purposes, was matched 
only by his compulsion to write. Contrary to popular myth, Sartre was 
not into drugs. He liked to drink alcohol and smoke tobacco, but he 
took a hallucinogenic drug only once in his life, in 1935, as part of a 
medically controlled experiment. He wanted to experience a genuine 
hallucination so that he could write about it in his book The Imaginary 
(Sartre 1940, 2004a). As for his famous penchant for speed, the ageing 
Sartre took far too many Corydrane tablets, a once legally available 
mixture of aspirin and amphetamine. His aim was not intoxication 
but warding off tiredness in order to maintain his prodigious literary 
output. It is doubtful that he could have written Critique of Dialecti-
cal Reason (Sartre 1960b, 1985b), his vast two-volume synthesis of 
existentialism and Marxism, without the tablets. So, Sartre was not 
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addicted to drugs but to writing. As an existential psychoanalyst might 
argue, Sartre, like many a so-called drug addict, used drugs to fuel a 
far deeper addiction. 
From childhood, he wrote for six hours a day most days of his life. As 
he writes in his 1964 autobiography Words, "My commandments have 
been sewn into my skin:. if I go a day without writing, the scar burns me; 
and if I write too easily, it also burns me" (Sartre 2000a: 104). Sartre 
also says in Words that his books "reek of sweat and effort" (ibid.: 103), 
but the truth is that with the help of a little chemical stimulation as he 
grew older, he was more often than not possessed by a kind of total flu-
ency that allowed him to write without pausing: the next idea, the next 
sentence, always ready to be set down on paper as required. Sartre was 
fond of arguing that genius is as genius does, and he is surely right that 
the genius of a great writer consists in his or her work. As he writes in 
Existentialism and Humanism, "The genius of Proust is the totality of 
the works of Proust; the genius of Racine is the series of his tragedies, 
outside of which there is nothing" (Sartre 1993a: 41-2). The creation 
of Sartre's genius in the form of his body of work, however, was surely 
facilitated to a considerable extent by his rare talent for total fluency. As 
they say, you've either got it or you haven't, and he had it in abundance. 
Sartre might reluctantly accept that he had a natural ability as far 
as his fluency was concerned, but he would insist that it was what he 
chose to do with his ability that was all important, that brought it into 
reality. Without his choice and self-determination to write, his natural 
ability would have been nothing. 
This is not to say that what Sartre churned out was not in need of 
extensive revision and editing. When he went blind in 1973 he said 
that he could no longer write because he could no longer undertake the 
necessary revisions he felt were necessary to convey certain ideas in a 
certain style. He was not satisfied with simply dictating his thoughts. 
The younger Sartre, with considerable help from de Beauvoir, was 
willing to rewrite and polish with the kind of attention to detail that 
produced Nausea, his stylistic masterpiece. As he grew older, busier 
and more directly involved in political campaigning around the world, 
however, much of his output was less well edited. 
Another feature of the output of the older Sartre was the number of 
significant but nonetheless unfinished works that he produced. Always 
fond of working on more than one project at once, it was inevitable that 
not everything he started would be finished. Not least, an old theory 
would be eclipsed by a new one, while one French writer would sud-
denly seem a far more worthy subject for a biography than another. 
But as he grew older he was in danger of never finishing anything. This 
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seems an unfair accusation, as his unfinished Critique of Dialectical 
Reason, for example, is two huge volumes long, while his unfinished 
The Family Idiot (Sartre 1971-2) - a biography of Gustave Flaubert- is 
three huge volumes long, 2,081 pages in all. Sartre had more and more 
to say as he got older, at least until the cataclysm of his blindness in 
1973. He was a man in a hurry, a man obsessed with opening up new 
intellectual territories while he still had the brain power and eyesight 
to do so. Fine-tuning everything he produced would have required a 
wealth of time he simply did not possess. 
Fortunately, not all the works of the later Sartre are unfinished and 
somewhat unpolished. Words, in particular, is finished, highly stylized 
and beautifully crafted; a work to rival Nausea or Being and Nothingness 
(Sartre 1943a, BNl, BN2). Words secured the offer of the 1964 Nobel 
Prize for Literature, which Sartre politely declined on the grounds that 
"The writer must refuse to let himself be transformed by institutions, 
even if these are of the most honourable kind" (Sartre press statement 
to Carl-Gustav Bjurstrom, 22 October 1964). 
Words is not the vast autobiography that one would expect from a 
man whose life was so eventful and historic, spanning two world wars, 
and who was so in the habit of writing such immense tomes as Being and 
Nothingness and the Roads to Freedom trilogy (Sartre 1945a, 1945c, 
1949a). A surprisingly slim volume, Words is nonetheless packed with 
concise and wittily expressed ideas, observations, ironies and senti-
ments. Like all of Sartre's biographies - Baudelaire (Sartre 194 7b), 
Saint Genet (Sartre 1952, 1963) and The Family Idiot-it is an exercise 
in existential psychoanalysis. It is certainly the place to go to discover 
what, according to Sartre, really made Sartre tick. 
Sartre was little over one year old when his father died. His mother 
and her father worshipped the child, viewing him as a being "meant to 
be". The child, however, was not fooled by the myth of his own neces-
sity, and from a surprisingly early age felt that his existence was absurd 
and pointless. He dreamt he was travelling on life's train without a 
ticket, without justification or purpose. He soon realized that only he 
could give himself a purpose and he chose writing as his raison d'etre. 
He adopted the ambition of becoming a great, dead French writer, 
although of course he knew he had to live a relatively long life first in 
order to achieve this goal. This was his fundamental choice of himself, 
an original choice of self that influenced all subsequent choices and so 
shaped his life. 
The notion of fundamental choice as the basis of each person's fun-
damental life project is central to Sartre's existentialism: his philosophy 
and psychology of the human condition. His childhood sense that a 
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person is nothing more than what he or she chooses to be was rein-
forced by his study of philosophy. He learnt from Kant, Hegel, Husserl, 
Bergson and Heidegger that consciousness is relational rather than an 
entity in its own right, that it exists only as a temporal consciousness 
of the world and is nothing beyond that. The central principles of Sar-
tre's worldview unfold readily from this basic premise regarding the 
nothingness of consciousness. 
As we are essentially nothing, whatever we are, we must choose to 
be it. We are burdened with the constant responsibility of having to 
choose, or, as Sartre puts it, we are "condemned to be free" (BNl: 439; 
BN2: 462). Of course, there are certain givens: our body, our immedi-
ate physical situation, our mortality. Sartre calls these givens facticity. 
Facticity does not limit freedom because freedom is not doing whatever 
one imagines but constantly having to choose in face of one's factic-
ity: what to do with one's body, one's circumstances, one's limited life 
span; what meaning to give to it all. Constantly having to choose what 
we are by choosing what we do makes us anxious. We would like to 
be complete, a being at one with itself rather than a being constantly 
striving for completion in a future that is never reached. So most, if not 
all of us resort to some degree of bad faith, fooling ourselves that we 
are fixed entities that need not or cannot choose. We use our freedom 
to try and cancel out our freedom by choosing not to choose. But as 
Sartre points out, "Not to choose is, in fact, to choose not to choose" 
(BN1: 481; BN2: 503). 
Bad faith cannot achieve its goal, and the person in bad faith lives 
their life in denial, refusing to positively affirm their freedom. The 
existentialist holy grail of authenticity involves a person overcoming 
their bad faith, recognizing that they are inalienably free and living their 
life accordingly. In practice, this involves living a life without regrets or 
excuses, throwing oneself into each situation and meeting its demands 
head on. As Sartre writes in his war diaries: 
To be authentic is to realize fully one's being-in-situation, what-
ever this situation may happen to be ... This presupposes a patient 
study of what the situation requires, and then a way of throwing 
oneself into it and determining oneself to "be-for" this situation. 
(Sartre 2000b: 54) 
Sartre recognized that humans are very flawed and that the goal of 
authenticity is therefore very difficult to obtain. Indeed, he admitted 
his own failure to achieve it. "I am not authentic. I have halted on the 
threshold of the promised lands. But at least I point the way to them 
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and others can go there" (ibid.: 62). Arguably, the holy grail of sustained 
authenticity is just too difficult for anyone to achieve, in that it must be 
maintained moment by moment in face of life's myriad temptations to 
slide back into bad faith. Just as one cannot be anything, only play at 
being it, one cannot simply be authentic. To believe that one is authen-
tic, as a stone is a stone, is simply another form of bad faith. Nonethe-
less, authenticity is a goal worth striving for if one wants to live life to 
the full and draw near to achieving one's full potential. 
Certainly, Sartre's life was that of a man constantly striving against 
bad faith in light of the nagging realization that he was inalienably free. 
From childhood, he knew that he was nothing more than what he chose 
to be, that he had no destiny other than the destiny he must create for 
himself. He wrote to construct an identity for himself out of nothing 
and the central purpose of his writing, beyond saving himself, was to 
remind people of their own essential nothingness and inalienable free-
dom; of the great and pressing need to respect freedom in themselves 
and in others. At the end of Words he writes, "I have never seen myself 
as the happy owner of a 'talent': my one concern was to save myself -
nothing in my hands, nothing in my pockets-through work and faith" 
(Sartre 2000a: 158). These words echo a passage from his play Kean 
(1954, 1994). Like Sartre, like all of us, the great Shakespearean actor 
Edmund Kean was nothing beyond the parts he played. "I live from day 
to day in a fabulous imposture. Not a farthing, nothing in my hands, 
nothing in my pockets, but I need only snap my fingers to summon 
spirits of the air" (Sartre 1994: act 2, 31). 
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Sartre and Husserl's Jdeen: 
phenomenology and imagination 
Beata Stawarska 
With [the] distinction [between noetic and noematic analysis] ... 
there becomes salient a distinction between two realms of being 
which are radically opposed and yet essentially related to one 
another. (Husserl 1983: §128) 
Since the being of consciousness is radically different, its meaning 
... is opposed to the being-in-itself of the phenomenon. 
(BN1/BN2: Introduction) 
Sartre's relation to Husserl may seem curious, if not downright para-
doxical. An outspoken enthusiast of phenomenology, which would lib-
erate philosophy of its idealist heritage and bring it back into the world, 
Sartre was simultaneously, and just as passionately, an uncompromising 
critic of the methodological and categorical apparatus the Husserl of 
Ideen I (first published 1913; translated as Ideas Pertaining to a Pure 
Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, Husserl 1983) 
put into the service of mapping out transcendental consciousness. One 
could dissolve this paradox by deeming Sartre faithful to the perceived 
spirit of Husserl's phenomenology, but not to its word. Yet such a set-
tlement glosses over the fact that this paradox is not simply a result 
of a scholarly disagreement. Sartre holds philosophy accountable in 
the face of the world where suffering, hunger and the war are both a 
possibility and a daily reality - the philosophical task cannot therefore 
ever be confined to a narrowly epistemological problem, but must 
also be existential, ethical and political. Husserl's phenomenology was 
oriented towards the more dassicaJly academic task of ascertaining 
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true knowledge and founding a rigorous philosophical science. Even 
though Husserl's phenomenology opened up a window out of the com-
fortable refuge of interiority celebrated in idealism and out onto the 
world, it took its role to be that of providing an alternative school of 
thought, hence lacking in the kind of engagement and commitment 
Sartre sought. Sartre's eventual alignment of phenomenology with 
idealism in the late 1930s testifies of his crisis of faith in a philosophy 
that was too attached to ideas and representations in its doctrine, but 
also, and more importantly, too attached to the comfortable refuge of 
the academia in its practice and way of life. The manifest tension in 
Sartre's relation to Husserl extends then beyond doctrinal and meth-
odological disagreements, and touches on the problem, what are we, 
philosophers, to do? 
This tension between differing philosophical aspirations sheds some 
light on the fact that Sartre, a self-professed Husserlian, could have been 
both transformed and animated by Husserl's vision of philosophy as 
phenomenology, and actively rebelling against its perceived traditional-
ism, especially the concessions made to a thinking that softens the bite 
of reality by turning it into a representation. Thus, while Sartre caught 
a glimpse of the liberating potential of the phenomenological method, 
he seemed just as eager to liberate the set of doctrines espoused by Hus-
serl's phenomenology from its perceived scholastism (in the literal and 
not historical sense of the word). No furniture adopted from the older 
schools of thought, especially the idealism taught by Brunschwicg and 
dominating the philosophical climate at the Ecole Normale Superieure 
during Sartre studies, should populate the cleared phenomenological 
field. Sartre is then an anti-scholastic thinker in seeking to take philoso-
phy out of the school; this disposition clashes with Husserl's motivation 
to establish phenomenology as a recognized academic discipline, on 
a par with the sciences. The overt disagreements between Sartre and 
Husserl discussed below can only be deciphered, in my view, within 
this larger horizon of differing visions of the philosopher's tasks and 
responsibilities. 
Sartre's introductions to Husserl 
While Sartre's engagement with Husserl's Ideen I can be safely dated 
back to 1933-4, the time Sartre spent at the Maison Academique 
Fran~aise (the French Institute in Berlin), it is much harder to date his 
initial exposure and interest in Husserl's phenomenology, which pre-
cipitated him to read Husserl closely. Husserl's phenomenology was 
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largely unknown in France at the time; Sartre did not attend Husserl's 
lectures at the Sorbonne on 23-6 February 1929 (Contat & Rybalka 
1981: xlvi). His initial exposure would probably have been channelled 
via informal conversations within his circle of friends and acquaintances 
rather than through institutions. 
The most oft-cited account of such a conversation is the one given 
by Simone de Beauvoir in the second book of her memoirs, La Force 
de l'age (de Beauvoir 1989, first published in 1960). According to her 
testimony, Sartre's (and de Beauvoir's) interest in Husserl's Ideen I 
was inspired by the now famed conversation over apricot cocktails in 
a Parisian cafe with Raymond Aron in 1932. Excited by this exchange, 
Sartre reportedly dragged de Beauvoir around Paris on a search for a 
book dealing with Husserl's phenomenology. They found Levinas's 
La Theorie de !'intuition dans la phenomenologie de Husserl (Levinas 
[1930] 1963), and Sartre was "so eager to inform himself on the subject 
that he leafed through the volume as we walked along, without even 
having cut the pages" (de Beauvoir 1989: 157; de Beauvoir 2001: 135, 
112). Sartre later himself recalls this conversation in a 1972 interview, 
although the beverage in question was, in his memory, a glass of beer 
(Sartre 1978: 26). Sartre concurs that his and de Beauvoir's discovery of 
Husserl took place during the conversation with Aron and emphasizes 
that Husserl's influence began "no earlier than 1933" (ibid.: 25). In the 
interview, Sartre notes the great promise Husserl's phenomenology held 
for describing the concrete reality of things. As he put it: "Well, I can 
tell you that knocked me out. I said to myself: 'now here at long last is 
a philosophy'. We thought a great deal about one thing: the concrete" 
(ibid.: 26). The necessity of moving towards the concrete was deeply 
felt by the young French intellectuals around that time, and expressed 
forcefully in Jean Wahl's influential monograph Vers le concret (Wahl 
1932), which argued for a move away from a philosophy founded on 
idealism and theory towards a description of reality as encountered in 
everyday life. 
A slightly earlier dating of Sartre's initial exposure to Husserl is given 
in a more recently published series of interviews, Talking with Sartre: 
Conversations and Debates by John Gerassi (2009). Questioned about 
his Berlin stay, Sartre responds: 
I got the same fellowship to go study [in Berlin in 1933] that Ray-
mond Aron had the previous year. He helped me get that deal and 
so he also gets the credit for introducing me to phenomenology, 
but as you know it was your father [Fernando Gerassi] who did 
that. (Ibid.: 25) 
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Dismissing Aron as "another con man", Sartre states: 
your father [Fernando GerassiJ talked to me about Husserl for 
two years before Aron went to Germany. I even had read a book 
by Levinas about it. No, what Aron made me want to do is go to 
Germany, all expenses paid, to have a good time. (Ibid.: 253) 1 
This testimony puts pressure on Aron's self-attributed credit for Sartre's 
initial interest in Husserl in general and Ideen I in particular. Since 
Sartre refers to "the book by Levinas" (i.e. Levinas [1930] 1963) in the 
context of his conversation about his introduction by Fernando Gerassi 
to Husserl, it is feasible that he read it before the conversation with 
Aron. Sartre seems to corroborate this inverse chronology in "Une vie 
pour la philosophie" (Rybalka 2000). 
De Beauvoir herself may have played a more active role in introduc-
ing Sartre to phenomenology than her memoir suggests. According to 
Margaret Simons, de Beauvoir may have been introduced to Husserl's 
phenomenology via her Sorbonne professor Jean Baruzi in 1927 (de 
Beauvoir 2006). A student of Husserl's phenomenology, Baruzi gave a 
lecture in 1926 on Leibniz that referred to Husserl's phenomenology 
and the method of reduction; he completed a dissertation in 1924, 
published in 19 3 1 as Saint Jean de la Croix et le probleme de l 'experience 
mystique, which gives an existential description of religious anguish 
and the lived experience of the mystic (Baruzi 1931). Simons notes 
that even though de Beauvoir credits Sartre with introducing her to 
phenomenology in the 1930s, "given her close work with Baruzi in 
1927, it is possible that she misrepresented the date of her introduction 
to phenomenology just as she did her early interest in philosophy" (de 
Beauvoir 2006: 49n). De Beauvoir, who actively deployed the phenom-
enological category of lived experience in her own work, would then 
likely have had some familiarity with Husserl's phenomenology when 
she met Sartre in 19 29. 
There is also evidence that Sartre was holding weekly conversations 
for two and a half months in 1928 with the Japanese philosopher Baron 
Shuzo Kuki, a student of Husserl in Freiburg and of Heidegger in Mar-
burg, where the topic of German phenomenology was regularly brought 
up. Shuzo Kuki therefore deserves credit for steering Sartre towards 
phenomenology a number of years before Aron (Light 1987: 4). 
In sum, Sartre's multiple introductions to Husserl in the 1920s were 
of an informal and conversational sort, and as such left limited traces 
in the published literature. Sartre was beyond doubt ripe to receive 
Husserl by the time he engaged the Ideen in Berlin- already his earliest 
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writings demonstrate careful attention to descriptive detail, which 
earned him the title of a "savage" and "unconscious" phenomenologist 
(de Coorebyter 2003 ). The early essays include a 1924 piece "L'Apo-
Iogie pour le cinema: defense et illustration d'un art international", 
where Sartre adopts the starting point of consciousness in describing 
the film, and equates the latter with consciousness itself due to their 
shared indivisible duration (Sartre 1990: 380). Sartre may then come 
across as a phenomenologist sans le savoir, who practises a return to 
the things themselves in his own writings wel1 avant la lettre of classi-
cal phenomenology. The influence of Bergson is unmistakable there, 
before the influence of Husserl, and it will play out at length in the 
1929 thesis on the image (discussed below). As a student of Bergson's 
philosophy at ENS, Sartre, together with other French intellectuals at 
the time, was favourably disposed towards a rigorous philosophy of 
consciousness developed by Husserl, and adopted it wholesale when 
he started reading the Ideen in Berlin. 
Sartre, the Husserlian 
Sartre obtained a grant to pursue research at the Maison Academique 
Frans;:aise in 1933-4, where he replaced Aron. He divided his days 
between reading Ideen I in the 1nornings, and writing what he referred 
to as his "memo on contingency" ("factum sur la contingence"), pub-
lished in 1938 as La Nausee, in the afternoons. It was during this 
time that Sartre drafted his early phenomenological essays, all of them 
engaged with aspects of Husserl's phenomenology from Ideen I, but 
also drawing on Husserl's other works. Sartre wrote "La Transcend-
ance de l'ego" in 1934, first published in the avant-garde journal 
Recherches Philosophiques in 1936-7. A lesser-known but forceful 
expression of Sartre's allegiance to phenomenology is found in a brief 
article titled "Une idee fondamentale de la phenomenologie de Hus-
serl: l'intentionalite", which was also drafted in 1934 in Berlin, but 
published only in 1939. The two monographs on the imagination, 
L:Imagination and L:Imaginaire, came out in 1936 and 1940, respec-
tively. Esquisse d'une theorie des emotions was drafted in 1937, and 
first published in 1939. It is usual to regard the writings from the 
1940s, such as "Conscience de soi et connaissance de soi" (Sartre 
1948c) and the magnum opus L'Etre et le neant: essai d'ontologie 
phenomenologique (Sartre 1943a), as breaking away with phenom-
enology, due to the uncompromisingly polemical stance adopted by 
Sartre in the critique of Husserl. However, this relation is complicated 
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by Sartre's continued adherence to the stance of consciousness and 
intentionality in these later works. What changes most dramatically, 
in my reading, is the tone of Sartre's pronouncements; most of the 
criticisms and revisions are sketched out already in the expressly phe-
nomenological phase. 
Even though Sartre was to distance himself from Husserl's intel-
lectual influence in favour of Heidegger, and then Marx, Husserl's 
role in Sartre's philosophical trajectory remains unique: it renewed 
his confidence in the value and relevance of philosophy to the quotid-
ian and the mundane, and launched Sartre on the path of sustained 
philosophical writing. As he noted, "Husserl had gripped me. I saw 
everything through the perspectives of his philosophy ... I was 'Hus-
serlian' and long to remain so" (Sartre 1985a: 225, 183). Husserl thus 
figures as an adopted philosophical master and mentor to the early 
Sartre; the latter expresses his philosophical provenance, however, in 
a decidedly contrary fashion. Sartre may come across as a parasitic 
reader of Husserl, who is leaching the available intellectual resources 
to the very bone and acknowledging the master's authority by repeat-
edly testing the validity of his claims. Hence, even though Sartre's early 
phenomenological pieces ("La Transcendance de l'ego", Sartre 1936-7; 
I.:Imaginaire, Sartre 1940) were, on his own admission, written directly 
under Husserl's inspiration, they were just as much written "against" 
Husserl; yet such counter-writing was possible "just insofar as a disciple 
can write against his master" (Sartre 1985a: 184). The rebellious tone 
found in the early works is therefore an expression of inspired disci-
pleship seeking to define its own distinctive philosophical voice while 
partially channelling another. 
Sartre employs the phenomenological method adopted from Husserl 
to suspend the validity of the claims and concepts posited by Husserl; 
his loyalty is in the approach and not in the doctrine, and his goal is to 
purify the phenomenological field established by Husserl by clearing 
it of any mental furniture adopted from the philosophical tradition 
(the egological notion of consciousness, the representationalist view of 
the imagination, recourse to passive matter or hyle in descriptions of 
the activity of consciousness) - ultimately up to the point of equating 
consciousness with nothingness. Sartre makes Husserl taste his (Hus-
serl's) own medicine by pointing the sharp end of the phenomenologi-
cal razor back onto the field of the master's own philosophy; he thus 
uses the method borrowed from Husserl to suspend the validity of 
claims made by Husserl. As such Sartre may be positioned in the sphere 
separating what Husserl (in Sartre's view) says and what he effectively 
does with phenomenology, or what he promises and what he effectively 
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accomplishes. The promise of phenomenology is revolutionary, the fruit 
overly saturated with the usual juices of academic thinking; Sartre's goal 
is then to liberate Husserl from himself. He claims to be (albeit he is 
rarely recognized as) consistently Husserlian throughout this process; 
henceforth, when engaged in his ontological project that posits a dia-
lectical opposition between the realms of being and nothingness, Sartre 
makes this claim: "I'm coming back to dogmatism via phenomenology. 
I'm keeping all of Husserl, the being-in-the-world, and yet I'm reach-
ing an absolute neo-realism" (Sartre 1993b: 43). The phenomenologi-
cal method becomes in Sartre's hand a radical purifying solution that 
leaves nothing behind - or better, that attains nothingness as ultimate 
realization of consciousness itself; the world is restored in its density 
and transcendence unmediated by essences and ideas; the dialectic of 
being and nothingness is then a logical and necessary extension of 
phenomenology of consciousness. 
This mixture of loyalty and rebellion resonates with the profound 
ambivalence in Sartre's relation to Husserl; in some testimonies, the 
relation is described by a series of unmistakably alimentary metaphors, 
as a kind of intellectual cannibalism, feasting on Husserl's corpus (a 
curious stance to adopt by a scholar overtly critical of any notion of 
alimentary philosophy!) - but ultimately destined to immortalize the 
spirit (if not the corpus) of phenomenology. Hence Sartre makes this 
observation about Husserl's impact on "La Transcendance de l'ego" in 
particular, and his thinking in general: 
I wrote it ... under the direct influence of Husserl; although I 
must admit that I take in it an anti-Husserl position. But that's 
because I am argumentative by nature ... I have to take [things] 
in and assimilate them completely until they become part of me 
... And even when I do understand, it's always with arguments 
and reservations, since I have to pick everything apart, cut it into 
little pieces, remove the bones, etc. And after all that long process 
had taken place, I was absolutely pro-Husserl, at least in certain 
areas, that is, in the realm of the intentional consciousness, for 
example; there he really revealed something to me, and it was at 
that time in Berlin that I made the discovery. (Sartre 1978: 30) 
If a patricide was committed while Sartre was reading Husserl's Ideen I 
in Berlin, the latter text still provided a nourishing ground for Sartre's 
philosophizing- up to a point of "exhaustion" of this ambivalent rela-
tion in the 1940s. 
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Intentionality against transcendental ego 
The overt task of "La Transcendance de l'ego" (Sartre 1936-7, 1960a) 
is to adopt and improve on Husserl's phenomenology so as to free it 
of unnecessary encumbrances, turning Husserl's method back onto the 
field of his philosophy. Sartre adopts the method of phenomenologi-
cal reduction to gain access to the field of pure consciousness, but he 
radicalizes it to the point of excluding the transcendental ego itself. 
Sartre therefore challenges the claims made by Husserl in Ideen I (Hus-
serl 1983: §80), relative to the irreducibility of the pure ego-pole in 
consciousness. Contrary to Husserl, Sartre claims that the ego is not 
a necessary substrate of all the individual acts of the cogito; it would 
rather be an object engendered apres coup by reflection which therefore 
distorts the originally non-thetic or non-positional character of (pre-
reflective) consciousness, making it appear as an object, rather than 
as pure subjectivity. Against Husserl's claim that the ego "survives the 
annihilation of the world", Sartre contends that the ego is an element 
of the transcendent world and so "falls like the other existences at the 
stroke of the epoche" (Sartre 1960a: 104). 
Sartre's argument expressly challenged HusserPs presumed "Kan-
tianism", unresolved in Ideen; specifically, a move from a de jure claim 
that the "I think" must be able to accompany all my presentations to a de 
facto claim that "I think" does in fact accompany all my presentations. 
Sartre found no phenomenological support for turning the Kantian 
requirement that it be possible to identify any act of consciousness as 
mine into the claim that the I is an existent subject of any cogito. Contra 
Husserl, Sartre argues that the synthetic unity of apperception makes no 
existential claims concerning the I. Kant is interpreted to be saying that 
"I can always regard my thought or perception as mine: nothing more" 
(Sartre 1960a: 104). In Sartre's view, there is no phenomenological 
place for a pure ego. And even though he does not cite it, the follow-
ing passage from Ideen I can help appreciate the possibility of Husserl 
converting the Kantian prerequisite of necessary unity in consciousness 
into a phenomenological datum: / 
In every actional cogito the ego lives out its life in a special sense. 
But all mental processes in the background likewise belong to it; 
and it belongs to them. All of them, as belonging to the one stream 
of consciousness which is mine, must admit of being converted 
into actional cogitations as immanental constituents. In Kant's 
words, "The 'I think' must be capable of accompanying all my 
presentations". (Husserl 1983: §57) 
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This necessary conversion of mental processes into I-acts justifies, in 
Husserl's view, the postulate of the I as an irreducible subject of actional 
cogito. 
Sartre argues that the unity of consciousness is safeguarded already 
by its intentional relatedness to an object: 
Now, it is certain that phenomenology does not need to appeal 
to any such unifying and individualizing I. Indeed, conscious-
ness is defined by intentionality. By intentionality consciousness 
transcends itself. It unifies itself by escaping from itself ... The 
object is transcendent to the consciousnesses which grasp it, and 
it is in the object that the unity of the consciousnesses is found. 
(Sartre 1960a: 38) 
This passage brings into focus what Sartre considered to be a funda-
mental idea of Husserl's phenomenology in the Ideen, and what he 
developed in the same year in an article bearing its name: intentionality. 
In Sartre's handwritten notes in the margins of his personal copy of 
the Ideen (cited in de Coorebyter 2003), intentionality constitutes one 
of the central and recurrent themes. In response to Husserl's emphasis 
that intentional relation is included a priori in the "pure essences" of 
eidetic phenomenology (Husserl 1983: §36), Sartre notes in the margin 
what this emphasis excludes, namely a "relation from the outside which 
would be contingent and reducible to an external relation" ("liaison par 
le dehors qui serait contingente et se reduirait a un rapport externe"). 
Husserl's claim (ibid.: §128) that "eidetic description of consciousness 
leads back to that of what is intended to in it, that the correlate of 
consciousness is inseparable from consciousness and yet is not really 
inherent in it" is underlined twice and emphasized by a triple vertical 
line in the margin. Similarly, Husserl's insistence that a material object, 
like "this sheet of paper given in the mental process of perception, is by 
essential necessity not a mental process but a being of a wholly different 
mode of being" (ibid.: §35) is underlined, as are similar passages in §23, 
where emphasis on the difference and transcendence of the intentum 
to the intentional consciousness is clearly stated. 
This emphasis strongly resonates with the entire ontological vision 
of a dialectical tension between consciousness and being developed by 
Sartre in 1943, and can be found in passages like this: "In the case of 
the perception of the chair, there is a thesis - that is, the apprehension 
and affirmation of the chair as the in-itself which consciousness is not" 
(BNl: 140; BN2: 163). Sartre's handwritten notes and emphases in and 
around the text of the Ideen thus pick up the threads and then weave 
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them into the cloth of his own ontology; the threads add up retroac-
tively to an unexpected fil rouge which a more usual, transcendental 
reading would be unlikely to reveal. Sartre's atypical emphasis of the 
otherness of the noematic to the noetic in the Ideen thus awakens the 
reader to a previously unnoted strangeness stirred by the "different 
mode of being" within (and without) consciousness. It also lends cre-
dence to his self-ascription as a Husserlian - as Sartre is writing in the 
margins of Ideen, he is also writing a phenomenological ontology of 
Being and Nothingness, a project ambiguously situated within the body 
and on the margins of phenomenology itself. 
Intentionality, this basic stance of consciousness, figures as a mark 
of consciousness's direct and unmediated contact with the transcend-
ent world already in the 1930s. Sartre makes this claim with force in 
the 1934 essay: 
Against the digestive philosophy of empirico-criticism, of neo-
Kantianism, against all "psychologism," Husserl persistently 
affirmed that one cannot dissolve things in consciousness. You 
see this tree, to be sure. But you see it just where it is: at the side of 
the road, in the midst of the dust, alone and writhing in the heat, 
eight miles from the Mediterranean coast. It could not enter into 
your consciousness, for it is not of the same nature as conscious-
ness ... Consciousness and the world are given at one stroke: 
essentially external to consciousness, the world is nevertheless 
essentially relative to consciousness. (Sartre 1970: 4) 
Sartre thus credits the intentionality thesis with two things: a delivery 
from the idealist worldview that populates the inner world with sem-
blances of the outer, and from the realist worldview that turns the real 
into an absolute, which can be only subsequently encountered by con-
sciousness. Husserl would have restored the real world of "artists and 
prophets ... with its havens of mercy and love" (ibid.: 5), and delivered 
us from the notions that "the spidery mind trapped things in its web. 
Covered them with a white spit and slowly swallowed them, reducing 
them to its own substance" (ibid.: 4). As such, intentionality would be, 
inescapably, an ontological thesis spelling out the being in the world 
of phenomenal consciousness, it would be a dialectical thesis bringing 
into light the conflict-within-the-contact of transcendental conscious-
ness and the transcendent world, where ontological belonging can be 
experienced as horror and mortal danger. 
Sartre's decidedly realist reading of intentionality does not mention 
that the meaning-endowing consciousness actively constitutes its object. 
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Or rather, he reads the constitution of the world as an imprisonment of 
transcendental consciousness in an empirical one (Sartre 1960a: 36), 
a tragic fall into brute contingency, as narrated in Nausea and then 
Being and Nothingness. The two parallel tracks of projects pursued in 
Berlin: reading Ideen I and writing a factum on contingency, effectively 
intersect in Sartre's early phenomenological essays, such that Sartre is 
still writing on contingency while reading (and writing about) Husserl. 
The interest in contingency of a world encountered as a brute factum 
informs his emphasis on transcendence as being both external and 
indissociable from consciousness. Intentionality is figured as external-
ity, a bond of non-assimilable excess weighing down consciousness to 
the world. 
Intentionality so redefined is then turned back onto its nourishing 
ground, and put in the service of arguments contra Husserl; it puts 
pressure on any need to locate transcendence within immanence, and 
to posit an ego as a transcendental substrate of experience (and then 
against the argument against a representationalist theory of the imagi-
nation and discussed below). The ego could only divide consciousness 
from itself like "an opaque blade", and thus constitute the "death of 
consciousness" (ibid.: 40); following the fundamental character of 
intentionality, (pre-reflective) consciousness is still granted self-con-
sciousness but that does not suppose a self separable from conscious-
ness: "consciousness is aware of itself insofar as it is consciousness of a 
transcendent object" (ibid.: 40). This constant contact with transcend-
ence translates into absolute clarity and lucidity within immanence; 
later in Being and Nothingness, Sartre will make a similar point that 
consciousness (of) self should not be read in terms of a barrier separat-
ing a subject from an object. 
While "La Transcendance de l'ego" is overtly a critique of the postu-
late of the transcendental ego, it is written as much "for" as it is "against" 
Husserl, and its engagement with Husserl's phenomenology transcends 
the narrow confines of this technical argument. The overtly critical tone 
can easily make the reader lose sight of Sartre's positive investment in 
the phenomenological project, and an intent to carry it further. First, 
intentionality reread with a determined focus on transcendence can 
answer the problem of whether or not distinct consciousnesses can be 
said to perceive one and the same world (Sartre 1985a: 184). Sartre 
is advancing the phenomenological project by actively countering the 
charge that each individual consciousness may be shown to constitute 
its own private world only. This concern is obviously tied to the charge 
of solipsism, and Sartre considers the problem of the being of the world 
on a par with the problem of knowing others. Ultimately, that is, by 
22 
SARTRE AND HUSSERL'S IDEEN: PHENOMENOLOGY AND IMAGINATION 
the time Sartre is developing his ontology, the latter problem will be 
grounded in such a realist notion of the common world. Yet Sartre is 
tackling this problem already in his phenomenological phase, and his 
argument "against" the transcendental ego is simultaneously an argu-
ment "for" the possibility o.f knowing others within phenomenology 
of consciousness. (It is obviously also "against" Husserl's own stated 
views, whose refutation of solipsism Sartre deems "inconclusive and 
weak" - see ibid.: 184). An ego-less construal of consciousness would 
dispel the threat of solipsism hovering over Husserl's phenomenology. 
Refigured as transcendent rather than transcendental, the ego is not 
locked in the interiority of the first person experience and can engage 
in relations with others. There is no longer anything "impenetrable" 
about the other nor about the self in this perspective (Sartre 1960a: 77, 
96); the threat of solus ipse is rendered null and void. 
There are other instances of "La Transcendance de l'ego" being writ-
ten both "for" and "against" Husserl: for example, the notion of imper-
sonal consciousness would provide the motivation for performing the 
phenomenological reduction. Sartre argues that "the epoche appears 
in the phenomenology of Husserl as a miracle", since no reasons or 
motives for suspending the otherwise coherent natural attitude are put 
forward (ibid.: 102). Reduction appears as an excessively intellectual 
method, an erudite procedure, capable of being performed only at the 
end of lengthy study, and as such gratuitous (ibid.: 103). Refigured as 
a spontaneity without a subjective centre, manifest in states of anxiety, 
insomnia or obsessional thinking, consciousness would be more prone, 
so to speak, to suspending and thematizing its quotidian beliefs even 
when it is not deployed by an academic philosopher; the epoche would 
emerge then as "both a pure event of transcendental origin and an ever 
possible accident of our daily life" (ibid.: 103)- rather than as a scholas-
tic method. The epoche thus gets tied directly to a philosophy of exist-
ence, in its return to the concerns of the mundane and quotidian human 
condition, not limited to furnishing the toolbox of an Erkenntnistheorie. 
It is also brought into contact with empirical narratives documenting 
such instances of monstrous spontaneity within consciousness itself, 
notably the psychology of Pierre Janet (see Stawarska 2005). 
An ego-less construal of consciousness can also help respond to the 
charges of the political left that phenomenology, like idealism, is a "phi-
losophy without evil" that dissolves reality into a stream of represen-
tations (Sartre 1960a: 104-5). As such, non-egological consciousness 
can give full and concrete measure of human agonies, suffering - and 
rebellion. This expressly ethical and political interest is obviously closer 
to Sartre's own rather than Husserl's philosophical aspirations; using 
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the yardstick of social relevance to assess the validity of transcendental 
claims brings a more engaged orientation to phenomenology, which 
distances Sartre from Husserl more radically than any specific theo-
retical disagreement in method and doctrine ever could. It confirms 
the need to situate their philosophical projects within the respective 
visions of the philosopher's responsibilities and commitments, or what 
a philosopher is to do. 
Imagination 
Sartre authored two monographs devoted to the imagination, and while 
both take up themes from Ideen I, they also extend his earlier thesis 
"L:Image clans la vie psychologique: role et nature", which Sartre pre-
sented to obtain the diplome d'etudes superieures at the Ecole Normale 
Superieure in 1927. This unpublished thesis focuses on the role of the 
image in perception and conception, and draws on a number of authors, 
notably Alain and Bergson, but also Binet, Piaget, Taine, Delacroix 
(his thesis adviser), Descartes, Jaspers, Leibniz, Kant, Spinoza, Ribot, 
Freud and others. There is lack of clarity in the scholarship relative 
to when Husserl became an influence on Sartre's thinking about the 
imagination. According to one claim, Sartre referred to Piaget, Freud 
and Jaspers, and even Husserl, in his 1927 thesis (Moran 2000: 365). 
Left as is, this claim risks overstating the facts - especially considering 
lack of public access and extensive publications on the thesis. The actual 
text, transcribed from thesis into type by Michel Rybalka, is mainly 
concerned with the transition from Alain to Bergson. The new influence 
on Sartre in this work is Bergson, not Husserl. Of the two references to 
a "Husserl" (sic) in the thesis, the first is embedded in a citation (from 
Flach), the second invokes a logician, author of a cursorily rendered 
critique of psychologism. The existing references are therefore either 
secondhand (de Coorebyter 2003: 21) or unrelated to the topic of the 
imagination. Similarly to his writings on cinema from 1924, Sartre may 
well be developing a precocious phenomenology in his writing on the 
image, but the interlocutor on the subject of consciousness is Bergson. 
Sartre's first published work on the imagination, Vlmagination 
(Sartre 1936, 1972a), does engage Husserl directly. While the bulk of 
the book is devoted to a critical survey of the existing theories of the 
imagination by Berkeley, Hume, Bergson and the psychologists Buhler, 
Titchener, Kohler, Wertheimer and Koffka, the final chapter takes up 
the phenomenology of Husserl as a much-needed alternative. Sartre 
praises Husserl for having "blazed the trail" for his own theory of the 
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imagination, even though he regretted that the scattered and fragmen-
tary character of Husserl's observations on imagination contained in 
Jdeenl makes their exposition exceedingly difficult (Sartre 1972a: 143). 
To the principal merits of Husserl's phenomenological theory belong, 
in Sartre's view, first, explicating the intentional structure of conscious 
acts, including the imaginary acts of consciousness, and, secondly, laying 
the ground for the assimilation of pure fantasy with the consciousness 
of physical pictures (paintings, drawings, photographs). The latter con-
tribution is especially important in that it provides the basis for Sartre's 
own unitary theory of imagination developed at length in I:Imaginaire 
(Sartre 1940, 2004a), which subsumes "mental" images and physical 
pictures in one extended "family" (famille d'images). While the first 
book on imagination proceeds by first critiquing existing empirical 
and experimental accounts as falling short of defining the essence of 
the psychological facts, and then opts for an eidetic reflection on the 
phenomenon under investigation, the second book starts off with the 
"certain" characteristics of imagining consciousness as yielded by phe-
nomenological reflection. 
In both books, Sartre deems intentionality to be key to understanding 
imagination. The principal merit of the intentionality thesis is that it 
provides the only means of preserving the transcendence of the object 
of a conscious act, whether perceptual or imaginary. Defining con-
sciousness in terms of intentionality ultimately breaks with any form 
of immanentism where the object of consciousness gets identified with 
a content in consciousness, and so where its transcendent character 
with regard to consciousness is compromised. Sartre targets especially 
Berkeley's idealism for having reduced transcendent objects to their 
mode of appearance, and so reduced the objective world to subjec-
tive impressions. The intentionality thesis permits, Sartre contends, to 
restore the transcendent character to the world, because the intendum 
ceases to be the content of the subjective act. To be sure, the act of 
consciousness is still composed of impressional data, but these hyletic 
components of a subjective act are not to be confused with the object 
of a conscious act (Sartre 1972a: 132). More 1importantly still, the 
intentionality thesis provides the ultimate means of breaking away with 
a long and faulty tradition of theorizing imagination as a variant of 
perception. Sartre's critical studies of the dominant theories of imagina-
tion produced in the history of Western philosophy, from Descartes to 
Bergson, aim to dissipate the common illusion haunting these theories 
that the image is a sort of a lesser thing, a trace of the perceived object. 
This illusion gives rise to, what Sartre calls, the "naive ontology of the 
image" for which "the image is made into a copy of the thing, existing 
25 
JEAN-PAUL SARTRE: KEY CONCEPTS 
as a thing" (ibid.: 4). However, the procedure oflocating images in the 
mind renders it effectively impossible to distinguish between percep-
tion and imagination - while we can easily tell them apart in experi-
ence; furthermore, it falls prey to the ''illusion of immanence" which 
takes consciousness to be a receptacle for mental representations. The 
intentionality thesis permits to theorize imagination otherwise than 
as observation of perceptual traces left behind in consciousness with 
the mind's eye. The image ceases being an immanent psychic content. 
Sartre refers to Husserl's example of imagining a "centaur playing 
the flute" from §23 of Ideas I to illustrate this point. Following Hus-
serl, the centaur produced in this flight of fancy can be called a mental 
'representation' only as long as it is understood that "we mean by 
"representation" what is represented" rather than "a psychic state". 
The centaur can thus be termed an intentional object of the imaginary 
consciousness even though it does not have an independent existence 
and is no more than a product of the mind. "It exists neither in the soul 
nor in consciousness nor anywhere. It does not exist at all, it is invention 
through and through" (Sartre 1972a: 133 ). Sartre thus credits Husserl 
for having "restored to the centaur, in the very heart of its 'unreality'," 
its transcendence" (ibid.: 134). The centaur can be regarded as a "tran-
scendent nothing" (Ricoeur 1981: 170), irreducible to the mental act 
despite its non-existence. 
Another important influence of Ideen I on Sartre's theory of the 
imagination can be found in the link established by Husserl between 
fantasy and picture consciousness. Even though the object of an imagi-
nary act is a "nothing", Sartre does not deny that there is real content in 
the imaginary act. The question of what makes up this psychic content 
is discussed fully in /_;Jmaginaire; still, Sartre assimilates pure fantasy, 
such as imagining a "flute-playing centaur", with the consciousness of 
a physical picture, such as a painting, a drawing or a photograph due 
to impressional matter or "stuff" being found in both already in the 
earlier essay. He finds the "germ of this assimilation" in another pas-
sage from the Ideen I, where Husserl comments on Diirer's engraving 
"The Knight, Death and the Devil". Husserl distinguishes there between 
two ways in which the engraving can be apprehended: as an object of 
a "normal perception", where it is grasped as a physical thing, a sheet 
of printed paper, or as an object of aesthetic contemplation where the 
figures of the Knight, Death and the Devil get represented "in image" or 
where "we are directed to the 'imaged' realities (abgebildet), the knight 
in flesh and blood, etc". This passage leads Sartre to conclude that the 
consciousness of a physical picture, such as "The Knight, Death and 
the Devil" engraving, can be aligned with an act of pure fantasy, for 
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example, imagining a flute-playing centaur, in that both acts consist of 
intentionally animating some content, which may be either physical or 
mental (Sartre 1972a: 135). The foundation for Sartre's own unitary 
theory of the imagination defined in Llmaginaire as "an act [of con-
sciousness] which aims at an absent or non-existent object as a body 
(dans sa corporeite), by means of a physical or mental content which 
is present only as an 'analogical representative' of the object aimed 
at" (Sartre 2004a: 20; 1940: 46) emerges thus in direct dialogue with 
relevant passages from Ideen I. 
That is not to deny Sartre's overt disagreement with Husserl on the 
subject of the imagination, apparent especially in Llmaginaire. The 
main disagreement concerns the relation between imagination and 
perception, and to the possibility of obtaining intuitive fulfilment in 
imagination. Thus, while Sartre adopts Husserl's bodily presence (Leib-
haftigkeit) of the object of perception, he denies that such presence of 
what he calls the flesh (la chair), that is the intimate texture, can be 
found in the object of the imagination itself (Sartre 2004a: 16; 1940: 
38). In imagining an object one has an immediate consciousness of 
its nothingness (2004a: 13; 1940: 33 ), and so absence or lack are the 
defining features of the imaginary, not a (possible or intended) presence. 
Sartre emphasizes therefore the negating power of consciousness (in ref-
erence to Heidegger), and deems the theory of fulfilment "outrageous": 
"We cannot allow that an image comes to fulfil a consciousness; it is 
itself a consciousness. It seems that Husserl was here the dupe of the illu-
sion of immanence" (Sartre 2004a: 59). One could retort that Sartre's 
own theory of the imagination is at least ambiguous on the question of 
mental content, since it adheres both to the understanding of the imagi-
nation as intentional relation and posits the analogue as a necessary 
mediating term (whether physical or mental) between consciousness 
and its object (Stawarska 2001). Sartre's critique of Husserl's reliance 
on impressional data applies then to Sartre's own theory of imagination 
just as well, and may showcase the difficulty of ever attaining absolute 
purity and translucence within the phenomenal field. In any case, Sartre 
overtly chastizes Husserl for failing to rise to the standards of (Sartre's 
own) understanding of the intentionality of consciousness as being like 
a vortex expelling any content out into the world. 
The rationale of Sartre's critique of Husserl can be found in his 
commitments to the creative force deployed by imaginary activity, as 
irreducible to simply re-presenting what is already there (or what was 
already realized in perception), and thus as direct expression of free-
dom. Sartre argues throughout J;Imaginaire that imagination and per-
ception are the two irreducible attitudes of consciousness, the former 
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deploying the free rein of creative activity unmotivated by any intui-
tively available contents. What is primary then is not perception but 
a duality of positive and negative acts - perception and imagination, 
with imagination having its object manifest in a sui generis fashion, 
and despite the greatest paucity of content. The presumed richness and 
vivacity of the imaginary world is illusory; rather than attribute quasi-
perceptual presence to it, we should bring out the, at times, acutely 
experienced lack of the imaged object, as when I imagine a loved one 
who is away or maybe even dead. In such cases, imagination stages 
the non-being of its object in a dramatic fashion, and it is precisely 
the impossibility of attaining fulfilment that constitutes the drama of 
realizing that the loved one is not there, not in this photograph, paint-
ing, caricature, or mental vision. Imagination then has everything to 
do with the potential of consciousness to live and gain distance from 
the ensnaring presence of the perceptual world; it frees consciousness 
up from the usual entanglement in the brute being-there and opens up 
a space of non-being and negativity. Imagination provides the royal 
road to consciousness as a field where lack and absence are both pos-
sible (consciousness is a necessary and sufficient condition thereof) and 
acutely felt. Neither Husserl nor Heidegger would have given justice 
to this basic fact that the existential nature of consciousness is that of 
a lack (Sartre 1993b: 70). 
Intentionality and the emotions 
Esquisse d'une theorie des emotions (Sartre l 939a, 197 5) is an extract 
from a much larger treatise in phenomenological psychology, La Psy-
che. This planned "big book" of some four hundred pages, written 
"enthusiastically" in three months in the autumn of 1937 (Sartre 1985a: 
184), has remained unpublished. Sartre discarded most of it as "pure 
Husserl": it expressed Husserl's ideas as assimilated and expressed by 
Sartre in a different style (de Beauvoir 1987: 231). Sartre regarded the 
salvaged sketch on the theory of the emotions, on the other hand, as 
original work (ibid.). The published book is similar in design and orien-
tation to the first book on the imagination in that it critiques the empiri-
cal and experimental accounts (the classic theories of James, Janet and 
Wallon) as falling short of defining the essence of the psychological 
facts, and opts for an eidetic reflection on the phenomenon under 
inv~stigation. Like the first book on the imagination, and in agreement 
with its title, the book offers a rough sketch and not a complete treatise 
in phenomenological psychology of the emotions. 
28 
SARTRE AND HUSSERL'S /DEEN: PHENOMENOLOGY AND IMAGINATION 
Sartre contends that the emotion like any other act of consciousness 
must be intentionally oriented to an object - to hate someone is to find 
them hateful, to love is to find them loveable. Furthermore, emotions, 
together with all other conscious acts, involve a non-thetic or pre-
reflective consciousness of self. As such, emotions possess and must be 
thematized according to their meaning or signification, rather than as 
sheer accidents or as mere sum totals of scientific facts. This signifying 
quality justifies resorting to the method of phenomenological psychol-
ogy as an alternative and a foundation for the empirical approaches. 
In addition to this adoption of Husserlian themes, one finds the usual 
Sartrean commitment to the freedom of consciousness in his sketch. 
The emotions are purposive, rather than being passive states or hidden 
treasures of the unconscious. The object of the emotion is not simply 
discovered in the pre-existent natural world, but consistently tied to 
the magical productivity of consciousness itself, and engendered in 
an effort to flee the world experienced as resistant or difficult. Like 
the imagination, the emotions deploy therefore the creative potential 
of consciousness and involve a measure of active distancing from the 
already available world. Furthermore, since pre-reflective conscious-
ness of self is distinct from knowledge of self (see also the 1943 essay 
Consciousness of Self and Knowledge of Self on this distinction), the 
emotional consciousness involves a degree of captivity or bad faith, 
which can only be dispelled by purifying reflection. 
Phenomenological ontology 
All the consequences of Sartre's critique of Husserl developed in the 
earlier phenomenological essays can be found in the works published 
in the 1940s. In "Conscience de soi et connaissance de soi" (Sartre 
1948c, 1967), Sartre notes: 
We have in Husserl a gradual elucidation and a remarkable 
description of the essential structures of c0nsciousness ... but 
never the posing of the ontological problem, namely that of the 
being of consciousness. In the same way the problem of the being 
of the world remains in suspense ... we never return from the 
phenomenological epoche to the world. (Sartre 1967: 55) 
Transcendental phenomenology needs therefore to be expanded into 
ontology-it needs to raise the question of being as irreducible to appear-
ance, but without dropping the descriptive method of phenomenology. 
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The 1943 opus J;Etre et le neant, subtitled "an essay in phenomenologi-
cal ontology", seeks to accomplish just that: it develops an ontologi-
cal system from the perspective of phenomenal consciousness. At the 
same time, Sartre has definitely arrived at the point of "exhaustion" 
in his relation to Husserl in the 1940s, and is uncompromising in his 
critique of the entire methodological and categorical apparatus. Husserl 
is charged with "infidelity" to his original conception of phenomenol-
ogy, for the following reasons: 
• for his Berkeleyan idealism in interpreting Being and transcend-
ent objects of intentional consciousness as non-real (BNl: xxvi; 
BN2: 6); 
• for not having escaped the thing-illusion (illusion chosiste) by 
introducing the passive hyle and being bound to the doctrine 
of sensation in his account of consciousness (BNl: xxxvi; BN2: 
15-16); 
• for remaining timidly on the level of purely functional description, 
which confines him to the level of appearances and forecloses the 
possibility of pursuing an existential dialectics; 
• for being, "despite all his denials, a phenomenalist rather than 
a phenomenologist" (BN1: 73; BN2: 97), only able to surf the 
surface of the infinite myriad of appearances; 
• for sketching a mere caricature of genuine transcendence that 
fails to pass beyond a consciousness into a world and beyond the 
present into the past and the future (BNl: 109; BN2: 132); 
• for being unable to escape solipsism any more than Kant, particu-
larly by the useless and fateful hypothesis of the transcendental 
subject (BNl: 233-4; BN2: 257-8); 
• for not taking sufficient account of the refractoriness (coefficient 
d'adversite) in our immediate experience (BNl: 328); and 
• for assuming that an eidetic phenomenology of essences can lay 
hold of freedom, which Sartre identified with consciousness and 
regarded as the prior ground of any elucidation of human essences 
(~Nl: 439; BN2: 461) - the last challenge ultimately entailing a 
shift from a phenomenological to an existentialist orientation. 
This long litany of accusations adds surprisingly little to our knowl-
edge of Sartre's relation to Husserl documented by the writings from 
the 1930s - many of the now overtly stated concerns were heard in 
the.earlier phenomenological essays, the new ontological directions 
expressly followed were explored already within a perspective now 
deemed too phenomenal. The concerns stated and new directions 
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followed may then have implicitly oriented the entire trajectory of 
Sartre's engagement with Husserl's phenomenology, and have only 
been brought into sharp focus in the 1940s. The professed break with 
Husserl appears then more as a blurred line; a phenomenology of an 
unequivocally classical kind continues to provide the frame of reference 
for the ontological Sartre. The unwillingness to abandon the perspec-
tive of consciousness, which sets him apart from both Merleau-Ponty 
and Heidegger, is evidence enough of Sartre's continued adherence to 
classical phenomenology. Even though Sartre's critical stance towards 
Husserl is more articulate and more radicalized in the 1940s, what 
changes the most is the tone - we no longer hear a trailing disciple refer 
to a master but an author speak on behalf of his own opus magnum, in 
his own voice. The question of break and/or continuity is therefore as 
complex in Sartre's oeuvre as it is the philosophy of Merleau-Ponty and 
Heidegger; Sartre's provocateur tone may amplify the tension of writing 
simultaneously from within and on the margins of phenomenology, for 
and against Husserl, up to the point of exhaustion and a turn to politics. 
Note 
1. I'd like to thank Matthew R. Lexow for pointing out Fernando Gerassi's role 
in Sartre's introduction to Husserl's phenomenology interviews to me, and 
Dennis Gilbert for providing information about Sartre's unpublished thesis on 
the imagination. 
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FOUR 
Sartre's understanding of the self 
Christian Onof 
Sartre's metaphysics are borne out of phenomenological investigations 
into the emotions, the imagination, and particular phenomena that 
are revelatory of ontological truths, such as the famous experience 
of La Nausee (Sartre 1938, 1965a) in which the novel's protagonist, 
Roquentin, experiences the fundamental difference characterizing the 
way of being of things from what it is to be a conscious being (Sartre 
1965 a: 182-3). This chapter aims to present how, from this basic insight 
and the theory of consciousness that accompanies it, Sartre develops 
an understanding of the self. In the first part of the chapter I will focus 
largely upon The Transcendence of the Ego (Sartre 1936-7, 2004c). 
In the second part I examine how Being and Nothingness contributes 
to this task. Although largely expository, the chapter will make some 
critical comments, because identifying the weaknesses of a theory is a 
precondition for properly grasping its strengths. 
Sartre's early theory of the ego 
The phenomenological investigations that are illustrated so powerfully 
in Sartre's novels, and La Nausee in particular, provide building blocks 
for a theory of consciousness that has direct implications for the under-
standing of the self who is conscious. With Roquentin's experience, 
Sartre is clearly drawing attention to the fact that consciousness cannot 
be viewed as a way of being that is comparable to that which we are, in 
normal circumstances, familiar with in our environment. This sets the 
foundation for what Sartre will distinguish in Being and Nothingness 
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as the being of the for-itself, in opposition to that of the in-itself. For 
our purposes, what is first fundamental about this distinction is that the 
in-itself "is" in a self-contained way, while the for-itself 's existence can 
only be understood in relation to the in-itself. Second, this relatedness 
defines a fundamental characteristic of consciousness for Sartre: it is 
always to be understood as consciousness of something: consciousness 
is fundamentally intentional. 
This different way of being of consciousness implies that any notion 
of self cannot be a notion of a self as substance in the sense that being 
in-itself is the type of being of substances. And not being substantial 
means two interrelated things for Sartre: first, it means that there is no 
substratum for this type of being, which is pure appearance; second, it 
means that this kind of being is not its own foundation. 
Consciousness before Being and Nothingness 
Focusing now on the claim of intentionality, let us note that there is a 
long history to the conception of intentionality, or directedness towards 
an object, and much of it is marked by the introduction of a notion 
of representation, which explains how the intended object constitutes 
mental content. To have a certain representation, on this account, is to 
be intentionally directed towards an object, and the object defines, in 
some sense, the content of the representation. 
Some such representational theories identify a role of intermediary 
for the representation in accounting for the epistemology of the percep-
tion of an object: to see an object is just to have a representation that 
is related in the right way to the object (for example, causally). Such 
an understanding of the role of mental representations is rejected by 
Sartre in his early work on the imagination (I'Imagination, Sartre 1936, 
1972a; I:Imaginaire, Sartre 1940, 2004a). There are no such things as 
mental images inside consciousness, and which account for our relation 
to objects (Moran 2000: 380). Sartre wants to avoid the opacity that is 
introduced into consciousness by means of such a mediation: Sartre is 
a direct realist. If one can indeed talk of the appearances of an object, 
and thus differentiate the object from any single or finite number of 
appearances for a perceiver (the object would then correspond to an 
infinity of possible appearances, as Husserl or phenomenalism would 
have it; ibid.: 115, 160; Gardner 2009: 53), this is not to give these 
appearances any separate status as mental entities. Indeed, it is a fun-
damental feature of Sartre's understanding of consciousness, that it is a 
pure transparency directed to the object. Consciousness is not therefore 
understood in terms of the usual notion of mental content for Sartre. 
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This has an important implication for the understanding of the self. 
Namely, there is no locus for something like an ego to be found in 
consciousness. For Sartre, any such notion of ego would negate the 
diaphanous nature of consciousness, as "The Transcendence of the Ego" 
shows (Barnes 1992: 29). Here, in particular, any notion of ego that 
would be the ground of all the subject's intentional relations is excluded. 
By making this claim, Sartre is directly targeting Husserl's notion of 
transcendental ego. Husserl (1983: 132-3) claims that such an ego can 
be identified as that which does not change throughout our experience. 
That is, once one has carried out the phenomenological reduction he 
calls epoche, through which the world is reduced to its way of appear-
ing, one grasps this world as it is constituted by a transcendental ego 
(Husserl 1980: §12). Sartre replies, however, that once the world and 
empirical subjectivity have been excluded through the epoche, there 
is no such residual ego to be found (Moran 2000: 377); indeed, any 
transcendence should, for Sartre, fall under the epoche, and thus be 
understood as not constitutive of consciousness (Sartre 2004c: 14). 
Moreover, to claim that there is a transcendental ego would amount to 
"slicing through each consciousness like an opaque blade" (ibid.: 7), in 
so far as it would destroy the transparency of consciousness. 
Sartre diagnoses Husserl's error as stemming from a misinterpreta-
tion of the meaning of Kant's transcendental unity of apperception 
(TUA), Sartre correctly points out that the TUA arises in the context of 
the de jure question of the possibility of objective knowledge. Husserl's 
transposition of this notion into the context of phenomenology belongs 
to a "dangerous tendency in contemporary philosophy ... of turning the 
conditions of possibility determined by critique into a reality" (ibid.: 2). 
Sartre thus accuses Husserl of borrowing a de jure notion and using it 
to make a de facto claim. 
Let us note here that, while Sartre is right to uphold Kant's distinc-
tion between de jure and de facto issues (Kant 2003: A84-5/B 116-7), 
his realism implies that he does not assign the TUA the constitutive 
function it has for Kant. Rather, Sartre has it that the "I" is the result of 
a synthetic unity of representations: "it is this pre-existing unity which, 
on the contrary, makes it possible" (Sartre 2004c: 5). It is arguable that 
had he embraced Kantian idealism, Sartre's views on the "I" would 
have been altered. Leaving this issue aside, Sartre's theory of the ego in 
The Transcendence of the Ego involves more than these negative state-
ments about a transcendental ego: this critique concerned unreflective 
fir~t-order consciousness, directed onto the world, but there is more 
to Sartre's understanding of the ego in The Transcendence of the Ego 
than the absence of the "I" from any such unreflective consciousness. 
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Reflective consciousness in The Transcendence of the Ego 
Aside from non-reflective positional consciousness, Sartre explains that 
there is a form of reflective consciousness in which an "I" appears. Hus-
serl had already observed that the psychological ego is the result of a 
constitution by the subject (Moran 2000: 169-71). Sartre now claims 
that the same applies to Husserl's transcendental ego, and that this 
constitution occurs through reflection (Sartre 2004c: 28). This is what 
is encountered in the "I think": what the kind of reflection involved 
in Descartes's cogito achieves is not the discovery of an "I", but the 
creation of one (ibid.: 42). 
In the second part of The Transcendence of the Ego, Sartre provides 
an account of what is entailed in the constitution of a transcendent ego 
in reflection. Psychological entities that transcend consciousness, such 
as states, qualities and actions, are unified by being brought under a 
"transcendent pole of synthetic unity" (ibid.: 21 ). 
Moreover, in the conclusion to The Transcendence of the Ego, Sartre 
brings out the practical dimension of the natural attitude (where the 
world is considered as it appears naturally, without any phenomeno-
logical reduction) in which the ego appears alongside pure conscious-
ness. For Sartre (ibid.: 48), the natural attitude masks consciousness's 
spontaneity, a spontaneity that is anguish-inducing. This pre-empts a 
theme that Sartre develops at length in BN, namely that of bad faith: 
by interpreting oneself as having some apparent identity in the ego, 
the subject can conceal the fact that it is in fact a pure spontaneity that 
bears full responsibility for its choices (ibid.: 48). Indeed, for Sartre, 
the distinction between voluntary and involuntary spontaneity is only 
possible if "all activity is given as emanating from a passivity that it 
transcends" (ibid.), whereas the pure spontaneity of consciousness is 
such that such a distinction is not possible. This practical dimension of 
the constitution of the ego is further developed by Sartre in the Sketch 
for a Theory of the Emotions, where he explains how emotions present 
the world in a different light, which serves the purpose of relieving us 
of the burden of acting to alter it (Sartre 1939a: 43-4). 
/ 
Self-consciousness 
A type of consciousness that is obviously of utmost importance for the 
understanding of the self, is self-consciousness. Sartre makes the impor-
tant claim that all consciousness must involve self-consciousness: this is 
described by Sartre as a form of "non-positional" consciousness (Sartre 
2004c: 7-8), and distinguished from reflection: "a consciousness has 
no need of a reflective consciousness in order to be conscious of itself" 
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(ibid.: 11).This account has the advantage of avoiding an infinite regress 
of consciousnesses that take other consciousnesses as their object. The 
claim is that consciousness is transparent, and in particular transparent 
to itself; hence it must be the case that all consciousness is conscious of 
itself. What is rather unclear, however, is where this leaves the "self", 
and indeed it appears that Sartre somewhat skirts this problem in The 
Transcendence of the Ego by referring to "consciousness of itself" rather 
than "self-consciousness". We shall see below that the danger of another 
type of infinite regress of self-consciousness leads Sartre to developing 
his theory of self-consciousness in BN in a way that will provide the 
foundation for a more developed theory of the self. 
Sartre's minimalist metaphysics of The Transcendence of the Ego do 
indeed raise two sets of questions that crystallize the concerns implicit 
in this worry, as Gardner (2009: 14-15) points out. These are related 
to fundamental phenomenological features of what it is to be a self. 
Namely: 
• Consciousness is personal. There is nothing in the above to suggest 
how any notion of personal individuality of the field of conscious-
ness can arise from the impersonal description that it amounts to. 
• Reflective consciousness has not been properly analysed: Sartre 
only made negative observations as to its not being sufficient to 
account for the immediacy of self-consciousness. But in reflec-
tion, the subject is related to herself in a way that is distinct from 
the relation of the subject to the world. An analysis of reflection 
is therefore required to account for the familiarity of the subject 
with herself as object that is encountered in reflection. 
These issues are interrelated, as we shall see, and one of the achieve-
ments of BN will indeed be to fill in the metaphysics of the self in such 
a way as to meet these two concerns. 
The self in Being and Nothingness 
Pre-reflective consciousness 
From the outset, a key feature of Sartre's analysis of consciousness in BN 
is the introduction of a pre-reflective level of consciousness. This move 
in effect recognizes a problem that has historically plagued many theo-
rie,s of self-consciousness found in the philosophical tradition. If self-
consciousness were knowledge, how would the subject consciousness 
know directly and infallibly that the object consciousness is identical to 
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it (BN1: xxviii)? As Frank (1991: 161) notes, following Henrich (1967), 
the notion of reflection does nothing to eliminate this problem (BN1: 
xxix), but rather crystallizes it: a third term that knows the identity 
of the reflecting subject and the reflected one is always required, if 
reflection is to explain the immediate acquaintance characteristic of 
self-consciousness, which leads to an infinite regress that traditional 
reflective theories of self-consciousness are open to. More directly, 
Sartre argues that I can only make sense of the act of counting my ciga-
rettes if I am aware of my consciousness of each individual cigarette, 
thus enabling me to be conscious that I now have counted up to twelve. 
Else, I would have to count my non-self-conscious consciousnesses of 
cigarettes (Gardner 2009: 46-7). This means that self-consciousness is 
a non-positional consciousness that is pre-reflective. 
What does this mean for the self? This new analysis of self-
consciousness brings out an intimacy of self-consciousness prior to 
any reflective activity. This provides the necessary grounding for the 
development of a theory of the self, a task that Sartre does indeed 
address in part 2 of Being and Nothingness. 
He describes the guiding thread of the investigation by claiming that 
the pre-reflective cogito is "homologous with the reflective cogito since 
it appears as the first necessity for non-reflective consciousness to be 
seen by itself" (BN1: 74; BN2: 98). This is a new take on the nature 
of pre-reflective consciousness, and it is a move that is well suited to 
addressing the two issues raised by Sartre's analysis of The Transcend-
ence of the Ego mentioned above. That is, by bringing reflective and 
pre-reflective consciousness closer together, it will be possible to explain 
how reflection has an immediate familiarity with its object, and to use 
reflective structures to identify the individuating characteristics of a 
for-itself. What is the justification for this move? Sartre tells us that it 
follows from the fact that "the cogito includes the nullifying charac-
teristic of existing for a witness" (BNl: 74; BN2: 98). We shall return 
to this claim later in the chapter. 
Aside from the introduction of this new take on the pre-reflective 
cogito, the phenomenon that Sartre uses to illustrate this approach 
is one of thetic consciousness, rather than positional consciousness. 
Sartre distinguishes consciousness of an object 0 (positional conscious-
ness) from consciousness that p (thetic consciousness). In both cases, 
such consciousness is transparent to itself and there is therefore a pre-
reflective consciousness that Sartre calls non-positional (no object or 
proposition is thereby posited), and which is non-thetic (BNl: xxix; 
BN2: 9-10). To characterize this, Sartre uses parentheses. So, I am 
pre-reflectively conscious (of) any positional or thetic consciousness. In 
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the case of the belief that p, this leads to the claim that I am conscious 
that I believe that p. 
In this pre-reflective consciousness lies an instability that Sartre takes 
as characteristic of the instability of the for-itself. That is, since there 
is total transparency (Sartre 2004c: 7-8), it must be the case for Sartre 
that the pre-reflective consciousness (of) a belief just is the belief. This 
necessary unity is, however, not that of the identity of being in-itself: 
"the subject and the attribute are radically different though still within 
the indissoluble unity of one and the same being" (BNl: 75; BN2: 99). 
The instability which characterizes the being of the consciousness (of) 
belief is such that "as soon as we wish to grasp this being, it slips between 
our fingers" (BNl: 75; BN2: 99): there is thus no straightforward iden-
tity between belief and the consciousness (of) belief. As Sartre explains 
(ibid.), to avoid this conclusion by claiming rather that the identity 
statement should be spelt out at the level of consciousnesses (of), so 
that there is a non-problematic identity (as that characterizing the in-
itself) between the consciousness (of) belief and the consciousness (of) 
belief, would amount to misunderstanding the role of the parentheses 
and turning the pre-reflective relation into a reflective one. 
The pre-reflective self-consciousness of belief therefore involves our 
being "faced with a pattern of duality, a game of reflections" (BNl: 7 5, 
BN2: 100). Here, Sartre has not overstepped the well-defined divide 
between the pre-reflective and the reflective. Sartre is here referring 
to "reflection" in the sense of mirroring, rather than thinking, which 
the French text distinguishes as "refleter" and "reflechir" respectively. 
The persuasiveness of any such investigation into the pre-reflective 
domain is, of course, necessarily limited by what can be grasped through 
philosophical reflection, so that an analogical grasp of "refleter" through 
"reflechir" is not necessarily misleading. And Sartre's understanding of 
consciousness as transparent to itself clearly requires that conscious-
ness and self-consciousness define a unity. But the proximity of the 
two words "refleter" and "reflechir" which lies in their common Latin 
root should not be overlooked. It is arguable that much of what Sartre 
claims about the pre-reflective cogito in the passages that follow the 
introduction of this notion of "refleter" gains its phenomenological per-
suasiveness from our experience of reflection as thinking, and the use 
of "grasp" in the passage quoted above confirms this. When Sartre talks 
of grasping ourselves as consciousness of belief, this may be striking a 
chord only in so far as we think of the reflective grasping that always 
fails to be identical with its target; and the choice of the example belief 
rather than any positional consciousness gives more plausibility to the 
notion of its thus being "troubled" (BN1: 75; BN2: 99). 
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Leaving this concern aside for now, with his understanding of pre-
reflective consciousness, the problem that Sartre has identified through 
his claim of the inherent instability at the heart of consciousness is the 
need to account for the fact that, in the case of belief for instance, there 
is both unity and a duality of belief and the consciousness (of) belief. 
Sartre examines and rejects different options for resolving this problem 
(BN1: 76-7; BN2: 100-1). First, we have Hegel's account of it as a 
"return upon itself" (BNl: 76; BN2: 100), which reveals the presence 
of infinity at the heart of the phenomenon; for Sartre, this ultimately 
amounts to reducing the for-itself to the in-itself. Second, Spinoza's 
distinction "idea-ideae" only leads to reducing this pre-reflective self-
consciousness to a duality, and thus "misses the pre-reflective phenom-
enon" (BN1: 76; BN2: 100). 
No philosophical solution appears to be able to resolve the key 
problem that Sartre claims to have identified in terms of the pithy obser-
vation that "presence is an immediate deterioration of coincidence" 
(BN1: 77; BN2: 101). And what separates the consciousness from the 
belief it is consciousness (of) is exactly nothing. This is the nothingness 
that lies at the heart of the for-itself. If the duality and unity of belief 
and the consciousness (of) it are to remain irreducible to one another, 
Sartre has an interesting way of describing their relation which intro-
duces teleology at the heart of the for-itself (thus justifying the use of 
the word "for-itself"). Namely, the consciousness (of) belief exists "in 
order to perform the act of faith" (BN1: 75; BN2: 99). This teleologi-
cal dimension echoes directly the claim noted above that is made at the 
very beginning of this analysis, namely that "existing for a witness" is 
a key feature of the for-itself (BN1: 74; BN2: 98). And it explains how 
nothingness can be said by Sartre to be "made-to-be" (BNl: 78; BN2: 
102): the for-itself is essentially a nihilation. A key manifestation of 
this teleological dimension is the phenomenon of lack, of which Sartre 
provides a detailed analysis. 
Before examining this notion of lack, let us take stock of the progress 
made by Sartre's analysis of the for-itself in Being and Nothingness 
compared with The Transcendence of the Ego. In Being and Nothing-
ness (BN1: 103-4; BN2: 128-9), Sartre explains in what ways he has 
altered his original account in Transcendence of the Ego. As we saw 
above, the account of consciousness in The Transcendence of the Ego 
stressed the error of assuming that an "I" can be found at the heart of 
the cogito. In so doing, however, it left unaddressed the issue of the 
individuality of the cogito. Each cogito is a personal one, but this was 
not explained by Sartre's account of consciousness as a transparency 
with no interior .. The account in BN does remedy this lacuna through 
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the notion of presence to oneself. In so far as I am present to myself, I 
am individuated as this person rather than another. So, without having 
to postulate some ego at the heart of consciousness, Sartre's account is 
able to account for the personal dimension of the for-itself. 
It may, however, be objected that this is a fairly minimal account. 
All it achieves is that it individuates one consciousness from another, 
thereby essentially characterizing the sense in which I am not another. 
Sartre seems aware of this and reveals a more substantial notion of per-
sonality that arises from his notion of "selfness", of which Sartre says 
that "selfness represents a degree of nihilation carried further than the 
pure presence to itself of the pre-reflective cogito" (BNl: 103; BN2: 
128). At the heart of the notion of selfness lies the Sartrean understand-
ing of the for-itself as a lack. 
The for-itself as lack and the notion of selfness 
In the introduction to Being and Nothingness, Sartre had presented the 
for-itself as a degenerate form of being, one which, as the analysis of 
the notion of presence to itself has shown, contains nothingness at its 
heart. This form of being was contrasted with the plenitude of the in-
itself which just is what it is (BNl: xii). Unlike the in-itself, the for-itself 
does not coincide with itself. In his analysis of the for-itself in part 2, 
Sartre reformulates the relation of the for-itself to the in-itself in terms 
of a dependence: the for-itself "can establish itself only in terms of the 
in-itself and against the in-itself" (BN1: 85; BN2: 109). That means 
that the for-itself establishes itself as a lack of in-itself, and Sartre uses 
examples of desire to illustrate the phenomenology of lack (BN1: 87; 
BN2: 111). What the for-itself lacks is called the for-itself possibilities. 
This lack is, moreover, the origin of transcendence for Sartre. 
"Human reality ... surpasses itself toward the particular being which 
it would be if it were what it is" (BNl: 89; BN2: 114). The being which 
thus haunts the for-itself is not just pure in-itself, for this would cor-
respond to an annihilation of consciousness. Rather, it is the impossible 
synthesis of the for-itself and the in-itself (BNl: 90; BN2: 114 ). Sartre 
adds: ''that being would be exactly the self which we have shown can 
exist only as a perpetually evanescent relation" (BNl: 90; BN2: 114). 
We thus have a notion of self "as the individual completion of the self 
which haunts itself" (BN: 91; BN2: 115). 
This defines the teleological dimension of the for-itself as a lack, 
which Sartre later describes as the "second aspect of the person" (BN1: 
104; BN2: 128), in contrast to the pure presence to itself analysed 
above, which is the first aspect. In so doing, he concurs with Heidegger 
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that this notion of "selfness" essentially involves the world. Sartre takes 
the example of a satisfied thirst (what is lacked) haunting my actual 
thirst. This "causes itself to be transcended towards the glass" of which 
this thirst is conscious (BN1: 104; BN2: 128). The glass (which is an 
in-itself) is then constituted by the for-itself as a "glass to be drunk 
from" (ibid.). This constitutes a world beyond which lies the self "which 
I am in the form of 'having to be it"' (ibid.) in so far as this self is the 
impossible for-itself (-in-itself) which has satisfied its thirst. So, the lack 
defines a desire directed to the world; this amounts to making mine 
some in-itself by interpreting it as instrumental to the satisfaction of 
my desire (this is my possibility). This in turn identifies my selfness as 
the result of this circuit that connects my desiring consciousness to a 
satisfied one. This defines the self in terms of what Sartre calls a circuit 
of ipseity (ibid.). 
We thus have a richer notion of the personal dimension of the self 
(here characterized in terms of the notion of lack and the correlative 
notion of possibility) than the mere appeal to presence to itself charac-
terizing the pre-reflective cogito. And we also have a phenomenological 
characterization of the sense in which the for-itself is having to be itself, 
one which Sartre has in effect transposed (as we saw above) into the 
very analysis of the for-itself as presence to itself. 
Reflection 
Drawing upon the phenomenology of reflection to inform his under-
standing of pre-reflective consciousness is a strategy that has another 
advantage for Sartre with respect to the relative paucity of the inter-
pretation of the nature of reflective consciousness in The Transcend-
ence of the Ego. For this relating of the pre-reflective and the reflective 
works both ways, so that it provides a more plausible account of why 
consciousness reflects upon itself. In discussing reflection, Sartre (BN1: 
150-58; EN: 196-205) criticizes traditional theories for which reflec-
tion amounts to a way of knowing one's mental states: self-knowledge 
is pre-reflective, and in any case, a phenomenora. like reflection cannot 
be explained for Sartre by reference to epistemological relations. 
Sartre's account builds upon the failure of the for-itself to coincide 
with itself in the pre-reflective structure of mirroring. The for-itself has, 
in effect, "lost itself outside itself" (BN1: 153; EN: 200). As that which 
is "having to be itself", the for-itself therefore seeks to recover its being 
by taking itself to be a unity which it apprehends as though it were a 
being in-itself, that is, a self-contained totality. But this attempt fails: in 
taking its possibilities as object of reflection, the for-itself distinguishes 
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itself from them; and this negation defines a distance from the for-
itself 's possibilities (BNl: 17 5). This lack of identity takes on a temporal 
form: I am always beyond that which I reflect upon (BNl: 154; EN: 
200). As a result, the psychological object, which is thus projected in 
reflection, fails to provide an adequate representation of the self. 
This projection of a psychological object in reflection is a key com-
ponent of Sartre's account of bad faith. For in so far as the for-itself 
flees from the abyss of its unlimited freedom (BNl: 464-5), and fails 
to recognize its nature as both facticity and freedom, it clings to an 
understanding of itself in terms of determinate psychological charac-
teristics (Sartre 2004c: 46-8; BNl: 63, 66, 473). That is, it deceives 
itself that, rather than being a for-itself who is condemned to constantly 
having to choose for himself while recognizing his groundlessness, his 
is a grounded being which has the solidity of the in-itself (BNl: 57; 
BN2: 80). 
And this has immediate moral consequences: claiming that the psy-
chological object which I wrongly claim to be has certain determina-
tions amounts to diminishing my responsibility as an agent (BNl: 57). 
But for Sartre, there are no pre-determinations to my choices (BN1: 
448-9, 459): it is all up to me, and as a result, I have to face the full 
responsibility for my acts (BN1: 553-4; BN2: 574-5). 
Conclusion 
Sartre's account of the nothingness that lies at the heart of the cogito 
has the advantage of setting up the framework for his analysis of the 
human condition as defined by a pre-reflective presence to itself, which, 
as an instable unity/duality, reveals a teleological dimension manifested 
in the notion of lack, which in turn enables the for-itself to be viewed 
as a project. Ultimately, the justification for this account, as noted at 
the outset, lies rather in Sartre's claim that consciousness has "the nul-
lifying characteristic of existing for a witness" (BNl: 74; BN2: 98). 
What grounds are there for such a claim? It would seem that these must 
lie in Sartre's anthropogenetic story about the origin of the for-itself. 
Namely, the for-itself arises from an original nihilation of the in-itself 
(BN1: 617; BN2: 637). As Gardner (2009: 69) points out, the status of 
this account is however uncertain. Is it a mere metaphysical fiction, as it 
would seem to be from the allusions to the Fall of Man? It would seem, 
h9wever, that it has to be more if it is to provide the underpinning for 
the later claims made about the for-itself 's nullifying characteristic. In 
other words, if this nullifying feature is at the heart of the for-itself, we 
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are owed an account of why that is, and the notion of a nihilation of the 
in-itself would appear to play this role. But of course, this leads directly 
to the question of why the in-itself gives rise to such a nihilation: since 
the in-itself is the inert plenitude of being, there would appear to be 
no ground in it for the "upheaval" (BN1: 617-18; BN2: 637-8) from 
which the for-itself is born. This metaphysical problem is acknowledged 
by Sartre (BNl: 619; BN2: 639), and although he discusses it, it is 
noteworthy that he provides no solution to it. 
However, even if some of the claims that are made along the way can 
be questioned, Sartre's analysis of consciousness provides a coherent 
picture of the for-itself 's mode of being from which an illuminating 
understanding of the self can emerge, an understanding which has 
crucial moral implications. 
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Contingency and ego, 
intentionality and nausea 
Steven Churchill 
The first procedure of a philosophy ought to be to expel things 
from consciousness and to re-establish its true connection with 
the world. (BN1: xxvii; BN2: 7) 
Being is without reason, without cause, and without necessity; 
the very definition of being releases to us its original contingency. 
(BNl: 619; BN2: 639) 
A man alone, tete-a-tete with the world 
The early period of Jean-Paul Sartre's career is often characterized in 
terms of his devotion to the pursuit of his literary art, along with the 
development of his nascent philosophy. The typical imagery associ-
ated with the young Sartre of the early 1930s, up until the outbreak of 
the Second World War, is therefore that of a relatively solitary writer; 
we might well picture him busily filling the sheets of paper in front 
of him with the prose flowing swiftly from his pen in a cafe or a bar, 
larg~ly oblivious to the goings-on around him. Indeed, Sartre arguably 
cemented this view of himself, by describing his self-image during this 
period as that of "a man alone" (Sartre 1977a: 45). 
By contrast, the post-war imagery commonly associated with Sartre 
is that of the "engaged writer", using his words as a means of com-
n;ienting on - and indeed actively fighting for - the social and political 
causes of his day. Accordingly, Sartre's life and works are often divided 
in half, with literature trumping politics on one side of the pre-war/ 
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post-war divide, and literature serving as a vehicle for political engage-
ment on the other. 
Rightly, this rather simplistic division has increasingly come under 
scrutiny from Sartre scholars, particularly in the years following Sar-
tre's death. It remains open to us to reposition the notions of "engage-
ment" or "commitment" as it applies to Sartre's works. Rather than 
referring exclusively to Sartre's later, explicitly political writings, we 
might also employ these notions in referring to Sartre's foundational 
desire for philosophy to address itself directly to worldly experience. 
From this vantage-point, Sartre's view of his younger self as "a man 
alone" may be reinterpreted; although Sartre's general attitude towards 
the role of the writer in society might well be said to have favoured 
aloofness over direct political action, his philosophical perspective 
consistently resembled that of a man seeking to shape up to the world, 
as a fighter would to his opponent. In this sense, we may reasonably 
regard Sartre early on in his career as a man seeking constantly to 
engage with the world head-to-head, so to speak, in both philosophi-
cal and literary terms. 
Realism 
Sartre's drive toward engagement with the very stuff of existence began 
with his decision, from his earliest studies in philosophy, "in favour of 
Realism" (de Beauvoir 1988: 157). Sartre recounted in a 1974 interview 
with Simone de Beauvoir: 
I turned thoroughly against Idealism when I was taught it. I had 
two good years of philosophy before going to Ecole Normale [in 
1924], and there I had only one idea - that any theory that did 
not state that consciousness perceived exterior objects as they 
were, was doomed to failure. (Ibid.) 
Sartre understood his perceptual realism as necessarily having socio-
political implications. If one sees things as they really are, then one is 
able to critique the lives of those blinded to reality by their own moral 
and intellectual hypocrisy; for Sartre, those living in bourgeois society 
represented the very epitome of such hypocrisy. From Sartre's perspec-
tive, those immersed in bourgeois ideology carried on with tawdry 
affairs, all the while preaching the virtues of chastity and monogamy; 
they exploited those in their employ, all the while preaching the virtues 
of charity and kindness. In other words, the bourgeoisie lived mired in 
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self-deception, on Sartre's view; he would later famously describe the 
phenomenon of self-deception at length, in his first great philosophical 
work Being and Nothingness: An Essay in Phenomenological Ontology 
(Sartre 1943a, 1958a), in terms of "bad faith" -the refusal to recognize 
the true extent of one's freedom, and to assume the full weight of the 
responsibility it entails. Sartre described this brash brand of perceptual 
and political realism as his "opposition aesthetics". He developed this 
view in the midst of an informal discussion group at the elite Ecole 
Normale Superieure in Paris. Meeting sporadically throughout Sartre's 
time at Ecole Normale from 1924 through to 1929, the group con-
sisted intermittently of Sartre himself, his life-long companion Simone 
de Beauvoir (from 1929), and friends including Raymond Aron, Paul 
Nizan and others; they referred to themselves as les petits camarades 
- classmates, peers, comrades. De Beauvoir describes her perspective 
on the group in these terms: 
[They] set out to prove that men were not rarefied spirits but 
bodies of flesh and bone, racked by physical needs and crudely 
engaged in a brutal adventure that was life ... all they asked of 
me was that I should dare to do what I had always longed to do: 
look reality in the face. (de Beauvoir 1963: 336-7) 
Although Realism proved crucial to the early intellectual development 
of both Sartre and de Beauvoir, each of their comrades ultimately came 
to walk their own intellectual path. Nizan, for example, wrote against 
Marxist Realism long before Sartre's own turn toward Marxism. 
Radical contingency (contra Nietzsche's early romanticism) 
Sartre's interpretation of realism, meanwhile, led him to grapple inten-
sively with the contingency of existence, such that contingency became 
the defining "big idea" of the early part of his career. To say that exist-
ence is contingent, is to hold that there is no guiding hand of necessity 
that governs existence. The world does not have to be as it is, such 
that things could be otherwise; indeed, nothing need be, at all. At this 
point, the full extent of the radicalism associated with Sartre's idea of 
contingency begins to become clear; to say that anything is possible in a 
contingent world, means just that. Simone de Beauvoir writes of Sartre's 
early view of contingency in terms of a deliberately dangerous attitude 
on his part. De Beauvoir recounts that, in debates with Raymond Aron 
regarding contingency: 
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Sartre went to unheard of extremes in his total rejection of univer-
sals. To him, general laws and concepts and all such abstractions 
were nothing but hot air: people, he maintained, ail agreed to 
accept them because they effectively masked a reality which men 
found alarming. He, on the other hand, wanted to grapple with 
this living reality. (de Beauvoir 1983: 31) 
The practical implications of Sartre's early radicalism with regard to 
contingency are nothing short of dramatic; on Sartre's account, one 
would have to countenance the possibility that a dropped glass would 
not fall to the ground and smash, but would instead remain floating in 
mid-air, or sprout wings and fly about, or do any number of other things 
besides. In other words, the whole of reality would have to be under-
stood as underpinned by an increasingly flimsy consensus, as opposed 
to a firm series of evidentially verifiable laws. Physics, mathematics 
and indeed the pure sciences generally, would all have to be drastically 
re-evaluated (if not tossed aside altogether), were Sartre's view to be 
taken to its logical conclusion. Sartre's "theory of contingency", as he 
called it, thereby coincided with his realist thirst after personal and 
political authenticity; a view of existence as contingent, after all, is 
conceived entirely in opposition to the notion that there is (or ought 
to be) a necessary order of things, serving as the ultimate justification 
for maintaining the status quo. 
In seeking to come to grips with the philosophical foundations of 
Sartre's view of apparently "necessary" laws, principles and so on as 
concealing the underlying contingency of existence, we might examine 
Sartre's relation to Friedrich Nietzsche's philosophy. In setting out to 
examine the Nietzsche-Sartre relation, it must be noted that Sartre 
himself tended to minimize the extent of Nietzsche's influence upon his 
philosophy. When questioned on the matter in a 1975 interview, Sartre 
claimed that he remembered "giving a seminar paper on Nietzsche in 
my third year at Ecole Normale" (i.e. in 1927), and that Nietzsche 
"interested me like many others" (i.e. like many other philosophers); 
Sartre asserted, though, that ultimately Nietzsche "never stood for 
anything in particular in my eyes" (Sartre 1981 b: 9). This ambivalent 
attitude towards the influence of Nietzsche's philosophy upon him later 
in life, would appear to sit convincingly alongside Sartre's youthful 
aggression toward Nietzscheans at Ecole Normale; Sartre threwwater-
balloons on them, shouting "Thus pissed Zarathustra! ", in a mocking 
reference to Nietzsche's masterpiece, Thus Spake Zarathustra (ibid.). 
Despite Sartre,s seeming reticence toward Nietzsche, however, there 
is genuine evidence to suggest that Nietzsche's perspective influenced 
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the development of Sartre's view of contingency. The third-year semi-
nar paper that Sartre referred to, for instance, was framed by the topic 
"Was Nietzsche a philosopher?". In responding to the topic, Sartre 
argued for a view of Nietzsche as a non-philosopher, who had revealed 
the extent to which all value-concepts were ultimately contingent, in 
the sense that they were not immanent, or otherwise "of the world"; 
rather, value-concepts were imposed by individuals upon the objects 
around them. On closer inspection, Sartre held, these apparently "nec-
essary" structures of truth and meaning supposedly underpinning our 
existence, reveal themselves as fickle, transient and, indeed, absurd. 
The view of Nietzsche as a non-philosopher who was nonetheless 
engaged in revaluing foundational notions of truth and meaning, would 
appear to coincide with views Sartre had held regarding Nietzsche for 
some time - prior even to 1927. For instance, in 1924 (at around the 
age of nineteen) Sartre recorded his view of Nietzsche in one of his 
notebooks, as follows: "Nietzsche. He is a poet who had the misfortune 
of having been taken for a philosopher ... he will always have success 
with those who prefer the form of ideas to their exchange" (Sartre 
1990: 471). 
In addition to Sartre's seminar paper and his assertions as a young 
man regarding Nietzsche, there is Sartre's creative work from the mid-
to late 1920s to be considered. In 1926, at around the age of twenty-
one, Sartre mentioned "writing about contingency" (Sartre 1974a: 5-6) 
in his correspondence with Simone J ollivet (also known as Simone 
Camille-Sans), his first "serious" love, prior to Simone de Beauvoir. 
J ollivet was a talented actress, starring on the French stage and screen, 
before ultimately declining into depression and alcoholism later in life. 
Now, during their brief romance (frustrated as it was by Sartre's inability 
to travel to Toulouse regularly to visit Jollivet), she revealed to Sartre 
her fascination with Nietzsche's philosophy. In response, Sartre wrote 
a semi-autobiographical novel over 1927-8, intended as a modern-
day retelling of Nietzsche's relationships with both Richard Wagner 
and his wife Cosima - the so-called Tribschen triangle (Sartre 1990: 
189-286). A Defeat does not see Sartre explicitly assert that existence 
is contingent (at least, not in the extant Empedocles section). Argu-
ably, the novel was intended by Sartre to serve primarily as a kind of 
literary confessional for personal revelations regarding his personal 
relationships at the time (both with Jollivet and others), rather than 
as an explicitly philosophical allegory. Yet Sartre positions the figure 
of the philosopher - through the character of Frederic, and therefore 
himself - as an individual who is able to conceive of the possibilities 
(but also the fundamental constraints) which arise in a world where 
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we are free to interpret our situation in varied ways, in the absence 
of "necessary" states of affairs. Despite its role in the development of 
Sartre's ideas and also his literary technique, A Defeat was rejected for 
publication by Gallimard. 
Around the same time (1927-8), Sartre worked on another Nietz-
schean novel project, Er the Armenian. Sartre intended this reworking 
of Plato's myth of Er, which appears at the conclusion of the Republic, 
as an examination of the theme of contingency in relation to moral 
value-concepts. In Plato's version of the myth, a man named Er (son of 
Armenios) dies in battle. Er's body remains undecomposed. Two days 
later he revives on his funeral pyre and tells others of his journey in the 
afterlife. The myth thereby introduces the idea that moral people are 
rewarded and immoral people punished after death. 
In Sartre's rendering of the myth, however, Good and Evil are absent 
from the world itself, which is shown to be morally innocent. Sartre 
has Prometheus (the mythical Titan responsible for creating humans 
from clay, and punished by the gods for stealing fire for humankind's 
use) state that the situation of humankind would be bettered if the gods 
were vanquished. Prometheus asserts that "When the gods will be van-
quished, there will be no more Evil on earth" (Sartre 1990: 322). This 
sentiment is broadly akin to the one Nietzsche expresses in an aphorism 
entitled "From paradise" in The Gay Science (Nietzsche 2001: §259). 
The classic biblical role of the snake as the tempter who brought about 
Adam and Eve's fall from grace is re-valued by Nietzsche, with the 
snake now positioned as the bringer of an anti-objectivist conception of 
morality, that paints moral absolutism as a form of divinely sanctioned 
bigotry. Nietzsche has the snake say: "Good and Evil are the prejudices 
of God" (ibid.: 150). 
Sartre's early attempts to express his intuitions regarding contin-
gency through his experimentations with Nietzschean ideas may well 
be viewed as lacking philosophical depth; indeed, in the case of his 
attempt to step into Nietzsche's shoes inA Defeat, Sartre's literary effort 
may seem pretentious, rather than a genuine homage. Yet, if we take 
together Sartre's earliest intuitions regarding realism with his radical 
view of contingency, then we are left with the view that the apparently 
"necessary" state of things serves, in fact, to conceal a reality where 
there are no guarantees. We are not just sent "down the rabbit-hole", 
so to speak, but hurtling down it, with no end in sight; a seemingly 
bottomless void. This is a view that can be examined via Nietzsche's 
early metaphysics of tragedy, in particular. 
In The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche (1993) asserts that civilization 
is an illusion, constituted on the surface of the striving power that 
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constitutes the whole of existence. Nietzsche refers to this striving 
power as the will (in a nod to Arthur Schopenhauer's philosophy). 
The will was represented in ancient Greek tragedy, on Nietzsche's 
interpretation, by the satyr chorus. Nietzsche asserts that the ancient 
Greeks were able to affirm their existence to themselves by casting-off 
the veil of civilization that cast them in the role of individuated subjects 
or persons, and returning to their original state of nature in primor-
dial unity as satyrs, as pure will. In this way, Nietzsche argues, the 
Greeks were able to achieve a deep-going "metaphysical consolation" 
(ibid.: 39), in spite of their existential sufferings; the will, after all, is 
shown to be "indestructibly powerful and pleasurable", on Nietzsche's 
view (ibid.: 39). This supreme life-affirmation, though, could only be 
achieved through the Greeks' drive to grapple with the existential con-
sequences of their realization of the illusion of civilization; in realizing 
the absurdity of existence, according to Nietzsche, we are ''repulsed" 
(ibid.: 40). It was in spite of this repulsive absurdity, Nietzsche argues, 
that the Greeks found their respite, indeed their salvation, in their art, 
in their tragedies. The dialogic portion of ancient tragedy, according 
to Nietzsche, was governed by the art-impulse associated with the 
Greek god of light, learning and dream-seeing, Apollo. Meanwhile, 
the orchestral, musically driven aspect of tragedy was governed by 
the art-impulse associated with the god of ecstatic excess, Dionysus. 
By allowing these two oppositional art-impulses to come together in 
a titanic struggle, Nietzsche holds, the Greeks created a supreme art-
form (ibid.: 32-40). 
Now, the young Nietzsche's view of the absurdity of existence as 
"repulsive", is one that ought to resonate strongly with Sartre scholars, 
despite the fact that Nietzsche did not imbue the experience with the 
precise psychological character that Sartre attributes to it. 
In Sartre's first published novel, entitled Nausea (Sartre 1938, 2007), 
the narrator, thirty-year-old dejected historian Antoine Roquentin, is 
repeatedly struck by nauseating qualms, which he records along with 
other day-to-day happenings and musings, initially on loose pages and 
then in a notebook. After years of travel, Roquentin has settled in the 
fictiOnal seaport town of Bouville (roughly translated from French, 
Bouville means "mud-town"), to concentrate on his historical research 
focused on the life and times of a fictional eighteenth-century political 
figure, the Marquis de Rollebon. 
In the winter of 1932, however, Roquentin first tastes the "sweetish 
s~ckness" (Sartre 2007: 11) he comes to call "the nausea" (ibid.: 18). 
From then on, this curious sensation of fearful, overwhelming disgust 
slowly seeps into every aspect of his existence (including his historical 
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research, his sexual life, and his relationships with other people in 
general), driving him seemingly beyond the limits of his sanity. At first, 
Roquentin ascribes his malaise to the failure of a central project in his 
life. The subject of his historical research, the Marquis, will no longer 
"come alive" for him, so to speak. The Marquis's dying "for the second 
time'', in this sense, thereby robs Roquentin of a justification for his 
work, and indeed, for his very existence (ibid.: 96). Roquentin also 
attempts to take refuge in his past, with a French-speaking English-
woman named Anny with whom he was once intimate; it soon becomes 
clear, though, that Roquentin's recollections of Anny no longer match 
with the woman now before him. Indeed, the reader is left wonder-
ing whether Roquentin's view of Anny ever had any real substance, to 
begin with (ibid.: 135). Roquentin's feelings of repulsion and disgust 
("the nausea"), are eventually revealed for him as having its source 
not in any one project, event or relationship, but rather in the sheer 
fact of Being, in the sheer fact of existence itself. The fact of exist-
ence is thereby unveiled not as an abstract epistemological designation 
bestowed upon things by academicians, but as a real and immediate 
presence in the world. 
Roquentin is struck by the appearance of a chestnut tree root nearby 
the bench where he is sitting in a park, and it proves quite literally to 
be the "root" of the whole drama that has been unfolding up to this 
point. He realizes it has lost its significance for him, its essence as a 
chestnut tree, an essence he had thought of as stable, permanent, even 
eternal. Ultimately, this stripping-away of essences that were, in fact, 
accumulated by a fragile consensus in the first place, comes to apply to 
everything for Roquentin. Sartre has Roquentin say: 
I couldn't remember it [that is, the chestnut tree root] was a root 
any more. The words had vanished and with them the significance 
of things, their methods of use, and the feeble points of reference 
which men have traced on their surface. I was sitting, stooping 
forward, head bowed, alone in front of this black, knotty mass, 
entirely beastly, which frightened me. Then I had this vision. It left 
me breathless. Never, until these last few days, had I understood 
the meaning of "existence". I was like the others, like the ones 
walking along the seashore, all dressed in their spring finery. I 
said, like them, "The ocean is green; that white speck up there is 
a seagull," but I didn't feel that it existed or that the seagull was an 
"existing seagull"; usually existence hides itself. It is there, around 
us, in us, it is us, you can't say two words without mentioning it, 
but you can never touch it. (Ibid.: 127) 
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Sartre soon has Roquentin make the transition from this experience 
with the tree root that implies the idea of contingency, to a more formal-
ized conception of contingency that makes clear the weight of respon-
sibility associated with the radical freedom that it entails. This time, 
he has Roquentin state: 
The essential thing is contingency. I mean that one cannot define 
existence as necessity. To exist is simply to be there; those who 
exist let themselves be encountered, but you can never deduce any-
thing from them. I believe there are people who have understood 
this. Only they tried to overcome this contingency by inventing a 
necessary, causal being. But no necessary being can explain exist-
ence: contingency is not a delusion, a probability which can be 
dissipated; it is the absolute, consequently, the perfect free gift. 
All is free, this park, this city and myself. When you realize that, 
it turns your heart upside down and everything begins to float ... 
Here is Nausea; here there is what those bastards ... try to hide 
from themselves with their idea of their rights. But what a poor 
lie: no one has any rights; they are entirely free, like other men, 
they cannot succeed in not feeling superfluous. And in themselves, 
secretly, they are superfluous, that is to say, amorphous, vague, 
and sad. (Ibid.: 131) 
Despite the prescient similarities we have considered regarding Sar-
tre and Nietzsche's early views regarding the illusion of apparently 
"necessary" states of affairs concealing the absurdity of the underly-
ing contingency of existence, Roquentin is no Dionysian disciple in 
the mould of the young Nietzsche; he does not find respite from his 
nausea (let alone ecstatic life-affirmation) in supreme artistic struggle 
and expression, even after his revelation in the park. It is true that 
Roquentin sees a slim hope of re-inventing himself at the conclusion 
of his diary, intimating that he might give up writing history and write 
fictiqn instead, after seeing a potential niche in existence for himself 
while listening to his favourite record, "Some of These Days". He 
asserts that this hypothetical fiction would have to be: ''A story, for 
example, something that could never happen, an adventure. It would 
have to be beautiful and hard as steel and make people ashamed of 
their existence" (ibid.: 178). 
, This faint outline of a possible fictional plot comes after Roquentin's 
assertion earlier on, that he would "be better off writing a novel on the 
Marquis de Rollebon" (ibid.: 58). In other words, semi-biographical 
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fiction is swapped for fiction proper by Roquentin, as a possible means 
of fundamentally reinvigorating himself. We might read Sartre here as 
asserting, through Roquentin, that fiction actually brings us closer to 
the "truth of things" than non-fiction, such as historical biography. 
Rather than trying to resurrect an historical existence and treat it as 
if it were real in the present, as Roquentin had tried and failed to do 
with his study of the Marquis, one can accept the fundamental unreal-
ity of fiction as capable of penetrating the very depths of existence. We 
have seen that this is possible with regard to Sartre's - and therefore 
Roquentin's - idea of contingency. Indeed, we might read Nausea as 
Roquentin's hypothetical novel, incorporating biographical elements 
with intrigues worthy of an adventure. Roquentin's hope for personal 
revitalization through creativity, though, is expressed as a tentative 
sort of hope, and nothing like the kind of powerful life-affirmation 
Nietzsche envisages. Whereas Nietzsche offered a vision of communal 
salvation from contingency in the form of therapeutic art, then, Sartre 
held that contingency could not be overcome, or even placated, by an 
affirmative force (whether artistic or otherwise), because such a power 
was simply absent from a truly contingent world. 
In 1929, the year he graduated from Ecole Normale, Sartre submit-
ted his philosophical intuitions to a literary journal (Les Nouvelles lit-
teraires) seeking submissions from students. In his piece, Sartre wrote 
(in part) to underscore the anti-Romantic, anti-vitalistic view of contin-
gency he had been developing in contrast to the young Nietzsche. Sartre 
argues that there can be "no such thing" as an indestructibly powerful 
and pleasurable Will underlying all things; this is plainly evidenced, 
on Sartre's account, by the general frailty and feebleness of existence. 
Sartre argues that "Everything is too weak" to have ever been under-
pinned by such a well-spring of lively energy. Indeed, Sartre opposes 
Nietzsche's life-affirming Romanticism further still, in explicitly ascrib-
ing a feel of morbidity to this weakness; Sartre writes that "all things 
carry the seeds of their own death" (de Beauvoir 1963: 342-3 ). Sartre 
appears later to draw on this early critique of Nietzsche's Romantic 
vitalism in Nausea, when he has Roquentin say:/ 
There were those idiots who came to tell you about will-power 
and struggle for life. Hadn't they ever seen a beast or a tree? 
This plane-tree with its scaling bark, this half-rotten oak, they 
wanted me to take them for rugged youthful endeavour surging 
towards the sky. And that root? I would have undoubtedly had 
to represent it as a voracious claw tearing at the earth, devouring 
its food. (Sartre 2007: 133) 
53 
JEAN-PAUL SARTRE: KEY CONCEPTS 
For Sartre, then, a view of all things as underpinned by a vitality nur-
tured by ongoing struggle requires too great an embellishment of the 
real state of things, as he understands it. Things are understood by him 
in terms of a mortal apathy, a pervasive listlessness. 
Phenomenology: a way forward 
Sartre's fundamental desire to maintain his radicalism while formalizing 
his ideas was eventually realized through his engagement with Edmund 
Husserl's phenomenology. The term phenomenology is derived from 
two ancient Greek words: phain6menon (that which appears) and logos 
(study). Phenomenology, then, is a philosophical methodology for the 
study of the phenomena that appear in acts of consciousness; phenom-
enology's central aim therefore lies in revealing nature of consciousness 
and its objects, through the methodical and meticulous description of 
appearances in experience. Husserl asserts that the object is always 
given to a subject, and the subject is always directed towards an object; 
in other words, Husserl deftly succeeds in abolishing the subject/object 
divide between consciousness and the world. 
From around 1933 onwards, Sartre read little else in philosophy 
except Husserl, with this period of intense study eventually conclud-
ing around 1939, only to give way to his close reading of Martin 
Heidegger's philosophy. By taking up the study of Husserl's works with 
such single-minded passion, Sartre had certainly left behind the brash 
intuitive simplicity of his earlier realism. Indeed, it may be thought that 
Sartre had retreated from his uncompromising initial assertion: namely, 
that philosophy ought to be founded on the claim that consciousness 
perceives things purely and simply as they are. Rather than abandon-
ing his earlier realist intuitions, though, Sartre saw himself as realizing 
their rightful fruition, by grasping the real just as it is, through phe-
nomenological description. Although Sartre did not interpret Husserl 
himself as advancing a philosophy of Realism per se, then, he neverthe-
less regarded his general goal of engaging directly with the world as 
it really is, as one he shared with Husserl. Sartre was now convinced 
that philosophy could address itself to the world as he saw and touched 
things, as he loved and fought with others, as he drank and smoked in 
bars; everything was now up for philosophical discussion. 
Of course, Sartre also faced certain challenges in becoming a phe-
nomenologist. Perhaps the most pressing of these was to integrate his 
realist sensibilities and his accompanying intuitions regarding existential 
contingency into a phenomenological framework; Husserl's account of 
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the structures of consciousness and conscious experience would have 
to be purified of any elements that stood in the way of Sartre's radical 
worldview of contingency. 
fortunately, Sartre was presented with a timely opportunity to work 
through the philosophical underpinnings of his existential phenom-
enology. Taking leave from his first academic post as a high-school 
philosophy professor at Le Havre in provincial France, Sartre trav-
elled to Berlin over the course of 1933-4 in order to study Husserl's 
writings intensively at the Maison Academique Francaise, the French 
institute in Berlin; meanwhile, Raymond Aron swapped places with 
Sartre at Le Havre. During this period, Sartre completed two philo-
sophical texts that both drew upon, and deviated in crucial respects, 
from Husserl's philosophy; a long essay entitled The Transcendence 
of the Ego (Sartre 1957a) and a short text entitled "Intentionality: 
a Fundamental Idea of Husserl's Phenomenology" (Sartre 1970). In 
addition to these philosophical texts, Sartre also worked on drafting 
his Factum on Contingency, a forerunner to Nausea. We have already 
seen that it is possible (indeed, desirable) to interpret Sartre's early 
view of contingency in relation to Sartre's dramatization of Roquen-
tin's discovery of contingency in Nausea. Given that Sartre wrote his 
philosophical texts in Berlin alongside his drafting of the Factum, it 
would seem reasonable to interpret Transcendence and Intentionality 
in relation to Nausea, as well. 
Ego 
In The Transcendence of the Ego, Sartre argues that Husserl's concep-
tion of the ego as transcendental, in the sense of its being included 
in consciousness, is inconsistent with his earlier views. In his Logical 
Investigations, published in 1900-1901, Husserl raises the tentative 
possibility that the ego might not, in fact, inhabit consciousness; he 
suggests that the ego may be an inert object for consciousness (Husserl 
2001a: 202-4). In the first volume of his 1913 work Ideas Pertain-
ing to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy 
(Husserl 1983), however, Husserl claims that such a perspective would 
involve a strange sort of transcendence for the ego. He describes this 
transcendence as one that is not constituted - a transcendence within 
immanence. 
This was a philosophically peculiar position to hold in Husserl's 
view, and he was no longer prepared to entertain it as a possibility as his 
philosophy developed (ibid.: 133). Sartre argues that Husserl's change 
55 
JEAN-PAUL SARTRE: KEY CONCEPTS 
of heart with regard to the ego is philosophically inconsistent with his 
view of consciousness as intentional; one might even say that Sartre 
accuses Husserl of being in "bad faith" in this regard. Sartre reasons 
that if consciousness is fundamentally consciousness "of" something in 
the world, as Husserl claims it is, then no psychical object, least of all 
a transcendental ego, should continue to be included in consciousness. 
Accordingly, Sartre wrenches the ego out from its supposed hiding-
place somewhere "behind" consciousness, and leaves it exposed to the 
travails of existence. In his introductory paragraph, Sartre succinctly 
describes his philosophical perspective, as well as his aims, in the fol-
lowing terms: 
For most philosophers the ego is an "inhabitant" of consciousness. 
Some affirm its formal presence at the heart of Erlebnisse [Hus-
serl's term for "acts" or "states" of consciousness] as an empty 
principle of unification. Others - psychologists for the most part 
- claim to discover its material presence, as the centre of desires 
and acts, in each moment of our psychic life. I should like to show 
here that the ego is neither formally nor materially in conscious-
ness: it is outside, in the world. It is a being of the world, like the 
ego of another. (Sartre 2004c: 1) 
Consciousness, then, becomes quite literally self-less for Sartre, a totally 
transparent nothing. Consciousness purified of a transcendental Ego is 
constantly in the process of overflowing itself, of reaching out into the 
world in free pursuit of its possibilities. Sartre's view of self-creation 
here is understood in terms of a spontaneous, moment-to-moment 
process, that is never entirely "finished" in its becoming. Here, then, 
is a nascent formulation of Sartre's famous maxim, "existence precedes 
essence" (Sartre 2001: 28). 
Sartre's choice of title is instructive here in its double meaning. The 
"transcendence of the ego" may initially be understood to refer simply 
to the subject of Sartre's inquiry, in that Sartre wants to show that the 
ego, is transcendent, in so far as it is not an inhabitant of consciousness 
on, in his view. At the same time, though, the title can also be taken to 
refer to an active exhortation from Sartre to his reader, to transcend 
the culturally and intellectually pervasive conception of the ego as 
"transcendental", in the sense of its being included in consciousness, 
which is invoked by Husserl. In other words, Sartre's chosen title may 
pe understood as capturing both the conception of the ego he is advo-
cating, as well as the one from Husserl that he is opposing. At base, 
Sartre regards this view of selfhood and self-creation as the optimal 
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foundation for an ethics and a politics that is outward-looking, worldly, 
and above all, positive. 
Having now outlined the arguments put forward by Sartre in con-
trast to Husserl in Transcendence, we might now examine them closely. 
Sartre gratefully acknowledges that Husserl's phenomenological 
method places him, as a philosopher, right in the midst of the objects 
of his experience. Yet Sartre seeks to show that Husserl needlessly 
doubles his conception of selfhood; Husserl identifies both a worldly 
psycho-physical self that is readily referred to by ourselves and by others 
as we go about living in the natural attitude, and a transcendental ego, 
that survives the epoche as an aspect of the fundamental structure of 
consciousness. Sartre refers to Husserl's transcendental ego as the "I", 
and to the empirical, worldly ego as the "Me". On Sartre's view, the 
very terms provided by Husserl's own methodology, ought to rule out 
the existence of an "I" that sits "behind" the "Me"; the epoche, Sartre 
reasons, is supposed to involve a suspension of any such fundamental 
existential assumptions and prejudices (Sartre 2004c: 5). 
Sartre's critique of Husserl's holding-on to· a transcendental Ego 
is not only based in his claim that Husserl's implementation of phe-
nomenology (and in particular the epoche) lacks philosophical consci-
entiousness and rigour; Sartre also claims that Husserl's conception 
of the transcendental Ego would result in an explicit act of violence 
being perpetrated upon consciousness. Sartre conceives of Husserl's 
transcendental Ego as "slicing through" each moment of conscious 
activity like "an opaque blade", which would lead to the "death" of 
consciousness (ibid.: 7). A transcendental Ego would act to govern, and 
therefore weigh down consciousness, on Sartre's view, and he claims 
consciousness cannot be limited "except by itself" (ibid.: 7). Sartre 
acknowledges that one might argue that a transcendental Ego is the 
source of consciousness, without holding that a transcendental Ego is 
the master of consciousness. However, Sartre claims, nothing can be 
the source of consciousness, except consciousness itself. 
On Sartre's account, consciousness is purified of a weighty transcen-
dental Ego, leaving only a worldly "me". He then seeks to account for 
our experience of an "I" as sitting, in some sense, "behind", or "under-
neath" our immediate experience. According to Sartre, Descartes was 
not being misled when his methodical, introspective method of doubt 
revealed the cogito, or the "I think"; nor was Husserl being deceived 
when he discerned a transcendental Ego undisturbed the epoche 
(ibid.: 9). Where Descartes and Husserl both went wrong, though, 
on Sartre's account, was to presume that they were encountering an 
"I" that had been there all along. Sartre argues that what was actually 
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occurring for Descartes and Husserl (as well as for anyone undertaking 
similar introspection) was the discovery of personalized consciousness, 
instantaneously created through reflection. In other words, Sartre holds 
that introspection does not reveal an "I", but instead creates one, at the 
very moment introspection takes place (ibid.: 11). 
On this basis, Sartre asserts that we ought to approach with extreme 
caution the idea that it is possible to derive a solid ground for knowl-
edge through introspective reflection, since it is in fact a seductive 
psychological mirage of sorts, which is often dubious, if not downright 
dishonest, in terms of the information it purports to provide us. Indeed, 
in the concluding section of The Transcendence of the Ego, Sartre asserts 
that all of the dramas people typically associate with their "inner life", 
including doubts, remorse and various emotional crises of the kind 
that people tend to record in diaries, are not features of our "inner 
selves" that are laid bare through introspection; rather, Sartre argues, 
these forms of inward-looking subject matter are "mere representa-
tions", that materialize along with the "I", upon introspection (ibid.: 
43 ). Sartre is not claiming, it must be said, that our "inner lives" are 
of no consequence for us in terms of our attitude toward existence; 
rather, his claim is that we tend to treat what he regards as essentially 
transient and ephemeral thoughts, feelings and so on, as if they were 
immutable features of our self-hood, as it were, that cannot be grappled 
with, much less overcome. 
It is especially interesting that in Transcendence Sartre invokes diary-
writing as an example of what he regards as the inherent folly in self-
scrutiny. After all, it is precisely this diary format that is employed to 
great literary effect by Sartre in Nausea. If Sartre's claims regarding 
self-exposes in Transcendence are anything to go by, then we must at the 
very least entertain the possibility that Sartre intends Roquentin's diary 
entries to be understood as a fundamentally futile exercise, revealing 
little more than red herrings and half-truths. These accounts, after all, 
are proffered by a poor witness: Roquentin's introspective "I" (Sartre 
2007: 3). On the other hand, we might also interpret Sartre as assert-
ing t,hat one can overcome the illusion crafted by the introspective "I" 
(even if only momentarily) by attending closely to the objects of our 
worldly experience (ibid.: 2). 
Having claimed that a transcendental ego is absent from conscious-
ness, but also that the appearance of an "I" is created when we undertake 
introspective reflection, Sartre then makes a much brasher assertion; 
namely, that an "I" is absent from unreflective consciousness. Initially, 
this phenomenon seems impossible to describe, given that unreflective 
consciousness is, by definition, resistant to its being reflected-upon, let 
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alone to its being phenomenologically described. It falls to Sartre to 
demonstrate how we might give expression to the absence of the ''I" in 
un-reflective consciousness, in a way that does not defeat the very pur-
pose of the exercise, by invoking personalized reflection. Sartre argues 
that unreflective consciousness can be demonstrated with recourse to 
memory; by carefully retrieving an experience in which we did not enter 
into reflection, Sartre argues, we may describe this situation without 
"disturbing" its unreflective quality. Sartre gives some substance to the 
role he envisages here for memory, through the experience of reading 
a particularly engrossing book. 
Suppose I attempt to recreate the moment in which I was com-
pletely "involved", so to speak, in reading a book, such that I was 
no longer reflecting on the very fact of my reading as a personalized 
act, such that I was no longer reflecting on the fact that it was "I" 
who was reading. This moment was the precise moment in which 
an un-reflected consciousness, in Sartre's phrase, appeared. When I 
attempt to re-create that precise moment, I realize that although I am 
conscious "of" the book, conscious "of" the characters, the plot and 
so on, I am also aware that there is no "I" present in this experience. 
It is, therefore, not a case of describing an experience in which "I" am 
reading about a detective tracking down a murderer; there is only the 
detective's gruff demeanour, his penchant for cigarettes and whisky, 
his mistress's voluptuous figure, the murderer's sadistic cruelty, and 
so on. Everything is happening, but there is no sense of anything hap-
pening for me (Sartre 2004c: 12). In this way, the absence of an "I" 
in unreflective consciousness is demonstrated, without recourse to 
reflection (or at least, without recourse to the kind of reflection that 
would undermine Sartre's point). Although Sartre acknowledges that 
this demonstration of un-reflective consciousness lacks the apodictic 
certainty typically associated with phenomenological description due 
to the fallibility of memory, he nonetheless regards this method as the 
only suitable one for demonstrating the absence of the "I" in unreflec-
tive consciousness. 
Following Sartre's demonstration to his satisfaction that a transcen-
dental ego is absent from consciousness (even unreflective conscious-
ness), he offers an account of how the one and only ego he does accept 
- the psycho-physical, worldly ''me" - is constituted. 
Sartre asserts that his conception of the ego is constituted of states, 
qualities and actions, with the ego serving to unify each of these enti-
ties as they are constituted in relation to consciousness. Having made a 
distinction between the various entities comprising the ego as they are 
constituted in relation to consciousness (ibid.: 21), Sartre then makes 
59 
JEAN-PAUL SARTRE: KEY CONCEPTS 
a rather startling claim: namely, that this relation between the "me" 
with its various entities and consciousness must be described in entirely 
magical terms (ibid.: 26). According to Sartre, this "magical" think-
ing is necessary because the lived spontaneity of conscious subjectivity 
cannot be grasped by a standard phenomenological framework that 
is concerned primarily with physical, rather than psychical, objects. 
Sartre asserts that, whereas physical objects are inert and reciprocally 
limited and defined by their relation to other such objects, conscious-
ness is absolute and spontaneous. To demonstrate how this "magical" 
relation between the "me" and consciousness functions in practice, 
Sartre invokes a concrete emotional example, that of disgust. In eve-
ryday terms, we typically think of feelings of disgust towards someone 
as the effect of a state of hatred. Yet the spontaneity of consciousness 
that Sartre envisages means that such absolute causal links between a 
state (in this case, hatred) and an episode of consciousness (in this case, 
feelings of disgust toward someone in the world) are invalidated. Sartre 
argues that in the absence of a firm causal relation between psychical 
states and episodes of consciousness, we must rely on the "magical,, 
notion of emanation, whereby a state does not ''cause" a particular 
outcome or effect in an absolute sense, but instead, an effect proceeds 
from a state (ibid.: 25). 
Sartre's use of the term "emanation" here is deliberately evocative of 
theology and the doctrine of the Holy Trinity, in particular. Just as the 
Son and the Holy Spirit "proceed" from God the father by emanation 
rather than by any kind of standard causal relation, Sartre holds that a 
similar idea can be applied to his example of the episode of conscious-
ness involving disgust. The conscious episode of disgust, Sartre asserts, 
is not an effect of hatred, but its emanation. Whatever one might make 
of Sartre's claim here, the central thesis he advances in relation to the 
constitution of the ego is clear enough; the ego acts to bind together its 
own component-parts (states, qualities and actions), but the absolute 
spontaneity of consciousness means that the relation between con-
sciousness and the "me" cannot be rendered in a typical phenomeno-
logical fashion. Sartre's conception of the ego, then, emphasizes the 
extent to which any attempt to "contain" or delineate consciousness in 
its pure spontaneity, particularly in terms of its relationship to the ~'me", 
is bound to slip through one's fingers, so to speak; "magical" notions 
therefore represent our only real hope of describing the interrelation 
between psychical states on the one hand, and episodes of conscious-
ness on the other (ibid.: 26). 
Sartre devotes the concluding portion of Transcendence to remarks 
on what he regards as having been the main achievements of his essay. 
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Sartre claims that his conception of the ego as "out there", in the world, 
just like the ego of another, overcomes two great philosophical conun-
drums, both of which also confronted Husserl: the problem of other 
minds, and the problem of solipsism. As far as Sartre is concerned, his 
conception of the ego's transcendence allows us to move from theo-
rizing consciousness as secluded in the privacy of individual minds, 
to understanding it as an inherently worldly (and therefore public) 
phenomenon (ibid.: 43). 
More than this, Sartre's perspective demonstrates an inherently 
existential motivation for the Husserlian epoche. Sartre holds that our 
primary motivation for eschewing the natural attitude should not be 
simply because of concerns over the internal coherence of Husserl's 
claims regarding a transcendental ego, though these concerns are of 
course pertinent to Sartre's project of purifying consciousness. Rather, 
Sartre asserts, the epoche attains its proper function by demonstrating 
the extent to which living in the natural attitude "masks from conscious-
ness its own spontaneity". On Sartre's view, then, living immersed in 
the natural attitude allows us to avoid the anguish that would follow 
from recognizing the full extent of the freedom that this spontaneity 
entails. Indeed, Sartre claims that this realization of consciousness's 
spontaneity serves to explain the origins of certain forms of mental 
illness, in opposition to the predominant psychoanalytic explanations 
in vogue at the time (ibid.: 47). 
A comparison with Nausea here again proves instructive. Roquen-
tin's discovery of the contingency of existence occurs in the context of 
what appears to be a deep psychological disturbance. He experiences 
various hallucinations, troubled sleep punctuated by nightmares, para-
noia and severe depression, among other symptoms. Indeed, he demon-
strates an early insight into his condition when he decides he will have 
to undertake his own "psychological analysis", and he worries that his 
training as an historian will only allow him to describe his psychologi-
cal state in the broadest terms (Sartre 2007: 4). Given Sartre's claim in 
Transcendence that a "vertigo of possibility" (Sartre 2004c: 47) may 
in fact be the true underlying cause of psychological suffering in many 
cases, it seems reasonable to understand Roquentin's predicament in 
terms of this ''vertigo". 
The epoche, in any case, is no longer motivated by rationality alone, 
but by a passionate grasp of the experience of anguish, and the desire 
to grapple with it. In his final remark, Sartre considers the political and 
ethical implications of his perspective. Interestingly, Sartre's targets here 
are theoreticians on the "extreme Left" who understand phenomenol-
ogy as an Idealist philosophy (ibid.: 50). In certain respects, Sartre's 
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position here appears commensurate with the classical view of him at 
this early point in his career as politically disengaged in comparison 
with his later philosophy, the political aspect of which was certainly 
aligned with the radical Left. 
On the other hand, though, we might interpret Sartre's chastisement 
of the Left in relation to phenomenology as simply asserting that those 
on the Left who hold that phenomenology represents a form of Ideal-
ism, are actually doing their cause a disservice; after all, these critics, it 
may be argued, are failing to appreciate, and to harness phenomenol-
ogy's power to describe our political situation, and to assist politically 
committed philosophers in bringing about concrete change. Sartre's 
bold claim here is that "nothing further is needed" (ibid.: 52) for an 
outward-looking, positive approach to ethics and politics, once his 
conception of a worldly Ego is accepted. 
Intentionality 
We have so far examined the arguments put forward by Sartre in the 
longer of the two philosophical texts he wrote in Berlin, namely The 
Transcendence of the Ego. We might now move to a consideration of 
the shorter text: "Intentionality: A Fundamental Idea of Husserl's Phe-
nomenology". In this essay, Sartre forcefully restates his conviction - in 
concurrence with Husserl - that consciousness is fundamentally inten-
tional, fundamentally consciousness "of" something. More than this, 
though, Sartre also argues that consciousness exhausts itself completely 
in its object. According to Sartre, consciousness is nothing other than its 
escaping itself in its Other - its object. In this way, Sartre gives expres-
sion to his view that consciousness is not a process that can be formally 
observed or grasped as such; consciousness is pure intentionality alone, 
in Sartre's view. In undertaking to purify consciousness of everything 
but its intentionality, its directedness toward its object, Sartre uses phe-
nomenology's descriptive prose. According to Sartre: 
Consciousness is purified; it is clear as a strong wind. There is 
nothing in it but a movement of fleeing itself, a sliding beyond 
itself. If, impossible though it may be, you could enter "into" a 
consciousness, you would be seized by a whirlwind and thrown 
back outside, in the thick of the dust ... for consciousness has no 
"inside." Precisely this being-beyond-itself, this absolute flight, 
this refusal to be a substance, is what makes it be a consciousness. 
(Sartre 1970: 4) 
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At the same time, Sartre uses similarly descriptive prose to formally 
attack the subjective Idealism he had been educated in. Sartre writes 
evocatively (and indeed provocatively) of subjective Idealism as "diges-
tive philosophy". On Sartre's account, subjective Idealism in France has 
been guided by the credo that "to know is to eat". Sartre laments that: 
We have all believed that this spidery Mind trapped things in 
its web, covered them with a white spit, and slowly swallowed 
them, reducing them to its own substance. What is a table ... ? A 
certain assemblage of "contents of consciousness" ... 0 digestive 
philosophy! (Ibid.) 
By casting the subjective Idealist view of the Mind in the role of a spider 
consuming its prey, and the subject as entrapped in the "moist gastric 
intimacy" (ibid.: 4) of this metaphoric digestive process, Sartre had 
given a vivid clarity to his central criticism of subjective Idealism: The 
object experienced is not the thing in itself; the subject experiences 
"contents of consciousness" constituted by its own mediating processes. 
Subjects therefore experience only themselves. 
As was the case with Transcendence, the views Sartre expresses in 
"Intentionality" can be understood in relation to Nausea. Roquentin 
provides us early on with an account of the experience of being con-
scious of objects, in light of his particular project to dine using a fork, 
or smoke a pipe. He is aware of the fact that when he attempts to pick 
up and use either of them that he is projecting that intention onto 
the object, and this manifests itself in the feeling that something has 
changed "in [his] hands" (Sartre 2007: 4) when he attempts to do so. 
He is confused as to whether his fork, for instance, "now has a certain 
way of getting itself picked up", or it is he who is doing the picking up 
(ibid.). What we have here, then, is an undecided perspective on the 
intentional order of things, so to speak, but an awareness, nevertheless, 
of the concept of intentionality as fundamental to a view of conscious-
ness as put forward by Sartre. That is to say, Roquentin shifts seemingly 
naturally from a consciousness of his being-consoious, to a "spreading" 
of this understanding onto objects of his experience. In short, he is 
conscious of his being-conscious "of" the objects of his experience. 
The literary aspect of "Intentionality" that is arguably most pertinent 
in relation to Nausea, though, is its imagery of digestion. By conceiv-
ing of Roquentin's experience of contingency in terms of nauseating 
qualms, Sartre gives expression to the notion that Roquentin's discovery 
of contingency is too much for him to swallow, too much for him to 
digest. At the same time, Sartre may be read as expanding further on the 
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critique of subjective Idealism developed in "Intentionality". Given that 
Roquentin cannot digest the fact of contingency, his "indigestion", so to 
speak, could be read as a negative parody of the stomach-like role Sartre 
claims is taken on by the Mind under a subjective Idealist worldview. 
Roquentin cannot assimilate the world into "contents of conscious-
ness", left to slowly dissolve in the "moist gastric intimacy" (Sartre 
1970: 4) of his mental interiority. Instead, everything he attempts to 
get hold of, to take in, simply throws him back out into the world, into 
the midst of the Nausea. 
Conclusion 
We began our exploration of Sartre's early philosophy guided by the 
intuition that it is possible to view the young Sartre not as an insular 
philosopher who subsequently came to be engaged with the world, but 
as a man actively engaged from the very beginning of his career in a fight 
to tear down all barriers that prevented him from grappling with life. 
To that end, we traced Sartre's initial raw realist intuitions through to 
his intuitions regarding the radical contingency of existence. I suggested 
that a reading of Sartre's early view of contingency as an anti-romantic, 
anti-vitalistic reaction to Nietzsche's early philosophy in particular, pro-
vides a useful way of interpreting the conceptual underpinnings of this 
aspect of Sartre's nascent philosophy. We then addressed the impasse 
posed for Sartre's realism and his view of contingency by subjective 
idealism, with phenomenology offering Sartre a way forward from this 
impasse. Given the life-changing importance of existential phenom-
enology for Sartre, we considered a reading of two of Sartre's early 
philosophical works (The Transcendence of the Ego and "Intentionality: 
A Fundamental Idea of Husserl's Phenomenology") that positions them 
as bound by their concern to position consciousness, and therefore 
the conscious experience of existence, as constantly "going beyond" 
itself, constantly tending outwards towards the world. Throughout 
our ~iscussion of these early texts, we considered the relationship 
between Sartre's early philosophy in its essayistic form, and its literary 
dramatization in Nausea. This view of Transcendence, "Intentionality" 
and Nausea as an interrelated "set" of texts, allows for Sartre's initial 
conceptual intuitions to be understood not simply as psychologically 
insular insights that were superseded or overtaken by his "engaged", 
politically driven post-war philosophy. Rather, Sartre's early philosophy 
may rightly be regarded as underpinned by a conceptual framework 
that is inherently "engaged" with the world in its own right. 
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Sartre: novelist and playwright 
Adrian van den Hoven 
Sartre the novelist 
Sartre began his career as a novelist in 1938 with Nausea, and ended it 
with the third volume of the Roads to Freedom series (Sartre 1949a), 
as well as fragments of a fourth volume (posthumously published as 
The Last Chance; Sartre 198 la, 2009). In 1940, as a prisoner-of-war in 
Trier, Germany, Sartre wrote (and performed in) his first play, a Christ-
mas mystery called Bariona, or the Son of Thunder (Sartre 1962b); he 
ended his playwriting career in 1965 with his adaptation of Euripides's 
The Trojan Women. 
Nausea is a perfect illustration of Fernandez's conception of the 
novel "as unfolding in the present, as does life itself" (Sartre 194 7 a: 
15). Events in this diary unfold in a discontinuous, haphazard manner, 
and Roquentin, the solitary narrator, adopts it "in order to see more 
clearly" (Sartre 198 la: 5). Its core passage ''In the Public Park" illus-
trates Roquentin's experience of contingency, and, since it takes place 
towards the end of the novel, it requires that one keep this revelation 
constantly in mind if one wishes to arrive at a proper interpretation. 
Roquentin discovers that the "essential is contingency", that it is "the 
absolute ... or the absurd", and that the universe is "perfectly gratui-
tous" (ibid.: 153-5). As a result, he views most human endeavours as 
pathetic attempts to disguise reality and to obscure, or embellish and 
prettify man's real position in the world. This applies to such arts as 
noyel-writing, sculpture, architecture, theatre. The ragtime "Some of 
These Days" and geometrical figures escape from this stricture because 
as intangible non-existents they inspire in Roquentin the hope that 
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perhaps he can save himself retrospectively by writing "an adventure 
that couldn't not have happened ... and that would allow people to 
guess at something that didn't exist, be beyond existence ... and make 
people ashamed of theirs" (ibid.: 210). 
Nausea represents a quest for a lucid understanding of man's place 
in the universe. Therefore Roquentin satirizes the Autodidact's attempt 
to embrace the world's knowledge by reading the library's holdings in 
alphabetical order; he also realizes that novels rearrange events in order 
to suit the ending and abandons his biography of Rollebon because he 
appears to be resuscitating himself rather than his subject. In turn, Anny, 
his ex-mistress, rejects him. This actress had viewed life in theatrical 
terms as "privileged situations" that required the creation of "perfect 
moments" (Sartre 198 la: 169). She has given up that belief but is 
not willing to reconcile with him notwithstanding his recounting his 
epiphany in the Public Park. He also loses the Self-Taught Man. The 
humanist turns out to be a pederast and is caught fondling boys in the 
public library. After being punched in the face by the librarian, he disap-
pears. After this series of abandonments, losses and painful discoveries, 
Roquentin is ready to return to Paris, live as a rentier and vegetate. Now 
his second epiphany occurs while he is listening to the ragtime "Some 
of These Days" a final time. Since neither geometrical figures nor music 
exist, he projects music as a possible solution to his dilemma. It does 
not add to the superabundance of existents and permits one to posit 
the creation of a purely imaginative work. 
Roquentin's first experience with nausea is revelatory. At the beach 
he attempts to emulate young boys who are skimming stones. He picks 
up a pebble but stops before he can throw it: "the pebble feels flat and 
dry, especially on one side, damp and muddy on the other. I held it 
by the edges with my fingers wide open so as not to get them dirty" 
(ibid.: 6). The pebble's admixture of certain basic elements - mineral, 
water and mud - as well as the pseudo-homosexual encounter with 
the young boys relate this experience of absurdity to his epiphany in 
the Public Park and the Autodidact's fateful encounter in the library. 
Next Roquentin attempts to describe a cardboard container; it is "a 
parallelepiped rectangle" (ibid.: 5) but then gives up. Perspective, intro-
duced by Diihrer, and since then used to provide a stable viewpoint 
on the world is failing him. However, once he feels again "quite at 
home in the world" he is able to describe the world outside his win-
dow from a stable vantage point: "Here is my room facing north-east. 
Below the Street of the War Amputees and the construction site of the 
new station. I see the red and white flame of the 'Railroad Workers' 
Rendezvous' at the corner of Boulevard Victor-Nair" (ibid.: 6). But 
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this stable perspective is illusory; when he brings his face close to the 
mirror, he remarks: 
what I see is well below the monkey, on the fringe of the veg-
etable world, at the level of jellyfish ... The eyes are glassy, soft, 
blind, red-rimmed, they look like fish scales ... A silky white 
down covers great slopes of the cheeks, two hairs protrude from 
the nostrils: it is a geologically embossed map. And, in spite of 
everything, this lunar landscape is familiar to me. (Ibid.: 23) 
As a human he has descended to the aquatic, the vegetable and the 
mineral realm. The traditional hierarchal view of man has collapsed; 
its substitute is a phantasmagorical conception of man in which all the 
universe's elements are intertwined. This lucid awareness of himself as 
a composite creation provokes him to reject the bourgeoisie in scathing 
terms: the "worthy citizens who did their duty and have rights" (ibid.: 
98-113) and whose portraits hang in Bouville's ("Mudville" or "Cow-
town") museum. They look down on Roquentin, this solitary individual 
"without social importance" (ibid.: 1) but he considers them "a bunch of 
bastards" (ibid.: 113 ). This satirical, parodical and critical work clears 
the air. It forces us to see beyond the distorting and illusionary veils 
that art, culture and philosophy (humanism) have imposed on us and 
recognize reality in all its overwhelmingly raw, and non-human mani-
festations. Nausea represents a comprehensive confrontation with the 
absurdity of mankind's existence and, paradoxically, it is also a valiant 
attempt to see beyond it and create a "human" space for us. 
The collection of stories in The Wall (Sartre 1939c, 1969a) conform 
to Fernandez's conception of the recit in which "the action takes place 
in the past; it explains and the chronological order barely disguises the 
underlying causal framework" (Sartre 1947a: 16). "The Wall", set in 
the Spanish Civil War, deals with Tom, Juan and Pablo, who have been 
condemned to death. It succeeds admirably in depicting the psycho-
logical anguish of the condemned men who are sharing the knowledge 
that, these are the last days. However, Pablo, the narrator, is set free 
after he accidentally betrays his leader Juan Gris in an attempt to make 
the enemy look ridiculous. Upon discovering that, Pablo bursts out in 
"laughter" (Sartre 198 la: 233 ). He now finds himself with his back to 
the wall rather than staring at it but his attempted farce has turned tragic. 
"The Room" tells the story of Mr and Mrs Darbedat, their daughter 
Eve and her husband Pierre, who appears to be going mad. Mr Darbedat 
is the picture of rugged health, his wife is a hypersensitive homebody 
and Eve is colluding with Pierre in his plunge into the world of madness. 
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This story views madness as a flight into an imaginary universe that 
"common sense" people find impossible to penetrate. 
In "Erostratus ", the modern counterpart of the eponymous mythical 
"hero" fails pathetically to gain fame posthumously. In the surrealist 
manner he takes a loaded revolver into the street, pulls the trigger three 
times but mistakenly goes down the wrong street only to find himself in 
the midst of a crowd. He pulls the trigger two more times and hides in 
a washroom. Instead of using the sixth bullet for himself, he opens the 
door at the last moment. The ultimate surrealist's gesture has resulted 
in a pointless tragedy. 
"Intimacy" satirizes modern romances as found in women's maga-
zines. Lulu lives with her "impotent" husband Henri (ibid.: 280) but 
imagines a romantic getaway with her lover Pierre. Rirette, Lulu's girl-
friend, eagerly attempts to have Lulu leave her husband and move to 
the Midi with Pierre. But Pierre turns out to be a mother's boy and 
Lulu soon returns to her impotent husband because in fact she prefers 
his helplessness to Pierre's ostensibly masculine ways. Another failure: 
Lulu prefers dramatic "gestures" to real change. 
"The Childhood of a Leader," inspired to a degree by Sartre's own 
childhood, is first an attempt to satirize the bourgeoisie's pretentions 
to "duty", "responsibility" and to its deserving a "dominant role" in 
French society. Lucien is anything but a leader; he experiments with 
homosexuality, surrealism, women and right-wing fascist politics yet 
finally follows in his father's footsteps. He may well think that he has 
undergone a "metamorphosis" and become a "leader" but a look in the 
mirror reveals his "childish appearance". At that moment he decides 
"to grow a moustache" to appear "more terrible" (ibid.: 388). These 
dexterous verbal exercises illustrate Sartre's perfect mastery of the genre 
and clearly demonstrate his ability to pinpoint people's flights into bad 
faith and the imaginary. 
Unlike Nausea, the Roads to Freedom series paints a much broader 
social and political canvas. Sartre's discovery of John Dos Passos's Nine-
teen Nineteen leads him to attempt to incorporate the most intimately 
personal and most social and public aspects of1human existence in a 
novel. Hence, the series takes the form of a chronicle that deals with 
the lives of a philosophy professor Mathieu Delarue, his pregnant mis-
tress Marcelle, the younger lvich and others as these lives unfold in the 
late 1930s. The series begins with The Age of Reason (Sartre 1945a, 
1947e). The second volume is the most successful. In The Reprieve 
(Sartre 1945c, 194 7£), Sartre adapts Dos Passos's and others' tech-
nique of multiple perspectives to deal with the signing of the Munich 
Accord, which brought temporary peace to Western Europe but was 
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disastrous for Czechoslovakia. It illustrates perfecdy Sartre's eclectic 
talents as a novelist as it succeeds admirably in recreating the period's 
anguish, confusion and false relief that was the result of the politics of 
appeasement. Iron in the Soul (Sartre 1949a, 1950b) concludes with 
the apparently last moments of Mathieu shooting at the advancing 
Germans from a tower. He "blazes away" at all his past "failures'' for 
"fifteen minutes" (Sartre 198 la: 1344); but is not killed. In The Last 
Chance (included in Sartre 198 la), the incomplete fourth volume, we 
encounter Mathieu and others in a POW camp. Ultimately, Sartre had 
hoped to demonstrate the "conversion" of his main characters into com-
mitted persons. But their highly dramatized metamorphoses would also 
have revealed the limits of Sartre's project. His very realistically drawn 
"types" could hardly have been expected to have become "genuinely" 
existential heroes or villains. 
Sartre the playwright 
Sartre's first play Bariona (Sartre 1962b; also included in Sartre 2005a, 
as are all Sartre's other plays discussed below) mixes elements of his 
own philosophy with biblical and literary sources and demonstrates 
his conception of the theatre as a world apart and distinct from ours in 
which speech, gestures and objects operate in a synecdochic relation-
ship with the spectators' psyche and thereby allow a complete grasp of 
the underlying message. Bariona accepts the Romans' demand for an 
excessive tax increase but then imposes enforced celibacy on his people 
so that that the tribe will die off. He even insists that his wife abort. 
However, when the people hear about the Saviour, they disobey his 
commands and rush to Bethlehem. Bariona follows them and when he 
looks into Joseph's eyes he is instantly converted and decides to take 
on the Roman army to save the life of the Saviour. The "look" will play 
a significant role in Sartre's Being and Nothingness, published in 1943. 
Bariona's act of defiance prefigures Orestes's defiant refusal to bow to 
Jupiter's authority and Hugo's quixotic refusal to accept the Party's 
latest change of direction. 
Sartre's second play The Flies performed during the Occupation is 
a reformulation of the Orestes story. He returns to Argos to find his 
roots but instead discovers that the city is living under a curse. The 
city stands for the Vichy regime. Like Petain, Jupiter has imposed a 
fake hierarchy of values and the king and queen are colluding with 
him and imposing a sense of guilt on their citizens. His sister Electra 
begs Orestes to murder his mother Clytemnestra and her new husband 
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Egisthus, who are responsible for their father's murder. He does so, 
but, overcome with guilt, Electra decides to stay and Orestes declares 
himself free, abandons the city and accepts full responsibility for his 
murderous act. Orestes's decision has often been criticized; he should 
have stayed and assumed the throne. But by refusing it and rejecting 
Jupiter's fake value system, he ends up playing an exemplary role and 
telling Parisians they don't have to accept the Vichy's fake value system 
either because they too are free! 
Sartre's play No Exit is deservingly his best-known drama. It fits his 
criterion that action should be set in a distant place: hell, and hence it 
becomes pure theatre. Since Garcin, Ines and Estelle are dead, all their 
acts are reduced to mere gestures. Sartre's hell turns the traditional 
depiction upside down, there is neither fire nor brimstone nor instru-
ments of torture; these characters are tortured by their past and those 
still alive, they torture each other in the present and will forever con-
tinue to do so. This impossible trio composed of Garcin, the cowardly 
but macho womanizer, Ines, the hard-nosed lesbian and sado-masochist, 
and Estelle, the frivolous society woman and child killer, become each 
other's mirrors and judges. They can no longer undo their past and they 
must "live" forever fully aware of what they have become. As in Bari-
ona, the look is crucial; the "multiple eyes" staring at him make Garcin 
realize that "Hell is other people" (Sartre 2005a: 127-8). None will 
ever escape the others' accusing glare and they will forever be trapped 
on their infernal merry-go-round. 
The Victors and the farce Nekrassov deviate from Sartre's rule that 
dramatic action should be situated far away in time and space but in a 
sense the extravagant farce creates its own space and time. The Victors, 
similar in many ways to "The Wall", is set in the Vercors and deals with 
the French milice and the maquis but unlike in "The Wall" where the 
men's suffering is psychological, the maquisards are tortured on stage 
and, consequently, Sartre sins against a capital rule of neo-classical 
French theatre that excluded violence. Given Sartre's bourgeois audi-
ence the reaction was predictable and the p1ay was a failure. When in 
"The Wall" Pablo accidentally betrays his leader( he is set free but that 
is not the case with the maquisards. They too will send the miliciens on 
a wild goose chase and they succeed in their ruse because Jean, their 
leader, is set free but in spite of the miliciens' promise, the maquisards 
are executed anyway. On the other hand, their torture is pointless 
because up until Jean is introduced into their midst they do not know 
his whereabouts. 
The Respectful Prostitute resulted in Sartre being accused of anti-
Americanism. Sartre had visited the USA in 1945 and written about 
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racism in Le Figaro and subsequently he became a well-known advocate 
for the Third World; however, this play is as much an illustration of 
the Deep South's fraught race relations as it is a denunciation of that 
hierarchical society's value system. Sartre had read about the Scotts-
boro Boys trial and knew his Faulkner and the result is a play where 
the dominant whites get away with murder as they terrorize blacks and 
subjugate "white trash". Lizzie is a New York prostitute who is travelling 
South on a train hoping to settle down and be provided for by some 
rich elderly gentlemen. This improbable scenario is complicated by the 
fact that in the segregated South she shares her compartment with two 
blacks. When a group of white men enter a fight breaks out, one of the 
blacks is shot and one escapes. Lizzie is picked up in a nightclub by Fred, 
the murderer's cousin, and they spend the night together in Lizzie's 
newfound apartment. Next morning the escaped black man knocks on 
her door and begs her to testify in his favour in court. The honest Lizzie 
agrees but she had not counted on Fred, the puritanical, lustful racist. 
He has left two ten-dollar bills on the table to entrap her so that when 
the police arrive, who are in collusion with Fred, there is proof that she 
is a prostitute. Lizzie also has a sentimental and socially upward mobile 
side to her and when Fred's father, the senator, pleads the case of the 
murderer's mother he succeeds in forcing Lizzie to sign and declare 
her son Thomas the innocent victim. In the meantime the lustful Fred 
shoots at another black who is being lynched and sees Lizzie's face in 
the flames. If his father had made much of the superiority of whites 
over blacks, Fred in turn sings the praises of the white elite over such 
social outcasts as prostitutes. When Lizzie agrees to become his kept 
woman, Fred proclaims that everything is back in order. When Sartre 
became a fellow traveller of the Communist Party, he allowed to have 
the ending changed and at the last moment Lizzie and the black man 
escape in a waiting police car. Given that the police had been shown 
colluding with the white elite, that ending appears improbable. Yet the 
play is a good indication of Sartre's thinking about the pervasive power 
the elite exercise over groups they consider social outcasts. 
D,irty Hands is rightly considered a masterpiece, but its seemingly 
anti-communist conclusion caused great embarrassment to Sartre, the 
fellow traveller. It conforms to Sartre's conception of theatre: it is 
set in a far-away country and presents us with a universe where the 
standard laws of space and time are suspended. We move from Olga's 
house to Hoederer's office and back to Olga's. In three hours we move 
horn the present to the past during which most of the action is played 
out in a sort of suspended present. It pits the young idealist Hugo 
against the realist politician Hoederer but what makes it interesting is 
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the extended flashback that recreates the period that Hugo spent as 
Hoederer's secretary and designated assassin. But Hugo ends up killing 
Hoederer not for political reasons but because he sees his wife in this 
"father figure's" arms. When, at the last moment he discovers that the 
Party has rehabilitated Hoederer, he rejects this latest political twist and 
defiantly allows himself to be eliminated to justify his own beliefs and 
Hoederer's tactics. The play leaves us suspended between his youth-
ful idealism and the exigencies of realpolitik. "To lie or not to lie" has 
become the ultimate question (Noudelmann & Gilles 2004: 297-9). 
The Devil and the Good Lord, once again set in a faraway place and 
time, plays on the paradox of good and evil and illustrates that Goetz, 
by alternatively playing both roles, is only fooling himself and that it is 
not the ultimate act of defiance that he thought it was. It is only when 
he accepts to do what he can do best, lead the army, that he realizes his 
true role. Ironically, he tells Nasty that he is not "born to command" 
but wants to "obey", which results in Nasty ordering him to assume 
leadership "of the army" and thus "to obey" (Sartre 2005 a: 499). When 
next he kills a chief who would rather "die" than "obey" him, he pro-
claims: "I take the command against my own will; but I won't give it 
up. Believe me, if there is a possibility of winning this war, I will win 
it ... There, the reign of man has begun". And finally: "I will remain 
alone with this empty sky above my head because I have no other way 
of being with you. We have to fight this war and I will fight it" (ibid.: 
501). Once again, a series of empty gestures conclude with a definitive 
final act but it also brings out the forlornness of the modern hero who 
must act without the divine guidance he had previously sought in vain. 
Sartre's adaptation of Dumas's Kean shows his marvellous grasp of 
the importance of gestures and acts and "theatrality" in general. Kean 
is admired as a genius on stage but despised as a lowly actor. This bas-
tard is full of resentment against the aristocracy but it is only when he 
transgresses the rules, steps out of his role and orders the aristocrats 
to "keep quiet" because "on stage he reigns supreme" (ibid.: 638) that 
he regains his dignity. It represents the victory of meritocracy over the 
aristocracy and Kean confirms it by marrying Anna who will be his 
manager during the day and his lover at night. 
Nekrassov satirizes not only the French right-wing press but also his 
own philosophy. It is a marvellous tour de force but it fails to convince 
us that all defectors from the Soviet Union are impostors. Sartre's dis-
like of the bourgeoisie was a well-known fact but this play shows the 
limits of his "fellow-travelling". If one can ignore the obviously falla-
cious message, it can be seen as a masterful display of his grasp of the 
spoofing done by the Keystone cops and others. 
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Unlike The Victors, The Condemned of Altona is a much subtler 
attempt to denounce torture as practised by the French army in Algeria. 
Set in Germany, it embraces a vast period from Luther and the rise of 
capitalism to the post World War II German Wirtschaftwunder. Hence 
it can also be viewed as a biting commentary on the collusion between 
leading industrial figures and whatever government is in power. Since 
Sartre was at the same time working on the Freud Scenario, it illus-
trates again, as did Dirty Hands, the fateful father-son relationship in 
which, in this case, the son, unable to loosen the bonds that bind them, 
becomes the "Butcher of Smolensk" and, hence, Sartre succeeds in 
"demystify[ing] military heroism by showing its link to unconditional 
violence" (ibid.: 1015). In this theatrical masterpiece Sartre exploits all 
the media resources, from cinema, to radio and the tape recorder, and 
illustrates the tenets of existential psychology in which the flashbacks 
and prolepses ultimately force Frantz to admit to his own war crimes. 
As in No Exit, the action takes place on two levels. Frantz's deliberate 
sequestration and feigned madness are desperate attempts to justify 
Germany's defeat as a disaster because he needs to deny Germany's 
evident economic rebirth and hide from his own failure. Father and 
son commit suicide together; their blindness to the horrific reality they 
have created leaves them no other way out. Yet, to the extent that we 
identify with Frantz, we recognize our own "complicity in that horrific 
universe's creation" (ibid.: 1028). It was Sartre's hope that the French 
public would "recognize that they are like the Germans portrayed" 
and that 'the theatrical mirage would disappear to leave room for the 
truth that hides behind the mirage" (ibid.: 1016). 
Let us conclude with Sartre's remarks about his adaptation of the 
Trojan Women, which was a box-office failure and ended his career as 
a dramatist. This denunciation of war: "ends on a note of total nihil-
ism ... In it the Gods die as well as the humans, and that death is the 
moral of the tragedy" (ibid.: 1051). Ultimately, Sartre's vision of a 
world without God thrives always on dramatic moments: both in his 
prose and his theatre it is the transforming act that makes man and ... 
makes all the difference. 
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SEVEN 
Psychoanalysis and 
existential psychoanalysis 
Betty Cannon 
Throughout his work Sartre has demonstrated a deep and continuing 
interest both in psychological theory in general and psychoanalysis in 
particular. His writing on psychological themes began with his thesis 
at the Ecole Normale Superieure in 1927, which was later published in 
revised form as the first part of Imagination (Sartre 1936, 1972a). This 
was followed by two classical philosophical/psychological treatises, The 
Emotions: Outline of a Theory (Sartre 1939a, 1975) and The Imagi-
nary: A Phenomenological Psychology of the Imagination (Sartre 1940, 
2004a). Sartre's first major philosophical work, The Transcendence of 
the Ego (Sartre 1936-7, 1957a), is at least as significant psychologi-
cally as it is philosophically. Of course, Sartre devotes a section of his 
philosophical masterpiece, Being and Nothingness (Sartre 1943a, BN1, 
BN2), to the development of premises for an existential psychoanalysis. 
Sartre's interest in psychoanalysis took a new turn in 1956 when he 
did extensive research and reading based on a request from producer 
John Huston to write a screenplay on Freud's life. Posthumously edited 
and published by Sartre's friend and colleague, the eminent French 
psychoanalyst J.-B. Pontalis, The Freud Scenario (Sartre 1986a) is sur-
prisi~gly vivid, favourable to Freud, and faithful to the Freud/Jones 
account of the birth of psychoanalysis Gones [1953] 1961). A careful 
reading reveals that most of the evidence for the unconscious that Freud 
discovers can be interpreted in two ways - according to Freud's theory 
of the unconscious and Sartre's theory of bad faith. Sartre's rereading 
of Freud at this time may have influenced his account of Flaubert's 
hysterico-epilepsy in The Family Idiot (Sartre 1971-2, 198 lc, 1987, 
1989a, 1991a, 1993c). At the same time, Sartre's account of Flaubert's 
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difficulties demonstrates a deepening of his own theory of bad faith to 
explain more fully the role of the body in the creation of symptoms. It 
may also be that when Sartre remarks in Search for a Method that only 
psychoanalysis ''allows us to discover the whole man in the adult; that 
is, not only his present determinations but the weight of his history" 
(Sartre 1968: 60), he was thinking of his recent encounter with Freud 
in writing the screenplay. 
Pontalis thought that one day the history of Sartre's deeply "ambigu-
ous relationship" with psychoanalysis "will have to be written and per-
haps his work reinterpreted in the light of it" (Sartre 1979: 220). The 
truth is that Sartre gave Freud an enormous amount of credit while disa-
greeing with him on many crucial issues. Sartre is aware that existential 
psychoanalysis could not have existed without the prior invention of 
Freudian psychoanalysis. He understands that his version of existential 
psychoanalysis is only a set of principles and that it provides nothing 
like the application to work with patients that fills out the literature 
of psychoanalysis. Sartre's psychobiographies provide examples, but 
they are not clinical examples. Existential psychoanalysis, Sartre says, 
has "not yet found its Freud" (EN: 734). Instead the "final discoveries" 
of ontology must become "the first principles of [existential] psychoa-
nalysis" (EN: 735). Those principles are Sartrean, although Sartre has 
learned much from Freud. Later Sartre welcomed R. D. Laing's work, 
which is deeply influenced by Sartre, as exemplifying a psychoanalytic 
perspective compatible with his own (Laing & Cooper [1964] 1971: 
6; Sartre 1979: 204). 
This chapter will compare and contrast existential with Freudian 
psychoanalysis, concluding with a brief consideration of how Sartre 
might be useful to psychoanalysis today. 
Freud 1s theory and method: the appeal to natural science 
Freud, like many psychologists from various perspectives, from his time 
to ours, attempted to ground his approach in the1natural science of his 
day. His position is fundamentally deterministic and materialist. He 
says that the intent of his early "Project for a Scientific Psychology", 
which is part of his posthumously published correspondence with his 
friend Wilhelm Pleiss, is "to furnish us with a psychology which shall 
be a natural science; its aim, that is, is to represent psychological proc-
esses as quantitatively determined states of specifiable material particles 
and so make them plain and void of contradictions'' (Freud [1950] 
1953-74: 355). In other words, Freud's aim is to reduce psychology 
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to neurophysiology, an aim that is sometimes voiced by psychologists 
today. 
Freud did not publish the Project during his lifetime because he real-
ized that the science simply was not there. Yet he did not abandon the 
attempt to ground psychoanalysis in natural science explanations and 
metaphors, as some post-Freudian theorists have claimed. He never fol-
lowed his own precept that psychoanalysis should cleanse itself of eve-
rything but "psychological auxiliary ideas" (Freud [1916-17] 1953-74: 
21). The four major hypotheses of his psychological metatheory are all 
scientistic postulates in the sense that they use natural science metaphors 
to try to establish the validity of psychoanalysis. The most experience-
distant of these, the drive theory of the economic hypothesis, is based 
on energy flow, inhibition and displacement- metaphors derived from 
charge and discharge theories borrowed from physics, hydraulic meta-
phors adapted from the discovery of the steam engine, and Freud's 
study with his mentors, Brucke and Meynert, in neurophysiology. 
The flow of energy in the organism is first conceived in terms of psy-
chobiological forces - libidinal and aggressive drives in the early Freud 
and, in his later work, life and death instincts, Eros and Thanatos. Freud 
believed that instinctual energy can neither be created nor destroyed, 
that it is at least theoretically measurable, that it can be condensed or 
displaced from its original objects to others (as in transference), that it 
can be "converted" from one form to another (as in hysterical blind-
ness), and that it can be withdrawn from the external world towards 
the ego or a lost object (as in narcissism or mourning). 
"Cathexis" is a concept implying the amount of energy attached 
to an object, an idea or ideas, or a body part. Before cathecting the 
mother and the breast, the infant is enveloped in primary objectless 
narcissism. Secondary narcissism involves investing in the ego rather 
than the object. A certain amount of narcissism is normal. Being in 
unrequited love drains energy away from the lover's ego, and thus leads 
to impoverishment. The ultimate aim of the organism, according to 
Freud, is the return to zero energy charge. The pleasure principle is a 
mechanical principle involving the physical reduction of quantities of 
energy in the organism. As Freud says, it "follows from the principle 
of constancy" (Freud [1920] 1953-74: 9). 
Although many current psychoanalysts dismiss or minimize drive 
theory, it is actually the engine that makes the Freudian machine go. The 
dynamic (conflictual forces in the psyche), topographic (consciousness, 
preconscious and unconscious) and structural (ego, superego and id) 
hypotheses all require it. The repository of the drives is the id, and the 
source of reality orientation is the ego, where drive energy is neutralized 
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or sublimated or displaced or defended against. The internalization of 
prohibitions against drive satisfaction combined with castration anxiety 
leads to the development of the superego, which may get some of its 
virulence from aggressive drives originating in the id. Because they do 
not have castration anxiety, women do not develop adequate superegos 
(Freud [1930] 1953-74). 
The neurosis develops when drives press for gratification and are met 
with resistance from the outside world and/or the superego. Substitute 
satisfactions in the form of symptoms result since energy cannot be 
destroyed but only displaced in the psyche. For example, compulsive 
hand-washing substitutes for the desire to handle faeces or other "dirty" 
activities. Or Freud's patient Dora (Freud [1905] 1953-74) develops a 
hysterical cough as a substitute for her desire for oral sex. In psychosis, 
the ego may be overwhelmed by the drives and hence lose touch with 
reality. 
In neurosis, defence mechanisms and resistance, as posed by the 
dynamic hypothesis, prevent the ego from seeing the disowned wishes 
(deriving from the drives) that are at the root of its troubles. The com-
plex develops when intrapsychic conflicts and their substitute solutions 
are pushed into the unconscious and zealously guarded by the censor 
who stands sentinel between consciousness and the unconscious. Later 
Freud removed the repressive force from the censor to the superego 
and still later to the ego defences. Anxiety results when the disowned 
repressed material threatens to break through into consciousness. 
On Freud's view, the way in which the methodology of psychoa-
nalysis works can be explained in terms of these hypotheses - indeed 
Freud would say that he developed the hypotheses as a way of explain-
ing the clinical material. The aim of therapy is to trace the develop-
ment of the person, explained by dynamics based on the above theory, 
from earliest childhood to the present. Fixations at various psycho-
sexual stages (oral, anal, phallic and genital) and substitute gratifica-
tions leading to the development of symptoms are primary data to 
be analysed. In the course of therapy, defences must be analysed and 
resistances to unconscious material (often manifesting as resistance 
to the therapy) must be overcome. The Oedipus complex, castration 
anxiety, psychosexual fixations, and resulting fantasies and symptoms 
must be confronted. Symbols appearing in dreams and other material 
are often of a universal nature, resulting from their roots in the drives 
and fixations in psychosexual development, and can be interpreted 
accordingly in the course of analysis. Analysis of the transference of 
energy from early libidinal fixations onto the analyst becomes a pri-
mary avenue for cure. 
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Freud's method involves asking the analysand to commit to a proc-
ess in which she says everything that comes to mind. This is called the 
"fundamental rule". The analyst listens with an attitude of "evenly 
suspended attention" so as to allow the unconscious material to emerge 
without interference or preference. Usually this is done with the analy-
sand lying on a couch with the analyst behind her in order to encourage 
the material to flow more spontaneously and uninhibitedly. The analyst 
interprets the unconscious material that emerges in the form of trans-
ference, resistance, defences, symptoms, symbols, fantasies, dreams, 
repetitive patterns and "acting out" so that it may become conscious. As 
Freud famously says, it is this making of unconscious material conscious 
that leads to cure: "Where id was, there ego shall be". The flow has 
been restored by removing the blocks to consciousness and if possible 
finding realistic outlets or sublimations for the repressed drive energy. 
Because civilization is full of "discontents" in the form of blocks to 
instinctual gratification (Freud [1930] 1953-74), the cure may mean 
nothing more, as Freud says, than allowing the analysand to move from 
neurotic symptomatology to "common unhappiness" (Freud [1895] 
1953-74: 305). 
Sartre1s approach: phenomenological inquiry and 
the fundamental project of being 
Although Sartre was always appreciative of Freud's great discoveries 
(the impact of childhood on adult development, the pervasiveness of 
self-deception, and the use of the current relationship between analyst 
and patient to explore the depths of the analysand's difficulties), he 
at the same time seriously objected to Freud's metapsychology. His 
objections are rooted in existential phenomenology, which rejects the 
premises of positivistic science as applied to human beings. Phenom-
enology is first and foremost an answer to Cartesian dualism: it does 
away with the division between mind and body, self and world, of 
sev:enteenth-century French philosopher Rene Descartes - a perspective 
that has deeply influenced the development of modern science. The 
founder of phenomenology, Edmund Husserl, poses a view of con-
sciousness as intrinsically intentional and world-related. There is no self 
without the world, no world (in the sense of specified thises) without 
the self. By intentionality Husserl is not suggesting that consciousness 
,has motives or intentions hidden away in the psyche, as in the ordinary 
use of the word "intention". Rather he means that consciousness is 
always consciousness of some real or imagined object. The intention 
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exists not behind the act of grasping the world in this way or that, but 
rather in that very act. 
Sartre takes Husserl's phenomenology a step further. Following 
Heidegger, who along with Husserl had a great impact on his philoso-
phy, Sartre objects even to the "transcendental ego" of Husserl, which 
constitutes the world of meaning and objects. For Sartre and Heidegger, 
there is no transcendental ego. There is only consciousness (Dasein, 
or "being there", in Heidegger's philosophy) experiencing the world 
in this way or that. It is from the perspective of existential phenom-
enology that Sartre rejects Freud's four fundamental hypotheses. From 
this perspective, there is no such thing as a psyche with substance and 
structure. There is no ego, superego and id, no consciousness, precon-
scious and unconscious, no psychobiological drives behind intentional 
acts, no internal dynamics that are separated from the world in which 
a person lives. There is only bodily lived consciousness grasping the 
world in this way or that. 
Hence when Sartre says that existential psychoanalysis attempts to 
grasp an individual's fundamental project of being, he is not simply 
talking about the Freudian complex in other language. As Sartre says, 
both the complex and the project are totalities rather than a collection 
of random responses, and both refer to an "infinity of polyvalent mean-
ings" (BNl: 570; BN2: 591). Yet the complex is a pattern of emotions, 
memories, perceptions and wishes in the personal unconscious organ-
ized around a common theme and powered by drives. The project is 
instead an original gut-level bodily lived conscious choice of a way 
of being in the world. The complex is determined. The fundamental 
project is freely chosen, though that choice is always situated - that is, 
it is always a combination of what the world brings and what I make 
of what the world brings. 
Both the complex and the original project are organized around 
desires, but the word desire means something different in each form 
of psychoanalysis. For Freud, desire refers to the sexual instinct and its 
objects, modulated through the psychosexual stages. For Sartre, desire 
refers to the fundamental lack of Being (nothingness or no thingness) 
that consciousness is. Sexuality is only one of its manifestations. My 
desire does not derive from a generalized drive that lies behind expe-
rience. It manifests in my experience as I relate to the objects of that 
experience in a variety of ways. It is motivated by the desire to fill the 
fundamental lack. It is the desire to use objects and other people to 
create a substantialized self. 
The fundamental project, unlike the Freudian complex, is not fixed 
in childhood. It is less a totality in the static sense than a totalization, a 
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continuous way of making sense of self and world that is always mov-
ing and changing. Its current meaning, though permeated by its child-
hood origins, is not reducible to those origins. As Sartre says in Search 
for a Method, a life develops in "spirals"; it "passes again and again 
by the same points but at different levels of integration and complex-
ity" (Sartre1968: 106). We may even find abrupt breaks and "radical 
conversions" to a different way of being in the world. This happens, 
for example, when Genet, in Sartre's biography Saint Genet (Sartre 
1952, 1963) turns from the life of crime for which he seemed destined 
to make himself a writer - or when a person changes radically in the 
course of analysis. 
The fundamental project, like the complex, has its origins in the 
past, which Sartre says is the "background-depth of all my thoughts 
and all my feelings" (BNl: 141; BN2: 164). Sartre even agrees with 
Freud that both forms of psychoanalysis must explore "the crucial event 
of infancy [or early childhood] and the psychic crystallization around 
this event" (BNl: 569; BN2: 590). The project is not, however, like 
the Freudian complex, determined by those childhood events. Rather 
the child chose (on the level of non-reflective basic intentionality) to 
live them in a certain way and hence developed the project. The child 
Genet, for example, chose to "be the thief they said I was" (Sartre 
1963). Obviously, the choice is not always (and in the case of mental 
illness it may never be) a viable choice. But it is a choice. It is I who live 
my circumstances in this way or rather respond mechanically to them. 
The reason present symptoms may seem determined by past circum-
stances is that we remember the circumstances vividly and see no other 
way that we could have lived them. This is partially so because we did 
choose to live them in this way and not in another. Interestingly Freud 
himself recognizes in a rather remarkable passage that determinism 
only works backwards. When one attempts to move from the present 
neurosis to the childhood origins, all seems inevitable. But when one 
gets to the original circumstances, one becomes aware that there could 
have been a different outcome and that this might have been just as 
und~rstandable. Hence, as Freud says: "The synthesis is not nearly so 
satisfactory as the analysis; in other words, from a knowledge of the 
premises we could not have foretold the nature of the results" (Freud 
[1920] 1953-74: 267). Freud thinks that this failure to predict happens 
because we can never know all of the etiological factors in a neurosis. 
Sartre thinks it happens because we are free . 
. The fundamental project is not just past-oriented. It is present and 
future-oriented as well. The present moment is, of course, where we 
live and where change takes place. Sartre describes the present simply 
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as "presence to being" (BNl: 121-2; BN2: 145). Any therapy that is 
going to be effective must be profoundly present to this presence - and 
must encourage those undergoing therapy to be increasingly present 
(rather than trying to escape into the past or the future). Yet the present 
is not a static something. The fundamental project is moving through 
time - actually, to be more precise, it is temporalizing. It is a pro-ject, 
or throwing myself forward out of the past toward the future. While 
the past is its ground, the future is its meaning. Hence Sartre says that 
existential psychoanalysis must be "completely flexible" and adapt 
itself to "the slightest changes in the subject"- recognizing that dif-
ferent approaches may be suitable for different analysands or for the 
same analysand at a different time in therapy (BN1: 573; BN2: 594). 
It must also be a deeply relational and collaborative venture - a joint 
undertaking in which "each person takes his chances and assumes his 
responsibilities" rather than a hierarchical process (Sartre 1979: 201). 
Ultimately, it is the "final intuition of the subject," rather than the inter-
pretations of the analyst, that is "decisive" in existential psychoanalysis 
(BN1: 574; BN2: 594). 
In Search for a Method (Sartre 1968) and the Critique of Dialectical 
Reason (Sartre 1960c), Sartre proposes a methodology for the social 
sciences in general that he names the progressive-regressive method. 
The regressive moment is the usual method of social science inquiry. 
It analyses and attempts to bring to light all those seemingly objective 
conditions of a person's (or group's) situation, including historical and 
socio-material circumstances, even language and culture. The progres-
sive moment instead uses comprehension, putting myself as a human 
being into the shoes of the other in order to understand the human 
meaning of a past event or action. This "pre-ontological comprehen-
sion that man has of the human person" (BNl: 568; BN2: 589) is also 
the beginning point of existential psychoanalysis. In looking at the 
past, this means not so much attempting to find causes and conditions 
as looking for motives and meanings. It means discovering the past as 
choice rather than as conditioning. This frees the future as well: If I 
was free, I am free. Often the future-directed dirriension of a person's 
project can be elicited by asking the question: "What does (or did) it 
do for you to do/feel/think/respond [in this particular way]?" 
The fundamental project is always an attempt to try to solve the 
problem of being, rather than a merely mechanical response to inter-
nal forces or external conditions. This is the problem of needing to 
create a substantial self while yet remaining free - to be somebody or 
something, as we say colloquially. Sartre says that the meaning of this 
desire is "ultimately the project of being God" - the ens causa sui of 
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Scholastic philosophy (BN1: 567; BN2: 587). Because it is impossible 
for a human being to be free and a substantial something at the same 
time, Sartre makes his famous statement: "Man is a useless passion" 
(BN1: 615; BN2: 636). Nonetheless, all our various ways of doing, 
being and having (with doing and having ultimately collapsing into 
being) are attempts to solve the problem of being - to create meaning 
down there in the future by bringing into existence a substantialized 
self as value. 
All our ways of relating to self and others are attempts to solve the 
problem of being. All our ways of temporalizing, spatialializing and 
relating to objects in the world, all our ways of inserting (or failing or 
refusing to insert) ourselves into language and culture, all our actions, 
mannerisms, tastes and gestures are ways of attempting to solve the 
problem of being. Sartre says, "there is not a taste, a mannerism, or a 
human act which is not revealing". Our gestures, facial expressions, 
body stance, and all the various ways of living our bodies are attempts 
to solve the problem of being. As Sartre says, ''A gesture refers to a 
Weltanschauung and we sense it" (BNl: 457; BN2: 479). It is the task 
of existential psychoanalysis to decipher that Weltanschauung. 
In attempting to elucidate the analysand's solution to the problem 
of being, however, the existential psychoanalyst is not looking for a 
solution that is first invented and then lived. The fundamental project is 
not rational but "prelogical" (BNl: 570; BN2: 591), and it can never be 
known in its entirety exactly as it is since it is no different from our gut-
level non-reflective way of living our lives in the world. It can, however, 
be known well enough to allow us to look at what we are doing and 
to shift and change. Hence the existential psychoanalyst will not just 
explore the usual data of psychoanalysis: "dreams, failures, obsessions 
and neuroses". She will also and especially consider "the thoughts of 
waking life, successfully adjusted acts, style, etc." (BN1: 57 5; BN2: 
595). She will understand that a person "expresses himself as a whole 
in even his most insignificant and his most superficial behavior" (BNl: 
5 68; BN2: 5 89). 
~he result of this investigation must be self-evident "not because it 
is the poorest and the most abstract but because it is the richest" and 
most concrete (BNl: 563; BN2: 584). We must explore the analysand's 
unique way of solving the problem of being. If this person is psychotic, 
for example, we will want to know not only that he found the condi-
tions of his existence intolerable and so needed to escape into fantasy 
qr imagination. We will also want to know why he prefers to be Jesus 
Christ and not Adolf Hitler or Genghis Khan. We will want to encounter 
in so far as this is possible the very person, not a collection of drives or 
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a bundle of unconscious wishes or generalized qualities or states. We 
must discover the person's fundamental project not behind concrete 
lived experience, but in that very experience itself. 
Sartre's answer to the problem of self-deception 
Existential psychoanalysis, like Freudian psychoanalysis, must account 
for the fact that the analysand's life is riddled with self-deception. Freud 
explains self-deception in terms of unconscious dynamics and wishes. 
Sartre explains it in terms of the division between pre-reflective and 
reflective consciousness and the structures of bad faith. Pre-reflective 
consciousness is simple gut-level awareness, basic intentionality. It is 
bodily lived, conscious and intentional, but not necessarily even ver-
bal since, as Sartre says, language is fundamentally for others. Sartre 
says that pre-reflective consciousness "is penetrated by a great light 
without being able to express what this light is illuminating". This is so 
not because we are dealing with an "unsolved riddle as the Freudians 
believe" (BN1: 571; BN2: 591). Indeed all is there, luminous, available. 
What is lacking is the means that would allow conceptualization. The 
truth is not hidden in the unconscious. Indeed it is not unconscious at 
all but unknown in the sense of being not yet reflected on. The analy-
sand, as Sartre says, must come to know what she already understands. 
The reason that consciousness and knowledge are not identical is that 
there is a gulf of "impassable nothingness" between the consciousness 
reflecting and the consciousness reflected on (BN1: 274; BN2: 298). 
This gulf does not represent a resurgence of the Freudian unconscious 
by another name. The impassable gulf occurs because when conscious-
ness turns and attempts to make a "pseudo" object of itself, the self 
reflecting and the self reflected on are not the same. This object of 
reflective consciousness is always a pseudo object because I cannot 
simultaneously see myself and be myself. At the moment of reflection, 
I am always reflecting on a past self. I am trying to grasp myself from 
the viewpoint of the other. / 
Hence arises the possibility for all kinds of distortions. Some of 
these come from my attempt to recapture my object self by looking at 
myself through the eyes of the other, especially the original powerful 
others, who were able to see me as an object out there in the world. The 
experience of what Sartre refers to as "the look" of the other makes me 
uncomfortably aware of this, since I experience the other's Look first 
in shame and later also in pride (BN1: 252-302; BN2: 276-326). I also 
need the other to see me, so that the failure of the original powerful 
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others to accurately see and validate me has a negative impact as well. 
Their looks, touches and words are important to my development as a 
person. All of us have experienced the distortions stemming from the 
looks (or failure to look) of the original powerful others. Our ways of 
criticizing or ignoring ourselves mimic theirs. Hence Sartre says that 
Flaubert, whose physical needs were taken care of but who was disre-
garded as a person, develops a passive personality. Lack of recognition 
as a person also plays a major role in Laing's examples of "ontological 
insecurity" (Laing [1959] 1979). These include cases where psychotic 
patients, having not been treated as persons early on in their lives, come 
to treat themselves and/or others as not being real or as being objects 
rather than subjects. 
Self-deception arises from the desire to view or make myself into a 
particular kind of object - for myself and/or others. Actually, the very 
belief that I can be an object like other objects in the world, a substantial-
ized self as a table is a table, is a distortion. It is an act of what Sartre calls 
bad faith, or lying to myself about the nature of my existence, because 
I am not an object but a free subject. Hence all those attempts to grasp 
myself as an object, leading eventually to the development of the ego 
in the Sartrean sense as a construct of reflective consciousness (not a 
seat of reality orientation, as in Freud), are in bad faith. They deny my 
position as a free subject. While it is not possible or even desirable to 
live without an ego (one would probably be either psychotic or a mere 
weather vane moving about with every wind), a rigidly developed ego 
is a primary source of self-deception (see Barnes 1991 on the positive 
aspects of the ego). Hence Sartre says in The Transcendence of the Ego 
that "perhaps the essential role of the ego is to mask from consciousness 
its very spontaneity" (Sartre 1957a: 100). 
Even viewing myself as a miserable, bad, inferior, ineffective, self-
ish or otherwise objectionable object is a matter of bad faith. Yet such 
a position, like alI solidifications of the ego, serves the purpose of 
giving me at least a sense of identity. It allows me to imagine that I 
am something and to avoid the nothingness that I actually am. Hence 
pe9ple often stubbornly cling to such identities. Furthermore many of 
the Freudian defences emanate from this desire to objectify the self. 
We have already seen how introjecting the original others aids me in 
developing a solid (if distorted) sense of self. Similarly, Sartre describes 
in Saint Genet and Anti-Semite and Jew how the despised or "evil" other 
confirms the "just" man or the bigot in his sense of solid superiority by 
.projecting all those potentially disowned qualities onto Genet the thief 
or the Jew as an outsider (Sartre 1963, 1965b). We are not dealing here 
with unconscious processes, but with manoeuvres in bad faith. 
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Since there are two poles to human reality - freedom and facticity -
there are actually two poles to bad faith. What I actually am is a freedom 
in situation, not a simple facticity or an ungrounded freedom. If I find 
myself unwilling, for whatever reason, to accept the tension implied in 
these two poles, freedom and facticity, I may try to escape in one direc-
tion or the other. I may overemphasize facticity, trying to make myself 
into a solid something, as in the form of bad faith discussed above. Or 
else I may try to escape into ungrounded freedom, pretending to be 
absolutely free in the sense of not being impacted by my present cir-
cumstances, my past, my socioeconomic conditions, my relationships, 
and so on. This second form of bad faith, in its more extreme forms, 
might lead to mania or psychosis - just as the other form might lead to 
severe depression or the grandiosity of narcissism. In milder cases, the 
second form might lead to "commitment phobia" or denial. 
Both forms of bad faith help to explain the phenomena of self-
deception without resorting to the unconscious - though of course 
existential psychoanalysis does not deny that there is a personal history 
that provokes one to adopt one strategy or the other. The strategies 
themselves, however, are not from a Sartrean perspective unconscious 
processes but ways of fleeing the truth of the human condition in one 
direction or the other. 
"Purifying reflection 11 and change 
Reflective consciousness is not, however, something to be avoided 
in favour of an impulsive spontaneity. Indeed, reflection cannot be 
avoided. Sartre describes a certain kind of reflectivity that actually 
reveals to us our freedom. So far we have discussed reflectivity only 
on the plane of what Sartre calls accessory or impure reflection. It is 
"impure" because it is contaminated with the desire to make myself an 
object. Yet there are two other forms of reflection that Sartre discusses 
briefly in Being and Nothingness. They are pure reflection and purify-
ing reflection. It is these forms of reflection that can lead a person to 
recognize the image of himself "as if he were seeing himself in a mirror" 
(BN1: 573; BN2: 594) - and thereby make a new choice of a way of 
being in the world. This indeed is the aim of psychoanalysis, Sartrean 
or Freudian, according to Sartre. 
Pure reflection, which Sartre describes as the "simple presence" of 
the consciousness reflecting to the consciousness reflected on (BNl: 
155; BN2: 177), is both "the original form of reflection and its ideal 
form". It is the original form since without it no other forms could exist. 
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It is the ideal form because it does not try to create an object self. The 
impassable gulf between reflective and pre-reflective consciousness does 
not disappear, but it is not contaminated by the motive to construct 
an object self. Purifying reflection goes a step further. It allows us to 
grasp all of those reflective distortions, with their roots in childhood, 
that keep us entangled in the structures of bad faith that form the neu-
rosis. Sartre says that the nothingness that consciousness is cannot be 
known to pre-reflective consciousness nor grasped as a psychic object 
by impure reflection, but that it "is accessib1e on1y to the purifying 
reflection" (BNl: 199; BN2: 222). 
Sartre associates purifying reflection with play (BNl: 582; BN2: 
602). He says that "play as contrasted with the spirit of seriousness 
appears to be the least the possessive attitude" (BNl: 580; BN2: 601). 
The spirit of seriousness, of course, is that materialist deterministic bad 
faith position in which [ claim to be an object rather than a subject. 
Play, on the other hand, allows for a lightness rather than a heavi-
ness of being. Sartre says that play is able to ''make manifest and to 
present ... the absolute freedom which is the very being of the person" 
(BNl: 581; BN2: 601). Hence, as I have suggested elsewhere, it might 
be appropriate to describe the antidote to the spirit of seriousness as 
the spirit of play (Cannon 2009, 2011, forthcoming). Indeed it might 
be appropriate to describe existential psychoanalysis itself, as D. W 
Winnicott ([1971] 1985: 3 8) describes psychoanalysis, as "two people 
playing together" - or, where one of them (hopefully the analysand) is 
unable to play, learning to play together. The analysand would thereby 
be able to escape from the constraints of the "serious world" and to 
create something that is not a mere repetition of the past, but something 
irreducibly new. 
Purifying reflection, in conjunction with play, can therefore be said 
to create a space for radical change in therapy. It can lead to the appear-
ance of one of those psychological instants that Sartre says "furnish the 
clearest and most moving image of our freedom" (BNl: 476; BN2: 
498). They are moments of "double nothingness" (BNl: 435; BN2: 
457), where past and present, self and world, change together as I 
move towards the future in a new way. Often they are accompanied 
by feelings of anxiety as well as lightness and playfulness. The anxiety 
that arises at such moments is not neurotic anxiety about the "return 
of the repressed". It is instead existential anxiety about the encounter 
with nothingness, with one's freedom. The existential psychoanalyst, 
in moving toward the "cure", will be careful to encourage the client not 
simply to move from one sense of a solidified self to another. Rather she 
will keep in mind Sartre's idea that the "principal result" of existential 
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psychoanalysis must be to make us "repudiate the spirit of seriousness" 
(BN1: 626; BN2: 646). Its task is to allow us to move to a place where 
we take freedom itself, our own and that of others, as value. 
Freud's method, which Sartre says is "better than its principles" 
(BN1: 573; BN2: 594), may actually encourage purifying reflection. 
The fundamental rule and evenly hovering attention may create the 
space for a person to engage in purifying reflection by setting aside the 
demands of everyday reality and the motive to appear in a certain way 
in favour of a simple curiosity about what is going on (see Thompson 
1994a, 1994b for an existential perspective on Freud's technique). 
Sartre, in fact, notes that Freudian psychoanalysis "is often in sight 
of an existential discovery, but it always stops part way" (BN1: 573; 
BN2: 594). Certainly that sense of gut-level recognition that the ana-
lysand experiences when the analysis has reached a certain point and 
the analysand feels he is seeing himself clearly as if reflected in a mir-
ror is an existential discovery. This experience is no mere intellectual 
reconstruction. Sartre says that the analysand does not merely agree to 
a hypothesis. Instead he experiences its truth: "he touches it, he sees 
what it is" (BNl: 574; BN2: 595). The analyst finds the "involuntary 
testimony of the subject'' to be "precious" since he can now "pass on 
from the investigation proper to the cure" (BNl: 573; BN2: 594). 
Where Freudian psychoanalysis falls short is not so much in its 
method as in providing principles that might explain what has hap-
pened. Sartre says that the experience of the analysand cannot be 
explained in terms of unconscious material becoming conscious. If 
the complex were really unconscious, if it existed in a realm apart 
from consciousness, the analysand could not recognize it. Instead the 
"enlightenment" of the subject "is truly understandable only if the 
subject has never ceased being conscious of his deep tendencies; better 
yet, only if these drives are not distinguished from his conscious self". 
In other words, the analysand's experience only makes sense if "the 
traditional psychoanalytic interpretation does not cause him to attain 
consciousness of what he is; it causes him to attain knowledge of what 
he is" (BN1: 574; BN2: 595). It only makes sense if the analysand is 
able to articulate on the reflective level what he had previously only 
experienced pre-reflectively. 
Sartre and contemporary psychoanalysis 
I have discussed the implications of Sartre's philosophy for post-
Freudian psychoanalysis up to 1991, when Sartre and Psychoanalysis 
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was published (Cannon 1991). There I suggest that Sartre's ideas about 
the look of the other and the importance of relationship explain better 
than Freudian drive theory the relational and mirroring needs of infancy 
and early childhood discovered by many of the post-Freudians. I think 
the revolution in psychoanalytic metatheory has only accelerated since 
then. Contemporary relational, intersubjective, and interpersonal psy-
choanalysts have continued the abandonment of Freudian drive theory 
that had begun with the analysts discussed in Sartre and Psychoanalysis. 
In doing so, they have developed an even stronger relational empha-
sis (see Mitchell 2000). Following Daniel Stern (1985), many dismiss 
Freud's idea of "objectless primary narcissism" - noting that research 
shows infants to be relational from the beginning of life. Many also 
criticize the hierarchical nature of the classical analytic relationship 
along lines similar to Sartre's criticism, insisting that analysis must be 
a "two-person" venture. 
Some contemporary psychoanalysts consider the unconscious itself 
to be "relational" (see especially Bromberg 2006, 2011). If they mean 
by this that there is a nonverbal bodily lived connection between 
analyst and analysand that must be explored, then Sartre would agree 
with the idea if not with the terminology. Indeed many contempo-
rary analysts are now attending to the nonverbal aspects of analysis, 
to "implicit" as well as "explicit" knowing (including interpersonal 
knowing), to the body and the intuitive "right brainn as well as the 
rational "left brain", as important sources of analytic information 
and as important to understanding how analysis "cures". Researchers 
are even comparing "pre-reflective" interactions between mothers 
and infants with similar interactions in analysis (see Beebee et al. 
2005). There is also an emphasis on spontaneity and novelty in the 
analytic interaction. One thinks of Philip Bromberg's emphasis on 
the importance of "surprise" and "novelty" and of Daniel Stern's 
(2004) "now moments", which remind one of Sartre's psychological 
instants. On the other hand, contemporary analysts sometimes mix 
levels of discourse, conflating biological body-brain language with the 
language of experience, in a way that Sartre would have objected to. 
Sartre, for example, would object to the idea of "right brains com-
municating with right brains" (Schore 2011). As he and R. D. Laing 
([1959] 1979) after him insist, we do not experience brain structures 
but people communicating - albeit with the brain as an underlying 
substratum to consciousness . 
. Some contemporary analysts actually go beyond Cartesian dual-
ism to develop a rapprochement with phenomenology and existen-
tialism. They are beginning to refer to their work as "post-Cartesian 
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psychoanalysis" (Stolorow 2011). Among these are Robert Stolorow 
and George Atwood, who we find discussing such things as the "pre-
reflective unconscious" (Stolorow & Atwood 1992). According to 
my understanding, what they have in mind is something very close to 
Sartre's idea of pre-reflective consciousness. Donnell Stern's (2003) 
idea of the unconscious as "unformulated experience" and Christo-
pher Bollas's (1987) conceptualization of the "unthought known" also 
remind us of Sartre's idea of pre-reflective experience. Certainly Roy 
Schafer's (1976) "action language," influenced by the work of Sartre, 
had long attempted to restore agency to the "unconscious". Yet the 
continued use of the word "unconscious" for "nonverbal" seems to me 
to be problematic in all these writers, especially since most of the bod-
ily lived experience being described has little to do with the dynamic 
unconscious of Freud. It is actually pre-reflective in Sartre's sense: It is 
bodily lived and experienced, personally and interpersonally, but not 
conceptually or reflectively known. 
Sartrean existential psychoanalysis has not yet found its Freud. No 
current psychoanalyst has used Sartre's philosophy to develop a sys-
tematic approach. Indeed no one since Laing has done so. With the 
exception of Roy Schafer, Roger Frie (1997) and myself, few have 
taken Sartre's work on existential psychoanalysis seriously. Current 
psychoanalysts interested in phenomenology and existentialism, like 
Ludwig Binswanger and Medard Boss before them, have been more 
often drawn to Heidegger than to Sartre. This group includes Robert 
Stolorow and M. Guy Thompson. Although I have developed a psy-
chodynamically oriented approach based on the work of Sartre, it is not 
pure psychoanalysis. Applied existential psychotherapy (AEP) is instead 
a synthesis of existential and psychoanalytic insights with interventions 
drawn from Gestalt therapy, body-oriented psychotherapy, and other 
experiential approaches. 
Sartre's work nonetheless appears to be fertile with insights and 
suggestions that could be useful to psychoanalysis and psychoanalyti-
cally oriented psychotherapy today - along with other forms of depth 
therapy. / 
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Nothingness and negation 
Sarah Richmond 
Although the title of Being and Nothingness registers the importance 
of the concept of nothingness (le neant) to Sartre's major philosophi-
cal book, it would be a mistake to think that nothingness only entered 
his philosophical thinking- or writing-in 1943. The concept appears 
frequently, with some variations, in Sartre's earlier "phenomenologi-
cal" essays. 
In The Imaginary (Elmaginaire), Sartre's 1940 study of the imagi-
nation, the concept of nothingness, and the concepts associated with 
it- negation, denial, annihilation, nothing- play an essential role (Sar-
tre 1940, 2004a). A principal aim of that work is to reject an influen-
tial philosophical conception of imagination as a capacity to entertain 
mental images, where these are conceived as immanent states of con-
sciousness that are similar in type to sensations. Sartre argues cogently 
against that view (of which the best-known proponent is probably David 
Hume), putting forward a number of objections to the very idea that 
imagination involves the presence of "images" to the mind. Sartre argues 
instead that imaginative activity involves a relationship to the imagined 
object that requires a radical break, on the part 0f consciousness, with 
the world. In addition, he denies the existence of any "images" in the 
mind. Instead we are to understand that the imagining consciousness, 
like consciousness in general, is directed to an object. But the objects 
with which the exercise of the imagination puts us in contact are unreal. 
The imagining consciousness "must be able to form and posit objects 
affected by a certain character of nothingness'' (Sartre 2004a: 183). 
The idea of nothingness, moreover, is already intimately con-
nected, in Sartre's thinking about the imagination, with the freedom of 
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consciousness. Sartre's "Conclusion" to The Imaginary argues that for 
any consciousness to have the capacity to imagine, it is a necessary con-
dition that it be free - and, further, that the imagination makes manifest 
a freedom which, in fact, any conceivable consciousness must possess. 
As the main aim of this chapter is to set out and evaluate the claims 
that Sartre makes about nothingness in Being and Nothingness, I will not 
discuss his earlier work on the imagination in further detail. However, it 
is important to note the extent to which The Imaginary was, for Sartre, 
a "rehearsal" for the more ambitious project of Being and Nothingness. 
A similar use of phenomenological methodology to support a specific 
ontological characterization of consciousness - in terms of freedom -
is also apparent in other early works. From the outset, then, Sartre's 
interest in phenomenology co-existed with and was an instrument for 
his wish to demonstrate the existence of human freedom, and his sense 
that the way to do this was by establishing an essential connection of 
consciousness with nothingness. 
It is fair to say, however, that in Being and Nothingness the concept 
of nothingness becomes far more prominent. In a letter to Simone de 
Beauvoir dated 24 January 1940 (the year that I.:lmaginaire was pub-
lished), Sartre announces that he has just discovered that nothingness 
can be given an organizing role in the "metaphysics" he is developing: 
"I have written a bit about metaphysics ... 'What a jumble!', you will 
say. But not at all; it is neatly organized around the idea of Nothing-
ness, or the pure event in the heart of being" (Sartre 1983a: II, 56; my 
translation) In Being and Nothingness Sartre announces that his project 
is "phenomenological ontology", and argues that an adequate ontology 
must take account of nothingness, "alongside" being. The promotion 
of the concept to a more pivotal role is reflected in the fact that after 
having introduced it, in the first chapter of part one, Sartre devotes 
two of the following sub-sections to a comparison of his conception 
of nothingness with those of two influential predecessors, Hegel and 
Heidegger. In other words, nothingness is shown to be sufficiently 
important in Sartre's philosophy to warrant inclusion in a detailed 
historical narrative, in which Sartre is also careful to point up the 
advantages of his own understanding of the concept, in comparison 
with the earlier ones. 
Sartre's argument for nothingness in Being and Nothingness 
Sartre introduces the topic at an early stage in Being and Nothing-
ness. Following the introduction, which surveys the domain of being 
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in general, part one is entitled "The Problem of Nothingness". Sartre's 
route to this problem has been the need, which the Introduction has left 
unmet, to understand how the two "regions" of being so far described 
- the for-itself and the in-itself - are related to each other. Since each 
of these types of being is, Sartre says, an "abstraction" - incapable of 
existing in isolation from the other-we need to find a "concrete" phe-
nomenon that will allow us to examine them as they are instantiated 
in the world. Closely tracking Heidegger's methodology in Being and 
Time, Sartre suggests that we choose, as our initial example, the very 
activity in which we, as knowledge-seekers, are currently engaged: the 
activity of asking a question or, as Sartre often puts it, "interrogation". 
From here his path diverges from Heidegger's: Sartre wishes to focus 
specifically on the fact that, for any question, the possibility of a nega-
tive reply exists. This is true for every question, Sartre argues, not only 
for those that admit of a yes/no answer: 
There are questions which on the surface do not permit a negative 
reply - like, for example, the one which we put earlier: "What 
does this attitude reveal to us?" But actually we see that it is 
always possible with questions of this type to reply, "Nothing" 
or "Nobody" or "Never". (EN: 39; BN1: 5; BN2: 29) 
Sartre goes on to argue that negative judgements of the type "S is not 
P" cannot fully account for nothingness (or non-being - non-etre - an 
alternative term that Sartre uses interchangeably). Negative judgements 
are founded on nothingness, rather than the other way round. With 
this claim Sartre concurs with Heidegger, who had made the same 
point in his famous account of "das Nichts" put forward in his 1929 
inaugural lecture at Freiburg, "What is Metaphysics?". Sartre's ideas 
about nothingness are heavily influenced by this lecture, to which he 
explicitly refers in Being and Nothingness. (It was from this lecture 
that Carnap took the sentences that he declared to be meaningless 
"pseudo-statements" in his equally famous 1932 article "The Elimina-
tion of Metaphysics Through Logical Analysis .of Language"; Carnap 
[1932] 1959). 
The core of Sartre's argument that, in addition to the negativity 
involved in negative judgements, nothingness requires ontological 
recognition is his well-known example of Pierre's failure to turn up 
in the cafe where he is expected. Sartre's strategy here is in the first 
instance phenomenological, not in Husserl's strict sense, but in the 
looser, philosophical sense associated with appeals to "what it is like" 
to undergo some type of experience. Sartre sets out to show that when 
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we consider what it is like to discover Pierre's absence from the cafe, 
we see that the experience involves an element of "encounter" with 
Pierre's non-being which precedes the level at which a judgement might 
be made, and cannot therefore be accounted for in terms of judgement. 
At the same time, Sartre is in disagreement with Bergson's "eliminativ-
ist" treatment of the concept of nothingness, which denies that there 
is anything to that concept that cannot be derived from the idea of the 
logical function of negation. 
Taking up the point of view of the person who, having made an 
appointment to meet Pierre in the cafe, is expecting to find him there, 
Sartre describes the activity of scanning the cafe visually in order to 
locate him. In this experience, Sartre suggests, there is an intuition of 
Pierre,s absence, an experience that might subsequently be reported 
by saying "I saw that he was not there" (Sartre takes the term "intui-
tion" from Husserl; we can take it here as equivalent to "perception"). 
Sartre's point is that if, in the course of looking out for Pierre, one 
sees, say, a female customer in a brown coat, that experience is not 
just a perception of a woman in a brown coat. Rather, part of what 
one sees, in seeing the woman, is that she is not Pierre - the expe-
rience of each person, as they are visually scanned, is modified by 
the possibility of their being Pierre, such that Pierre's non-appearing 
person "haunts" it. If one compares this with the experience of the 
cafe that another person, not expecting anyone in particular, might 
have, we can see how different the two experiences will be. The other 
person, looking at the woman in the brown coat, apprehends her in 
her own right. We could say that he sees her simply as a woman-in-
a-brown-coat, whereas our person looking for Pierre sees her as a 
woman-in-a-brown-coat-who-is-not-Pierre. 
To fill out this claim about perception Sartre draws, as elsewhere in 
his work, on the resources of Gestalt psychology. According to Gestalt 
theory, sensory experiences typically involve a perceptual "field", which 
may be differently organized by different subjects, according to their 
expectations and their practical orientation. The perceptual field is 
typically articulated into a salient figure - the object of explicit atten-
tion~ against a more or less indifferently experienced background. 
Borrowing this figure/background distinction, Sartre suggests that 
in the case of the person who has the appointment with Pierre, the 
cafe as a whole forms the background for a specific anticipated figure 
- that of Pierre. But as he is not there, the figure is experienced as an 
ab,sence. It is worth quoting at length Sartre's explanation of how, in 
these circumstances, the "object" of my intuition turns out to be "a 
flickering of nothingness": 
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When I enter this cafe to search for Pierre, there is formed a syn-
thetic organization of all the objects in the cafe, on the ground 
of which Pierre is given as about to appear ... the original nihila-
tion of all the figures which appear and are swallowed up in the 
total neutrality of a ground is the necessary condition for the 
appearance of the principle figure, which is here the person of 
Pierre. This nihilation is given to my intuition; I am witness to 
the successive disappearance of all the objects which I look at - in 
particular of the faces, which detain me for an instant (Could this 
be Pierre?) and which as quickly decompose precisely because 
they "are not" the face of Pierre. Nonetheless if I should finally 
discover Pierre, my intuition would be filled by a solid element, I 
should be suddenly arrested by his face and the whole cafe would 
organize itself around him as a discrete presence. 
But now Pierre is not here. Pierre is absent from the whole cafe 
... the cafe remains ground; it persists in offering itself as an undif-
ferentiated totality to my only marginal attention. Only it makes 
itself ground for a determined figure; it ... presents the figure 
everywhere to me. This figure which slips constantly between my 
look and the solid, real objects of the cafe is precisely a perpetual 
disappearance; it is Pierre raising himself as nothingness. So that 
what is offered to intuition is a flickering of nothingness. 
(EN: 44; BNl: 9-10; BN2: 34) 
This nothingness-involving perceptual experience, then, forms the 
basis for the judgement that might subsequently be formed, that "P is 
not here": the negative judgement depends upon the antecedent, pre-
judicative "intuition". 
What should we make of this? Sartre has, I think, convincingly 
demonstrated that there is something phenomenologically distinctive 
about experiences that appear to involve nothingness, but is this suf-
ficient to establish, against the eliminativist, that nothingness needs to 
be acknowledged as an element of ontology? Sartre's account invites the 
objection that the experience of Pierre's absence frdm the cafe is merely 
subjective in so far as it depends on the prior belief or expectation that 
Pierre will be there: the ''intuition" of his absence is not after all of 
something that is there "for all to see" but is a function of the spectator's 
expectation (indeed, Bergson would explain away the "intuition" in 
just this way, as registering a mismatch between the actual appearance 
of the cafe, and the way it was expected to appear). 
Surprising as it may seem, in so far as this admission appears to weaken 
his case, Sartre is in fact happy to acknowledge that the experience of 
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Pierre's absence undergone by his friend is a function of the friend's 
expectation but, refusing to see this point as a problem for his account, 
he takes it in a completely different and non-deflationary direction. 
Sartre agrees that Pierre's absence is subject-relative in so far as it 
depends upon the observer's expectation. Pierre's absence differs from 
that of a host of other equally absent characters (Sartre mentions Wel-
lington and Valery) whose absences from the cafe are "purely formal", 
and do not figure intuitively in the experience of anyone there: 
To be sure, Pierre's absence supposes an original relation between 
me and this cafe; there is an infinity of people who are without 
any relation with this cafe for want of a real expectation which 
establishes their absence. I myself expected to see Pierre and my 
expectation has caused the absence of Pierre to happen as a real 
event. (EN: 44-5; BN1: 10; BN2: 34) 
This admission, however, is not supposed to diminish the "reality" of 
nothingness; we are not to conclude that, because Pierre's absence is 
only apparent to his friend, the "intuition" is an illusion. Rather, Sartre 
claims, it shows that nothingness is associated with human conscious-
ness, it tells us something about its "location". Sartre is happy to admit 
that without consciousness there would be no nothingness. 
In section V of the chapter, Sartre pursues the question of where 
nothingness comes from. It must be kept in mind that nothingness, qua 
non-being, has no being. It cannot then be explained in terms of the 
in-itself, because that "region" of being, as Sartre has told us, is "full 
positivity": it cannot therefore "contain ... Nothingness as one of its 
structures" (EN: 57; BN1: 22; BN2: 46). But where then can "it" come 
from? As non-being, nothingness can have no power to produce itself, 
it cannot be or do anything. 
Perhaps in order to distance himself from Heidegger's controversial 
assertion "Das Nichts selbst nichtet" (often translated as "The Nothing 
noths"), Sartre issues a logical caution about the risk of misusing the 
concept of "nothingness". Evincing a more orthodox attitude towards 
logic than Heidegger's and anticipating the objection (which I discuss 
in the following section) which A.J. Ayer would make against him -
Sartre warns that it would be incorrect to use "nothingness" as the 
subject of any verb: 
we can not grant to nothingness the property of "nihilating itself". 
For although the expression "to nihilate itself" is thought of as 
removing from nothingness the last semblance of being, we must 
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recognize that only Being can nihilate itself ... in order to nihilate 
itself it must be. But Nothingness is not. 
(EN: 57; BNl: 22; BN2: 46) 
So if nothing cannot be produced either by being or by nothingness, 
Sartre concludes that there must be some being that in some way "is" its 
own nothingness: "the being by which Nothingness comes to the world 
must be its own Nothingness" (BN1: 23; BN2: 47; Sartre's emphasis). 
There must be a being "shot through" with nothingness, a dynamic 
being which "nihilates Nothingness in its being in connection with its 
own being" (BN1: 23; BN2: 47; Sartre's emphasis). And the only being 
that fits the bill, Sartre argues, is consciousness. 
Indeed, Sartre argues, the very possibility of asking a question - the 
conduct which Sartre initially sets out to investigate - requires the 
capacity to "stand out" from being, in order to put it into question. 
A withdrawal, or detachment ("recul"), from being is required, and 
nothingness makes this possible. 
The itinerary which has led us through Pierre's absence in the cafe 
now turns out to have been redundant. It looked as if the "negative 
reply" that any question may elicit had led us to see nothingness as a 
"real" element within the world - given to intuition - but the further 
question about its source shows that in fact it is consciousness which 
introduces it there in the first place. Sartre could have managed without 
this entire P-involving detour, by simply arguing, as he does, that noth-
ingness - or, as it now takes on the guise of this new name - freedom, 
is a necessary condition of the human capacity to ask a question. 
Sartre's assimilation of the nothingness of consciousness to its free-
dom, and the context of rational enquiry, in Being and Nothingness, 
might seem to align him with the tradition of thought, inspired by Kant, 
in which freedom is said to be a requirement of rationality. Indeed, 
our freedom qua rational beings is often illustrated by our capacity 
to "question" - as when we step back from our immediate beliefs in 
order to question their well-foundedness, and to decide, on the basis of 
reflective judgement, whether to endorse or dismiss them. In fact, the 
freedom that Sartre ascribes to human consciousness has no particular 
conceptual connection with rationality: for Sartre, adherence to the 
norms of rationality is itself a choice. In this respect, nothingness is a 
useful term for indicating the "thinness" of Sartre's characterization 
of consciousness. 
We can see that Sartre's claim is simply a variant of his earlier claim, 
in The Imaginary, that nothingness is a precondition of the imagination. 
Indeed, the interchangeability of the two arguments can be seen in both 
99 
JEAN-PAUL SARTRE: KEY CONCEPTS 
texts: in Being and Nothingness, several pages after the discussion of 
Pierre in the cafe, Sartre makes it clear that the capacity for which he 
thinks nothingness is required is in fact a general human capacity to 
"tear itself away from the world" ("s'arracher au monde"), and refers 
the reader back to his earlier work on the imagination: "The image must 
enclose in its very structure a nihilating thesis" (BNl: 26; BN2: 50). 
Symmetrically, in the conclusion to The Imaginary, Sartre states that the 
freedom he has shown to be necessary for imagining is also manifested 
in conscious activity more generally. For example, Sartre says, we see 
its operation in the exercise of Cartesian doubt. 
How acceptable is Sartre's account of nothingness? Our survey so 
far should already have made dear how mind-bogglingly slippery this 
concept is. In the next section I will focus more closely on some of the 
problems raised by Sartre's use of it. 
Problems for Sartre 
An important question is whether Sartre's use of nothingness requires 
us to tolerate a logical contradiction. Certainly Sartre appears at times 
to break the so-called "law of non-contradiction". According to this law, 
allegiance to which is commonly regarded as a necessary condition of 
rational belief, P and not-P cannot both be true. If Sartre appears to vio-
late it, is there a way of making sense of what he says that we can accept? 
At some points, Sartre seems explicitly to commit himself to the 
necessity of logical contradiction in his thought. In the Introduction, 
he asserts, for example, that the "principle of identity" has only a 
"regional" validity: it holds true of the in-itself, but not of the for-itself. 
Thus Sartre agrees that we can say, in relation to being-in-itself, that 
"being is what it is" (BNl: xiii; BN2: 21; Sartre's emphasis). 
But, as he goes on to say, outside that domain the principle cannot 
be maintained: 
This statement is in appearance strictly analytical. Actually it is 
far,from being reduced to that principle of identity which is the 
unconditioned principle of all analytical judgments. First the for-
mula designates a particular region of being, that of being-in-itself. 
We shall see that the being of for-itself is defined, on the contrary, 
as being what it is not and not being what it is. 
(EN: 32; BNl: xii; BN2: 21; Sartre's emphasis) 
This passage also contains, in the last sentence, the overtly paradoxical 
phrase - "being what it is not and not being what it is" - which Sartre 
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uses throughout BN to characterize the for-itself. I will return to this 
phrase later. 
In addition to this explicit statement, there are several passages 
where Sartre appears to make the concept of nothingness internally 
contradictory by reifying it- allowing it to stand as the subject of a verb 
-in just the way that, we noted earlier, his logical caution warns against. 
The following passage, for example, illustrates Sartre's oscillation, 
in the space of a few lines, between a reified "nothing" - capable of 
"insinuating itself" between elements of being - and an incompatible 
acknowledgement of its non-being: 
This freedom which reveals itself to us in anguish can be char-
acterized by the existence of that nothing which insinuates itself 
between motives and act. If someone asks what this nothing is 
which provides a foundation for freedom, we shall reply that we 
cannot describe it since it is not. 
(EN: 69; BNl: 34; BN2: 58; Sartre's emphasis) 
In one of the earliest English-language commentaries on BN (written 
even before it had been translated into English), A. J. Ayer noticed this 
move. Ayer objected to the "Looking Glass logic" of Sartre's discussion 
of nothingness. Ayer's complaint is that Sartre uses the term "nothing" 
as if it named something (Ayer 1945: 17), closely paralleling Carnap's 
criticism of Heidegger's use of "das Nichts". Ayer goes on to illustrate 
the sort of '~trick" that Sartre plays: 
To say that two objects are separated by nothing is to say that they 
are not separated; and that is all that it amounts to. What Sartre 
does, however, is to say that, being separated by Nothing, the 
objects are both united and divided. There is a thread between 
them; only, it is a very peculiar thread, both invisible and intan-
gible. But this is a trick that should not deceive anyone. 
(Ibid.: 18-19) 
As the passage from Being and Nothingness that I have just quoted 
shows, it is undeniable that there are some passages in the text in which 
Sartre uses this "trick". However, it is also a rambling work, demon-
strably in need of editing, and within its many pages Sartre is often 
inconsistent. It would be unfair to dismiss Sartre's endeavour as a failure 
merely on the basis of a few unfortunate passages. So a question remains 
as to whether some cogent position, which is either independent of 
those passages, or allows them an unproblematic interpretation, can 
be extracted from what Sartre says. 
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One interpretative strategy, which has been used by several defenders 
of Sartre, is to steer clear of the ontological aspects of his argument alto-
gether. Anthony Manser, defending Sartre's use of "le Neant" against 
Ayer, deferred to the positivists' repudiation of metaphysics, arguing 
that Sartre was not in fact advancing metaphysical claims. Instead, 
Manser offered a reading of (parts of) Sartre's claims which likened 
them to Wittgensteinian insights about the limits of some of our con-
cepts; he suggests, for example, that if we register our unwillingness 
to say of a machine that it is "following orders", we will have under-
stood something about Sartre's opposition to psychological determin-
ism. More recently, other philosophers have suggested that the most 
productive use of Sartre's claims is to construe them as merely phe-
nomenological. Gregory McCulloch, for example, writes that Sartre 
"is interested in what is involved, from the phenomenological point of 
view, in existing ... consciously, rather than in what a conscious entity 
is (e.g. brain, biological organism, immaterial substance, or whatever)" 
(McCulloch 1994: 3-4). 
Commentators have also accommodated Sartre's apparently con-
tradictory claim that consciousness "is what it is not and is not what 
it is" by suggesting that we should qualify it - temporally or in some 
other way. There are passages in Being and Nothingness that support 
this reading: Sartre's suggestion as to what the homosexual in bad faith 
should say, were he to speak truly, incorporates just such a temporally 
qualified characterization of his identity: "To the extent that a pattern 
of conduct is defined as the conduct of a paederast and to the extent 
that I have adopted this conduct, I am a paederast. But to the extent 
that human reality cannot be finally defined by patterns of conduct, I 
am not one" (EN: 99; BNl: 64-5; BN2: 87; my emphasis). 
But these strategies are misguided. In the first place, they make 
poor sense of a great deal of the text in question. As I have attempted 
to show, Sartre takes himself to be offering a chain of arguments that 
lead to the conclusion that consciousness "introduces" nothingness 
into the world, that it is literally its vehicle (Sartre's well-known state-
ment "Nothingness lies coiled in the heart of being- like a worm" does 
not look remotely phenomenological; BNl: 21; BN2: 45). If Sartre's 
intention were to convince the reader of her freedom solely by means 
of phenomenological considerations, we would expect the experience 
of anguish to carry great weight. But Sartre actually points out that his 
claim that anguish manifests our consciousness of our freedom is not 
supposed to convince us, on its own, that we are not subject to deter-
minism. He takes himself to have provided a distinct proof of that fact 
(which, moreover, does not rely on facts about the way in which we 
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experience anything): "anguish has not appeared to us as a proof of 
human freedom; the latter was given to us as the necessary condition 
for the question" (BNl: 33; BN2: 57). 
Second, removing the ontological force from Sartre's claims, by turn-
ing them into claims about how things must appear to us, makes them 
much weaker. Sartre himself concedes that these claims cannot secure 
the conclusion he wants: that is why, as we have just seen, he does not 
make our experience of anguish the central point by which we are to 
be persuaded. He is happy to admit, against an imaginary interlocu-
tor, that anguish - despite the fact that it feels like a consciousness of 
freedom - could co-exist with a psychological determinism of which we 
were ignorant (BNl: 33; BN2: 57). Similarly, if we introduce temporal 
qualifications, in the way suggested above, to defuse the description of 
the for-itself as "being what it is not and not being what it is", the claim 
states only that consciousness is subject to change, which is, of course, 
quite compatible with psychological determinism. 
It is clear then that Sartre intends nothingness to ground our freedom 
ontologically. But once this intention is given full recognition, it also 
becomes clear that the requirements made of the concept of nothing-
ness cannot be met. 
Things go awry in Sartre's account at a number of points. One prob-
lem is that his argument often moves much too fast. This is a serious 
flaw in Sartre's attempt to found negation as a logical category on 
nothingness tout court, in which the alternative explanation offered 
by Bergson's eliminativist approach is never convincingly ruled out: 
even if the putative experience of nothingness "precedes" the specific 
judgement that "Pierre is not here", Sartre has not shown that it is not 
informed by the subject's antecedent expectation of Pierre and thereby 
dependent on prior conceptual activity. So he has not shown that the 
concept of nothingness cannot in general be derived from our capacity 
for negation. Instead, Sartre jumps from the claim that nothingness is 
necessarily associated with human consciousness to the claim that it is 
somehow "woven into" the fabric of consciousness. 
In any case, as we saw earlier, the example of Pierre is an unnecessary 
detour. It returns us to Sartre's claim, rehearsed in The Imaginary, that 
nothingness is a necessary condition for raising a question in the first 
place. But the necessity of some kind of withdrawal (recul) from the 
world is not enough to establish the necessity of nothingness. Sartre has 
pointed out that some attitude other than complete perceptual immer-
sion in being is required, but this is not enough to rule out alternatives to 
his own nothingness-involving account. Sartre of course will dismiss any 
representational account of our capacity to conceive of things as being 
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other than they are - but the reason for this dismissal-that conscious-
ness can have no "content" - is not independent of the conclusion he 
is trying to establish. Rather than leading us to his ontology from some 
point outside it, then, Sartre's train of thought seems to circle around 
within it (Sebastian Gardner (2009: 22), one of Sartre's ablest defend-
ers, suggests that we might make a virtue of Sartre's "methodological 
circularity", once we have recognized its unavoidability. I do not have 
space to discuss this sophisticated line of defence here, but the strategy 
needs to be noted.). 
Most philosophical theories are obliged to acknowledge the exist-
ence of compelling philosophical alternatives; I am not suggesting either 
that the failure of Sartre's theory to adequately rule such alternatives 
out could have been avoided, or that it is fatal. There is, in addition, a 
general problem with the concept of nothingness that we have already 
touched on. The problem is the philosophical work that Sartre wants 
this concept to do. Even if we seem able to formulate a concept of 
nothingness, we cannot intelligibly grant it an explanatory role in rela-
tion to being. Sartre cannot at the same time respect his own logical 
caution about nothingness (by remaining faithful to its non-being) and 
establish that nothingness is the reason for our freedom. Sartre rep-
resents nothingness as "blocking" psychological determinism, but if 
determinism would hold "without" nothingness, then it must also hold 
"with" it, because non-being cannot intervene in the workings of being. 
Commentators have pointed out that one bizarre consequence of the 
ontology Sartre presents in BN is that, in terms of being, it amounts to 
no more than materialism. Adding non-being to the picture does not 
add any genuine further way of establishing human freedom. 
Problems without Sartre 
Sartre is often at his most brilliant when criticizing and noticing the 
weaknesses in the theories he rejects. And it is noteworthy that everyone 
who has taken a serious interest in the areas of philosophical thought 
that Sartre's own concept of nothingness aims to revolutionize has 
found them to be formidable and vexatious. In particular, Sartre is 
right to notice that the basic nature of human consciousness - and its 
capacity for self-consciousness - are especially resistant to explanation, 
either in naturalistic terms or by means of our "ordinary" concepts. 
From the outset of the phenomenological tradition, philosophers 
found it impossible to articulate the structures of consciousness satis-
factorily. For example, Franz Brentano (commonly regarded as the first 
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phenomenologist) is committed to two doctrines about consciousness 
that cannot be reconciled: first, that the object of consciousness is a 
content of consciousness, a "proper part" of it; and second, that in the 
case of self-consciousness, or "secondary intentionality", the object of 
consciousness is itself. This is mereologically impossible. Related dif-
ficulties can be found in Brentano's phenomenological successors, for 
example, in Husserl, in the "splitting of the ego", which makes phenom-
enological reflection possible. More recent discussions of consciousness 
often make these challenges the starting point of discussion. (And David 
Chalmers's well-known phrase "the hard problem of consciousness" 
turned the difficulty of accounting for consciousness's subjective aspects 
into a slogan.) In light of this history, we could regard it as a merit of 
Sartre's account that it embraces the contradictions that have been such 
a stumbling block to others, and tries to put them to productive use. 
In addition, Sartre shows great insight in grasping the many areas 
in philosophy in which the phenomenon of non-existence (as non-Sar-
treans would put it) features, and is poorly understood. Alongside the 
imaginary objects that Sartre discusses in The Imaginary, philosophers 
have struggled to explain the ontology of fictional entities, impossible 
objects (like the round square), and the objects referred to in statements 
of their non-existence. Sartre's elaboration of the concept of nothing-
ness aims both to account for these strange objects and to unify them 
within its compass. 
I have argued that Sartre's attempt to make the transition, from the 
phenomenon of negative judgements to a "nothingness" that allegedly 
provides their foundation, is insufficiently motivated. In relation to his 
philosophical rivals, we might see Sartre as making the same mistake: 
however apparent it may be that these rival theories are not successful, 
it does not, unfortunately, follow that the turn to nothingness provides 
a solution. 
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The look 
S0ren Overgaard 
Introduction 
Other people have a special place in our lives. Many of our favourite 
activities - from sports to serious conversations - essentially involve 
others, and numerous things that we can do by ourselves - watch a 
good movie, taste wine, visit museums - are just more fun if we can 
share the experience with someone. At the same time, other people are 
also the ones from whom we try to hide if we have done something 
dumb, embarrassing or morally wrong. And others can bore, annoy, 
threaten and harm us in a multitude of different ways. As we all know 
too well, life with others is not always pure bliss; indeed, as a character 
in Sartre's play No Exit (Sartre 1945b, 1955) puts it, other people can 
be "hell". An emphasis on the more negative aspects of human social 
life is evident in most of what Sartre writes about our relations with 
others in Being and Nothingness, induding his famous analysis of the 
fundamental encounter with the other in the shape of what Sartre 
terms "the look". 
The present chapter offers a presentation and defence of Sartre's 
analysis of the look. Since Sartre develops his account against the back-
drop of what he views as the shortcomings of the analyses of the social 
encounter offered by his phenomenological predecessors, we need to 
have a basic grasp of what those analyses contain. The early parts of the 
chapter therefore offers brief summaries of Husserl's and Heidegger's 
analyses of intersubjectivity (Hegel, another of Sartre's stalking horses 
in this context, will not be discussed), after which I outline Sartre's 
most important criticisms. 
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Husserl: intersubjectivity 
"lntersubjectivity" is Husserl's term of choice for anything having to 
do with the relations between subjects. In rough outline, his account of 
the most basic intersubjective encounter runs as follows. 
We experience our immediate environment as part of an objective 
world. To appreciate this phenomenological point, look at the book 
in front of you. It appears to you as something whose existence is 
independent of your consciousness of it. You don't experience it as 
something that might cease to exist if you closed your eyes or turned 
away. You see also see it as containing more than what you perceive at 
this instant. It contains other pages beside the ones you are currently 
reading, a cover that you don't see because it is facing the desk, and so 
on. None of this can be reduced to something you know; rather, this is 
how the book looks to you. 
Not only do you experience books as things that can exist unper-
ceived by you and have more aspects or sides than you can experience 
at once - you also experience them as things that in principle could 
be different from the way they appear to you. According to Husserl, 
this reflects the fact that the book does not appear to be your "private 
synthetic formation" (Husserl 1995: 91), but strikes you as something 
others can experience as well. The book, as it appears to you, is not 
just your private experiential object, but potentially the object of other 
subjects' experiences too: it is given as "actually there for everyone" 
(ibid.). This makes it possible that the book as others experience it devi-
ates from the book as you experience it. In this way, our immediately 
experienced world - what Husserl terms the "life-world" (ibid.: 136) 
- refers back to an experiencing intersub)ectivity. 
Husserl suggests that our experience of the intersubjective signifi-
cance of the world is itself based upon a more direct experience of 
other subjects as such. Absent such an experience there is no way of 
confirming my experience of the life-world as shared with others. Hus-
serl believes the direct experience of another subject as such is possible 
in the encounter between two embodied subjects". Recall that a physi-
cal object always has more sides or aspects than are strictly perceived 
in a single perceptual experience. This, of course, has to do with the 
fact that I always see a thing from a particular perspective; and this 
perspective, in turn, is determined by my bodily position in space. Not 
only that: Husserl also argues that the sense I have of there being more 
of the object than I currently see is connected with my awareness of 
my (bodily) potential for moving and thus changing my perspective. I 
am, in other words, aware of the hidden rear sides of things as sides I 
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would see if I moved in particular ways. And since this experience of 
the object as containing "more" than is currently perceived is essential 
to its appearing as a physical object (and not, say, an afterimage), Hus-
serl concludes that only an embodied subject can experience physical 
things as such (Husserl 2001b: 39-53). 
This point is important to Husserl's account of the encounter with 
other subjects. Given that I can only have perceptual experiences of 
physical objects as such if I am embodied, Husserl's problem is not how 
I can reach other minds "behind" their bodies, but how their bodies 
can appear to me as bodies of the right sort- that is, as other embodied 
subjects. Husserl's guiding idea here is that I must experience my own 
body and the body of another as forming a "pair", appearing as two of 
a kind (Husserl 1995: 112). If I touch a table top with my hand, this 
action is at the same time subjective and bodily; and if I watch my hand 
as it explores the table top, it visually appears to me as such. If I notice 
another person's hand moving across the table top, I immediately see 
it as a subjective organ exploring the table top, just like my own hand. 
Husserl emphasizes that although this experience is an immediate 
(perceptual) experience of the other's embodied subjectivity and not 
the result of an inference (ibid.: 111), this experience is fundamentally 
different from the perception of physical objects such as books, trees 
and coffee cups. While the cup never shows all of its sides at once, it 
nevertheless has no sides or aspects that cannot be perceived. Even the 
porcelain under the glaze can be perceived, if I am willing to scratch 
or otherwise damage the cup. Other subjects, by contrast, have aspects 
that essentially are unperceivable, Husserl thinks. I can see another's 
joy in her smile, but exactly what it is like for her to feel this joy is 
something in principle beyond my perceptual grasp (ibid.: 109). Unlike 
mere physical things, then, others "transcend" my experience: they so 
to speak always contain more than I will ever be able to experience. 
Heidegger: being-with 
' Much like Husserl, Heidegger takes his point of departure in the obser-
vation that we experience the world as containing implicit references 
to others. As he puts it, "the world is always the one that I share with 
Others" (Heidegger 1962: 155). Yet Heidegger generally puts greater 
emphasis on our practical involvement with our surroundings than does 
Hµsserl, and so the former highlights others' role as potential users of 
worldly objects (rather than observers). A wedding dress, for example, 
is not merely an object perceivable by others as well as by me, but is "cut 
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to the figure" (ibid.: 153) of the person who (unlike me) will wear it. 
"Similarly", Heidegger says, "when material is put to use, we encounter 
its producer or 'supplier'" (ibid.). The field that we pass when we are 
out for a walk refers to the farmer who neglects it or manages it well; 
my copy of The Corrections refers to its author, the bookshop where it 
was purchased and the person from whom it was a present; and so on. 
Heidegger's term for what Husserl would call the "subject" is 
"Dasein", or "being-there". Consequently, he refers to other subjects 
as "Dasein-with" (ibid.: 155). Thereby he obviously wants to high-
light that others are radically different from books, fields and wedding 
gowns. Others are my co-users, so to speak: other Daseins that wear 
clothes, read books, and plough fields. While Husserl's analysis sug-
gested an image of the other as someone who was standing opposite 
me, and whom I recognized as another subject via similarities between 
our bodies and behaviours, Heidegger's account suggests the image 
of someone standing by my side, turned (like me) towards a world of 
objects-for-use. 
This becomes more evident in what Heidegger says about "solici-
tude". Unlike tools and objects that we use - that are "objects of con-
cern", in Heidegger's terminology (ibid.: 157)-solicitude is Heidegger's 
umbrella term for our ways of relating to others. The term must not be 
taken to imply sympathy or concern for the plight of others: "Being for, 
against, or without one another, passing one another by, not 'matter-
ing' to one another-these are possible ways of solicitude" (ibid.: 158). 
Types of solicitude that do involve a modicum of caring or mattering, 
however, generally fall somewhere between two extremes, Heidegger 
thinks. On the one hand, I can "leap in" for the other, that is, take over 
"for the Other that with which he is to concern himself. The Other is 
thus thrown out of his own position" (ibid.: 158). The other extreme 
is the case where, as Heidegger puts it, I "leap ahead" of the other. The 
idea here is that I do not take over the other's projects (her "concern"), 
but facilitate her own taking care of them. Here one is preoccupied 
with "the existence of the Other, not ... a 'what' with which he is con-
cerned" (ibid.: 159). The first type of solicitude/then, focuses on the 
other's projects, on that with which she is concerned, and regards the 
other as replaceable: in taking care of her projects for her, I take her 
place. The second type of solicitude is directed at the other herself, as 
the one whose projects they are, and who therefore cannot be replaced. 
Heidegger's analysis- as also suggested by his discussion of these two 
types of solicitude - is generally oriented towards projects, work and 
collaboration. Simplifying a bit, we can say that, on the Heideggerian 
analysis, we encounter others in a context in which we are "concerned" 
109 
JEAN-PAUL SARTRE: KEY CONCEPTS 
with something - either individually or collectively. This highlights a 
difference between Heidegger's and Husserl's accounts. Perhaps one 
can say that whereas Husserl conceives of the fundamental encounter 
with the other as an encounter with a "you", or at least another "I" (alter 
ego), Heidegger's account suggests that the "we" is more fundamental. 
Moreover, while Husserl emphasized the transcendence of the other, 
Heidegger maintains that the others are precisely the ones from whom 
I initially (and for the most part) do not distinguish myself (ibid.: 154). 
Heidegger's well-known analysis of the role of the so-called "they" (or 
"one": das Man) further underscores this point. As Heidegger writes: 
We take pleasure and enjoy ourselves as they take pleasure; we 
read, see, and judge about literature and art as they see and judge; 
likewise we shrink back from the "great mass" as they shrink 
back; we find "shocking" what they find shocking. The "they", 
which is nothing definite, and which all are, though not as the 
sum, prescribes the kind of Being of everydayness. (Ibid.: 164) 
As suggested towards the end of the quote, the neutral and anonymous 
"they" not only controls our choice of smartphone, takeaway food, and 
the like, but even our most basic ways of understanding ourselves, each 
other, and the world around us. In fact, Heidegger believes our inability 
to distance ourselves from what "they" say and "one" is supposed to do 
is so massive that we generally are not even ourselves, but "they-self" 
or "one-self" (ibid.: 167). 
Sartre's critique 
As mentioned, Sartre's account of "being-for-others" takes its point of 
departure in what Sartre perceives as the weaknesses of the Husserlian 
and Heideggerian accounts. According to Sartre, Husserl is unable to 
escape solipsism- the hopeless view that only I (Latin: solus ipse) exist-
since on the Husserlian account the other can only appear "as an object 
to my knowledge" (BNl: 231; BN2: 255). Sartre discusses an example 
that may help to understand the reasoning behind this accusation. 
Sartre imagines that he is sitting in a park. Suddenly he notices 
another man pass by a bench located at the edge of a lawn. Sartre sees 
the man "as an object and at the same time as a man" (BNl: 25 4; BN2: 
2?7). What this involves, according to Sartre, is noticing how the sur-
roundings - the lawn, the benches, and so on - organize themselves 
around the stranger (BNl: 254; BN2: 277-8). This has the further 
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implication that these surroundings are no longer organized or grouped 
around me but flee from me towards a new centre in the shape of the 
other person: 
[The green lawn] turns toward the Other a face which escapes me. 
I apprehend the relation of the green to the Other as an objective 
relation, but I can not apprehend the green as it appears to the 
Other. Thus suddenly an object has appeared which has stolen 
the world from me. (BNl: 255; BN2: 279) 
This "object" is of course the other person. The rather conflict-oriented 
slant Sartre gives his description of the example should not blind us to 
the fact that the description is supposed to illustrate the essence of Hus-
serl's account (BN1: 256; BN2: 280). Just like Husserl, Sartre empha-
sizes how my experience of the embodied other is at the same time an 
experience that the world is not exhausted by its being for me, but is 
also what it is for the other. Since the world is in this sense no longer 
mine, one can (perhaps) say that the other has "stolen" it from me. 
Sartre thinks the Husserlian account is alright as far as it goes, but 
that it will never give Husserl what he wants, namely an analysis of 
the most fundamental encounter with another subject. For as Sartre 
writes, "the Other is still an object for me" (BNl: 255; BN2: 2 79). Of 
course, the other is a very special object given his power to reorganize 
my surroundings; yet he is nevertheless still my experienced object. 
The problem now is the following: if the most fundamental relation 
to another is a relation between me as the experiencing subject and 
the other as an experienced object, then it is not possible to verify - it 
becomes "purely conjectural" (BNl: 253; BN2: 276)-that the other is 
an experiencing subject just like me. On the one hand, the other seems 
fundamentally different from the lawn, the benches, and so forth. On 
the other hand, he is an observed object just as they are. And unless 
there is some other, more direct way in which he can manifest himself 
as an experiencing subject, his special status seems merely an unfounded 
assumption. Consequently, Sartre concludes thatJ--Iusserl cannot escape 
solipsism. 
Sartre does not find Heidegger's account satisfactory either. While 
Husserl conceived of the encounter with the other along the lines of 
Sartre's example of the stranger in the park, the image suggested by 
Heidegger's description is that of "a crew. The original relation of the 
Other and my consciousness is not the you and me; it is the we . ... It 
is the mute existence in common of one member of the crew with his 
fellows" (BNl: 246-7; BN2: 270). The problem with this image is not 
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that it reduces the other to an object and thereby collapses into solip-
sism. Rather, the problem is that the individual Dasein's relationship 
with the ~'crew" is a relationship with an abstract, anonymous sociality, 
as opposed to concrete other individuals - such as "Pierre or Anny''. 
More precisely, to the extent that the others with whom I am standing 
"side by side" are given to me as concrete individuals, then they must 
be so given in virtue of another type of experience I have had of them, 
in which they were presented as the individuals they are (BN1: 427; 
BN2: 448-9). I do not get to know other individual people by marching 
beside them (cf. BN1: 424; BN2: 446). So if I do know the ones with 
whom I march it must be because I have or have had other relations or 
encounters with them besides "being-with" them, shoulder to shoul-
der. But since "being-with" is supposed to designate the very structure 
that makes possible every encounter with other particular persons, no 
such more original encounter can be envisaged, on the Heideggerian 
account. Therefore, that account is ultimately solipsistic, Sartre argues 
(BN1: 247-9; BN2: 270-72). 
Here we have only scratched the surface of Sartre's critical discussion 
of Husserl and Heidegger. Much more could be said not only to flesh 
out Sartre's criticisms, but also on behalf of the targets of his criticisms. 
But our main interest here is in the conclusions Sartre draws from this 
discussion in terms of the nature of a viable account of the encounter 
with the other. 
The look 
As Sartre views the situation, it has become dear that neither my expe-
rience of the other (my looking at the other), nor our experience of, 
or "concern" with, some common object or task, can constitute the 
most fundamental relation between me and another subject. The obvi-
ous alternative, Sartre thinks, is a relation such that I am the other's 
experienced object. I encounter the other as subject precisely when I 
experience myself as the one who is being looked at, as opposed to the 
one who is looking. Thus, Sartre claims that the most original encounter 
with the other is an encounter with "the one who looks at me" (BN1: 
257; BN2: 281) - an encounter with the other's "look". 
The other's look does not have to be in the shape of two eyes directed 
at me. The look "will be given just as well on occasion when there is 
a- rustling of branches, or the sound of a footstep followed by silence, 
or the slight opening of the shutter, or a light movement of a curtain" 
(BNl: 257; BN2: 281). In fact, it is this sort of case, rather than my 
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experience of "the convergence of two ocular globes in my direction" 
(ibid.), which is the paradigmatic experience of the look. For as Sartre's 
own formulations make clear, eyes are objects. If the other who is look-
ing at me is herself visible to me, then I can - by looking at her - make 
the look disappear behind the two "ocular globes". Such formulations 
may sound strange, but Sartre's thought is by no means counterintui-
tive. There is a sense in which one can make another's look go away 
by staring at his or her eyes as if they were mere physical objects. "The 
Other's look", by contrast, "hides his eyes; he seems to go in front of 
them" (BNl: 258; BN2: 282). Indeed, "the Other's look is the disap-
pearance of the Other's eyes as objects which manifest the look" (BNl: 
268; BN2: 292). 
"The look", therefore, refers more to a subjective experience than 
to a phenomenon "out there" in the world. It is supposed to articulate 
our experience of another subject's presence, an experience we may 
have when no one is actually there and may fail to have when another 
person is actually looking at us. This is also clear in one of Sartre's most 
famous examples of the look: the experience of being caught peeping 
through a keyhole. At first I am totally caught up in the scene revealed 
to me through the keyhole - I am pure looking, as it were. Suddenly 
I think I hear footsteps behind me, and everything changes: I am now 
the shameful, contemptible voyeur exposed by the look of the person 
behind me. As Sartre discusses the example, however, it turns out there 
is no one there after all. But this does not mean that the look goes away. 
When, turning around, I discover that no one is there, what is cancelled 
is only "the contingent connection between the Other and an object-
being in my world", not the other's presence as subject, as look (BNl: 
277; BN2: 301). That the look remains is evidenced my burning cheeks 
and my lingering feeling of having been exposed. 
In fact, Sartre quite generally associates the experience of the look 
with feelings of vulnerability, disempowerment and even enslavement 
(BN1: 259, 265, 267; BN2: 282, 289, 291). The look paralyses me 
and makes it impossible for me to act naturally (or even look back). 
The nervousness we may feel if we have to speak/sing or dance in front 
of a large audience illustrates Sartre's point. We need not believe that 
the audience is a hostile one to feel that the sheer weight of their looks 
makes it difficult to act naturally. Even to walk or speak naturally can 
be almost impossible when one feels the others' looks piercing one's 
skin, as it were. 
According to Sartre, the only way in which I can escape my role as 
the other's paralysed object is by making the other my object, thereby 
again assuming the role of experiencing subject. But this means that 
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the most fundamental relation with others becomes one of conflict 
' 
where we struggle to objectify each other: "While I attempt to free 
myself from the hold of the Other, the Other is trying to free himself 
from mine; while I seek to enslave the Other, the Other seeks to enslave 
me" (BNl: 364; BN2: 386). Not only is this perspective on social life 
pretty bleak in itself; what makes matters worse is that the conflict is 
quite irresolvable: 
if I look at his look in order to defend myself against the Other's 
freedom and to transcend it as freedom, then both the freedom 
and the look of the Other collapse. I see eyes; I see a being-in-
the-midst-of-the-world. Henceforth the Other escapes me. . .. 
everything happens as if I wished to get hold of a man who runs 
away and leaves only his coat in my hands. It is the coat, it is the 
outer shell which I possess. (BN1: 393; BN2: 415) 
It is difficult to see how it could be otherwise. For the other's presence 
as a subject is her presence as the one who looks at me, objectifies me. 
Thus, if her exposure to my gaze merely places an object before my eyes, 
then any attempt on my part to conquer the other qua subjectivity must 
fail. I wiII never have more than the coat. And the problem with that is 
that the other has merely eluded my grasp, not disappeared entirely, and 
thus is still out there looking at me. As Sartre writes, "what is certain 
is that I am looked at: what is only probable is that the look is bound 
to this or that intra-mundane presence" (BNl: 277; BN2: 300). No 
matter how many such intra-mundane presences I am able to paralyse 
with my gaze, I am still looked at; I can never catch hold of the other as 
the one who looks at me. Sartre suggests that the other who looks at me 
consequently has an "unnumbered'' or "prenumerical" presence (BNl: 
281-2; BN2: 305). It is, then, not really this or that particular other 
that I encounter when I am being looked at, but rather something like 
Heidegger's neutral Man, which is everyone, yet no one in particular 
(cf. BN1: 282; BN2: 306). 
In the chapter called "Concrete Relations with Others", Sartre pains-
takingly draws the consequences of his conflict-oriented understanding 
of our encounters with others, issuing, for example, in his notorious 
analyses of love and sadism. Much of what of Sartre says about concrete 
relations with others is clearly reminiscent of Hegel's dialectics of mas-
ter and slave, but for Sartre mutual recognition is not in the cards. On 
th~ contrary, "we are indefinitely referred from the Other-as-object to 
the Other-as-subject and vice versa. The movement is never arrested, 
and this movement with its abrupt reversals of direction constitutes 
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our relation with the Other" (BNl: 408; BN2: 430). Thus, "we shall 
never place ourselves concretely on a plane of equality; that is, on the 
plane where the recognition of the Other's freedom would involve the 
Other's recognition of our freedom" (ibid.). 
Criticisms of Sartre 
Perhaps the most common critical reaction to Sartre's account of the 
look - and his account of social life more generally - is to fault it for 
its extremely negative slant. On Sartre's analysis, even sexual desire 
and love are ultimately types of irresolvable conflict. But, as Gregory 
McCulloch nicely put it, "many of us seem often to rub along rather 
more harmoniously than Sartre would have it, in and out of bed" 
(McCulloch 1994: 139). If so, isn't Sartre's account patently inad-
equate as an account of our most fundamental encounter with others? 
Not necessarily. Jonathan Webber makes a distinction between two 
aspects of the experience of the look, which is pertinent in this context. 
According to Webber, Sartre's account of the look weaves together 
an account of my "awareness of [my] being-for-others, of the gaze 
of the Other" with an account of the experience of the other person 
as "ascribing to one a fixed nature" (Webber 2011: 191-2). These, 
however, are different experiences, and it is only the latter experience, 
not the former, which underlies "the conflict that [Sartre] finds in our 
interpersonal relationships" (ibid.: 192). Yet the experience in question 
predominantly occurs "within the project of bad faith" (ibid.: 191; see 
also Chapter 10 of this volume), and is consequently not an experi-
ence Sartre thinks characteristic of our social existence as such. If this 
interpretation is sound, Sartre may perhaps be faulted for not keeping 
these points clearly apart. But his failing to do so, on Webber's reading, 
is merely a consequence of Sartre's general decision to weave together 
phenomenological ontology and cultural critique. At any rate, if Web-
ber is right, we can distinguish a "neutral" account of the experience of 
the look - of the pure presence of another subje€t - from the conflict-
oriented elaboration of the relations with others characteristic of the 
person in bad faith. And thereby the first criticism would be deflected. 
Webber's distinction may also help to address other criticisms. Sev-
eral critics have noted the strange fact that whereas Sartre is very insist-
ent, in his critique of Heidegger, that the encounter with the other 
must be an encounter with a concrete, particular other, Sartre himself 
ultimately associates the look with a pre-numerical other, which is 
precisely not a particular other at all (Theunissen 1984: 241-3; Zahavi 
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2002: 271-2; Overgaard 2007: 107-13). It thus seems that Sartre is 
inconsistent on this point. In fact, he seems to renounce all attempts 
to make a concrete encounter with a particular other intelligible as an 
original encounter. Such encounters can ultimately only be encounters 
with the other-as-object, and thus not original modes of intersubjectivity 
at all. The original intersubjective encounter is an encounter with an 
omnipresent, invisible and strangely abstract other. 
Perhaps, however, this criticism rests on a double misunderstanding. 
First, what Sartre clearly suggests is that the attempt to "fight back'' 
by objectifying the other is of no use, as it only allows me to conquer 
an object. But we now know that this struggle of looks is something 
characteristic of bad faith - not something that must be part and parcel 
of each and every experience of the look. Second, Sartre does not posi-
tively say that I cannot experience the look in the shape of a concrete 
person looking at me. In fact, he explicitly contradicts that claim: "what 
most often manifests a look is the convergence of two ocular globes in 
my direction" (BN1: 257; BN2: 281; Sartre's emphasis). Sartre seems 
to argue, then, that there is a way of seeing the other through feeling 
exposed to her look, and that this is quite different from looking at the 
other (as in Sartre's park example). This makes it possible for him to 
maintain that the encounter with the look can be an encounter with a 
particular, individual other. 
Moreover, if Sartre was to say that it is this experience of exposure 
to the look in a concrete face-to-face encounter that is the most original 
encounter with another subject as such, there is evidence to suggest that 
his claim might be true, in at least one sense of "most original". Devel-
opmental psychologist Vasudevi Reddy has argued that it is an infant's 
felt emotional responses (for example, of coyness) to being the object of 
another's attention that makes them aware of other people's attention 
as such (Reddy 2008: ch. 6). As Reddy writes, "in the first instance, 
infants are aware of others' attention when it is directed to themselves", 
and "this awareness is based upon the capacity to respond emotionally" 
to others' attention when so directed. Then, "as the infant's engagement 
with others' intention develops in complexity, the infant becomes aware 
others' attention when it is directed to other things in the world" (ibid.: 
92). Read through a Sartrean lens, Reddy's work seems to confirm that 
it is indeed the experience of the other's look that first reveals the other 
to us as a subject - as someone able, among other things, to attend to 
his or her surroundings. 
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Bad faith 
David Detmer 
"Bad faith", as a first approximation, refers to self-deception. While 
lying to oneself might be the clearest example of what is meant by bad 
faith, most of the examples that Sartre discusses involve techniques 
that are subtler than overt lying, and might better be characterized as 
attempts to evade the truth and to keep it hidden from oneself. Such 
conduct is widespread and common, according to Sartre, especially 
when the truth to be evaded concerns one's own freedom and conse-
quent responsibility. Accordingly, Sartre, as a champion of both freedom 
and truth, devotes a great deal of attention to describing, explaining, 
and attacking bad faith. Indeed, bad faith emerges as a central concept 
in his thought, one that is repeatedly taken up both in his philosophi-
cal work and (implicitly) in his literary writings, and throughout all 
phases of his career. 
The concept of bad faith serves a number of functions in Sartre's 
work. For example: 
• It helps him to explain the widespread acceptance of certain 
beliefs that he regards as obviously false. 
• ·It aids him in his attempt to prove that the being of consciousness 
must be radically different from that of non-conscious things. 
• As a central concept in his "existential psychoanalysis", it serves 
as an indispensable tool in his attempt to understand human lives, 
both real (as in his biographical studies of Genet and Flaubert) 
and fictional (as in his development of characters in the story 
"The Childhood of a Leader" and the play No Exit, among other 
works). 
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• Implicitly in his early works, and explicitly in his later ones, it 
functions as an instrument of moral criticism, as it is identified 
as a vice to be overcome, and is contrasted with a corresponding 
virtue, that of "authenticity". 
The challenge of bad faith 
The very existence of bad faith poses a challenge to Sartre, since it 
appears, on the face of it, to be impossible. The reason is that bad faith 
seems to imply a contradiction. If I deceive myself, "I must know in my 
capacity as deceiver the truth which is hidden from me in my capacity 
as the one deceived" (BNl: 49; BN2: 72). In this way bad faith dif-
fers both from cases of simple intellectual mistake and from cases in 
which one person deceives another. For when I make a mistake there 
is no inconsistent conjoining of true and false belief; I simply believe 
a falsehood. And when I deceive another the truth and the falsehood 
are distributed among two consciousnesses; I know the truth, and I 
lead the other to believe a falsehood that I do not myself believe. But 
if I successfully deceive myself it would appear that I must, at one and 
the same time, both know the truth (so that my denial of it counts as 
a deception, rather than as a mere mistake) and not know it (so that I 
am genuinely deceived). But how can I both know something and not 
know it at the same time? 
The answer, according to Sartre, has to do with the strange character 
of the being of consciousness. A conscious being, according to Sartre, 
differs radically from other kinds of beings in that it fails fully to coin-
cide with itself, but rather always stands somewhat at a distance from 
itself. Its manner of being is shot through with negations, dualities, and 
ambiguities; and it is precisely the exploitation of these that facilitates 
bad faith. Sartre even goes so far as to say that consciousness, or, in 
some formulations, "human reality", "is a being which is what it is not 
and which is not what it is". He insists, further, that it is precisely this 
paradoxical fact that serves as "the condition of ehe possibility for bad 
faith" (BNl: 67; BN2: 90). 
Anguish 
But what can Sartre possibly mean by such baffling claims? Perhaps the 
easiest route into grasping his meaning is to consider his discussion of 
anguish. Sartre begins his analysis by distinguishing anguish from fear. 
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Whereas fear refers to concern about an external threat, "anguish" is 
Sartre's term for the reflective awareness of one's own freedom. But 
why should the consciousness of one's freedom be identified with worry 
or concern, analogous to fear, and differing from it only in that it takes 
a different object? 
Sartre explains by offering an example. Suppose that I am walking in 
the mountains, and suddenly come upon a long, narrow path, with no 
guard rail, at the edge of an abyss. I will experience fear when I realize 
that a threat from without - a sudden gust of wind, the sliding of rocks 
or dirt under my feet - could easily cause me to plunge to my death. 
But now suppose that I respond to my fear by resolving to proceed 
slowly, and with maximum caution. I will pay careful attention to each 
and every step, and I will maintain maximum vigilance in noting at all 
times the wind, the rocks, the dirt, and any other dangerous element 
in my surroundings. In this way I can greatly minimize the risk posed 
by these external threats, and feel confident that I will be able to reach 
the end of the path safely. 
But now a new worry emerges. How can I know now that I will main-
tain this caution throughout the period in which I will be in danger? 
Perhaps after walking a way without incident I will, in spite of myself, 
gain confidence, and gradually become more relaxed and less careful. 
Notice that this new worry is addressed, not to any external danger, but 
rather to my own future attitudes, choices and actions. I am concerned, 
in short, about my own freedom. This is anguish. 
The phenomenon of anguish thus exposes one of the ways in which I 
fail to coincide with myself. Though I exist as a temporal being, because 
I am always engaged in projects that are rooted in my past and which 
aim to bring about a specific future for me (such as one in which I return 
safely from my walk in the mountains), still, I am temporally separated 
from my past and my future, both of which, at least to that extent, 
therefore elude me and remain separate from me. My relationship to 
my future is thus shown to be thoroughly ambiguous. On the one hand, 
the reason I am so worried about the mountain hiker who might fall 
to h;s death is that this hiker is, in some obvious sense, me, and not 
someone else. But in so far as that hiker is temporally separated from 
me, and therefore beyond my present control, he is not me. So "I am 
what I am not, and am not what I am". Or, to be more precise, "I am the 
self which I will be, in the mode of not being it" (BN1: 32; BN2: 56). 
Anguish in the face of the future, then, "is precisely my consciousness 
oi being my own future, in the mode of not-being", since "the decisive 
conduct will emanate from a self which I am not yet" (ibid.). 
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Freedom and negation 
My lack of self-identity, my standing apart from myself, can also be 
approached by means of an analysis of freedom. On Sartre's view, 
every free action involves a double negation. On the one hand, to act 
is to attempt to bring about a state of affairs that currently is not. On 
the other hand, every act is also an attempt to negate what currently 
is. For example, suppose that I feel cold and consequently get up and 
put on a sweater. By this action I attempt to bring about a desideratum 
(a state of affairs in which I feel warm and comfortable) that currently 
is not, and I attempt to overturn the present situation (one in which I 
feel cold and uncomfortable). Such double negativity characterizes the 
way of being of all consciousnesses. I am constantly oriented towards, 
aiming at, and striving for, what is not; and I do so on the basis of a 
standing apart from, and a fleeing from, what is. 
Moreover, that towards which I strive both is and is not me. It is me 
in the sense that I conceive of myself as persisting over time, so that the 
future I am attempting to bring about is my future, rather than someone 
else's. But it is not me in the sense that I am temporally separated from 
it, and it is to some degree beyond my present capacity to control (for 
example, perhaps I will not be able to find my sweater; or, if I do, it 
might fail to make me warm). Similarly, I both am and am not every-
thing that characterizes me at present, such as my age, my nationality, 
my occupation, my social role, my current emotional state, or even my 
"ego". I obviously am them in the sense that they do accurately pertain 
to me and describe me, such that it would be folly to deny that I am, 
for example, an American philosophy professor in his fifties. But I am 
not them in the sense that I put a distance between myself and all of 
these facticities as soon as I perceive them or think about them. At that 
point they become not so much me as objects for me. I evaluate them, 
adopt attitudes toward them, and undertake projects on the basis of 
them or in spite of them. They are neither me nor my actions, but rather 
constitute that on the basis of which I act as I attempt to negate what 
is and to bring about what is not. I 
It is in this way that my way of being differs most radically from that 
of non-conscious things. A rock or a chair neither aims towards what 
is not nor attempts to negate what is. It forms no attitude towards any 
aspect of itself and does not take itself for an object. Thus, it fails to 
stand apart from itself, but rather coincides with itself perfectly. It is 
what it is. A conscious being, by contrast, escapes, evades and negates 
itself at every turn. It is what it is not and is not what it is. 
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How to deceive successfully: genera I principles 
But how, exactly, does the slippery, ambiguous, paradoxical nature of 
the being of consciousness facilitate bad faith? The answer to this ques-
tion has everything to do with the fact that it is usually easier to deceive 
with unclear and misleading half-truths than it is with clear statements 
of blatant falsehoods. For one thing, clarity aids, and vagueness inhibits, 
the critical project of investigating a claim so as to determine whether 
or not it is true. In order to refute an assertion, one ordinarily needs a 
reasonably clear understanding of what it means. So an effective method 
of deception is to employ ambiguity and vagueness, coupled with an 
appeal to the intended audience's interests and prejudices, so as to sug-
gest a message that would not be received so uncritically if it were stated 
clearly. Similarly, while it is often easy to expose deceptive statements 
in which the deceptive element resides in what is explicitly stated, it 
is vastly more difficult (it generally requires much more imagination, 
energy and critical thinking skills) to expose as deceptive statements that 
are, strictly speaking, true (or, at least, partly true), but which mislead 
by means of omission and emphasis. If one asks whether or not a given 
claim is true, often it is fairly obvious how one might go about finding 
the answer. For claims that are false are all false in the same way: they 
assert something that is not the case. But misleading statements can 
deceive in an almost unlimited number of ways. To anticipate, and thus 
to be able to investigate, all of the different ways in which a statement 
might mislead because it simply leaves out (rather than lies about) 
something of crucial importance, or because it puts undue emphasis on 
something else (even without lying about it), is often well beyond the 
critical resources of the intended audience for the deception. 
So the ambiguity of consciousness, its character of being what it is 
not and not being what it is, enables bad faith by rendering deceptive 
beliefs about oneself merely misleading partial-truths rather than clear 
thoroughgoing falsehoods. I deceive myself about myself by playing 
up one aspect of the complex being of my consciousness while playing 
down another, rather than by telling myself stories about myself that 
are dearly and wholly false. 
The specific mechanisms of bad faith 
Exploiting the facticity/transcendence duality 
One such pair of aspects that Sartre discusses at length is that of "factic-
ity" and "transcendence". Roughly speaking, the former term refers 
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to everything about me that is "given", that "is". It refers to all of the 
facts that pertain to me, such as the fact that I was born at a certain 
time and in a certain place, that I now hold a specific job, that I am the 
father of a specific person, that I have done certain definite things in 
the past, and so forth. "Transcendence", on the other hand, refers to all 
of the ways in which I go beyond these givens by thinking about them, 
evaluating them, and, most importantly, by undertaking actions on the 
basis of them (or in spite of them or in opposition to them). In short, 
"transcendence" is a synonym for "freedom", which Sartre understands 
in terms of a negating of facticity in the context of a reaching towards 
a desideratum that currently is not. 
This "double property of the human being" (BN1: 56; BN2: 79) 
facilitates bad faith because it allows me to deceive myself by (1) ident-
ifying myself with my facticity while ignoring my transcendence, (2) 
identifying myself with my transcendence while ignoring my facticity, 
or (3) sliding back and forth, in an unprincipled way, between iden-
tifying myself with my facticity and doing so with my transcendence. 
Such behaviours can be undertaken with a great deal of subtlety, so 
that they amount to nothing more than a selective focusing on one 
thing while averting one's gaze from something else. They need not 
involve the denial of truths that one is staring in the face, for such 
lies would indeed "fall back and collapse beneath my look" (BN1: 
49; BN2: 73). 
Bad faith is further facilitated by the fact that, according to Sar-
tre, the meaning of facticities is never self-announcing, but rather 
always depends on transcendence. He argues, on the basis of a care-
ful description of our perceptual experience, that seeing is almost 
always seeing-as. We encounter things in our perceptual field under 
the colour of concepts and categories. An apple might be noticed 
and seen as an apple, or as a specific kind of apple (such as golden 
delicious), or as a yellow thing, or as a roundish thing, or as a thing 
on the table, or as a fruit, or as an edible thing, or as a small thing, 
or as a thing from the grocery store, or as a thing to be included in 
a still life painting, and so on, or it might not be noticed at all, or 
noticed only vaguely and marginally, as part of the undifferentiated 
background of some more interesting object that is demanding my 
attention. Whether something is noticed at all, and if so, as what, 
and with what meaning, is usually determined by my interests and 
projects. (And Sartre holds that in all perception there is an elevation 
of part of the perceptual field to the foreground and a relegation of 
other parts to the background.) If I am interested in eating, I see the 
apple as an apple. If I am interested in painting, I see it as an element 
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in a still life. And if I am intensely engaged in a project with respect 
to which the apple has no relevance, I am likely either to ignore it or 
to notice it only marginally. 
So it is only as I am going beyond, or transcending, facticity that it 
emerges as meaningful. This is significant because, were it the case that 
I ignored some things so as to focus on others, and saw the things that 
I did focus on under the interpretive colour of some concepts rather 
than others, only or especially when I wanted to deceive myself, then I 
would be on my guard whenever I engaged in such behaviours, and my 
attempts at deception would be likely to fail. But because conceptual 
interpretation and selective focusing are essential parts of the phenom-
enon of perception as such, I can have no principled objection to their 
use in any given case. So my deceptive and misleading selective focusing 
on transcendence at the expense of facticity (or the reverse) in any given 
case need not lead to suspicion. And the same is true of my subsuming 
what I am focusing on under a deceptive and misleading interpretation. 
In short, the fact that omission, emphasis and interpretation are neces-
sary and legitimate in principle makes their illegitimate and dishonest 
use much harder to detect. 
Sartre is quick to point out, however, that the slippery and ambigu-
ous character of our way of being does not preclude accurate and hon-
est thought about it. For example, specifically with regard to facticity 
and transcendence, Sartre insists that ''these two aspects of human 
reality are and ought to be capable of a valid coordination" (BNl: 56; 
BN2: 79). To show this, he presents the example of a gay man who 
wishes to deny his homosexuality, as well as that of his friend, "the 
champion of sincerity", who wishes him to affirm it. The gay man is 
in bad faith because he denies his facticity. He acknowledges all of the 
facts that would lead an impartial observer to regard his orientation as 
homosexual, but "he refuses to draw from them the conclusion which 
they impose" (BNl: 63; BN2: 87). He does so by engaging in a double 
strategy. On the one hand, he identifies himself almost exclusively with 
his transcendence, minimizing his facticity. And on the other hand, to 
the e:ctent that he does confront his facticity, in the form of the his-
tory of his sexual conduct, he adopts an interpretation (he is sexually 
adventurous, but has merely had very bad luck in meeting women) 
whereby that conduct is not indicative of a deeply rooted tendency. 
The champion of sincerity, on the other hand, is in bad faith in that he 
denies his friend's transcendence, seeing him as a kind of thing, who 
is ,a homosexual in the same way that a paper clip is a paper clip. He 
regards his friend as having a fixed essence, so that his past conduct 
also constitutes his future destiny. 
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On Sartre's view, both of these men assert a half-truth, and neglect 
one or the other half of the facticity/transcendence duality. To avoid 
bad faith, they would need to attain, and to confront honestly, a clear 
understanding of the coordinated interplay of these two aspects of 
human existence. As Sartre puts it, the gay man would not be in bad 
faith were he to say: 
to the extent that a pattern of conduct is defined as the conduct of 
a homosexual and to the extent that I have adopted this conduct, 
I am a homosexual. But to the extent that human reality can not 
be finally defined by patterns of conduct, I am not one. 
(BNl: 64; BN2: 88; translation modified) 
Exploiting other dualities 
Bad faith can also be facilitated by several other dualities pertaining to 
the being of conscious agents. For example, recall from the discussion 
of anguish that we are temporal beings, ambiguously situated with 
respect to our past and future: I both am and am not my future and 
my past. While instances of bad faith involving the past/future duality 
are often identical to cases based on the facticity/transcendence dual-
ity (with the past playing the role of facticity and the future playing 
the role of transcendence), other cases have a different structure. For 
example, suppose that I habitually engage in behaviours that are likely 
to destroy my health gradually over time. While the bad faith that sup-
ports such self-destructive conduct might take the form of a denial of 
facticity (I ignore the abundant evidence concerning, say, the hazards of 
smoking), it might have nothing to do with a denial of either facticity 
or transcendence, but might, instead, simply be based on the ambiguity 
of my relationship to my future self. By identifying myself exclusively 
with my past and present I might wholly affirm the half-truth that the 
old man who will suffer from my behaviour is "not me", but rather 
someone else for whom I will do no more now than feel pity. 
Or again, consider Sartre's distinction betweeR thetic and non-thetic 
(or positional or non-positional) awareness of things. The point of this 
distinction is that to be conscious is to focus, so that some things get my 
full attention (thetic awareness), whereas I am only marginally (non-
thetically) aware of other things in my perceptual field. This distinction 
(which, once again, refers not to an occasional or optional feature of 
conscious experience, but rather to an ineliminable part of its essential 
structure, thus ruling out the possibility of a quick, principled objection 
to its use in instances of bad faith) facilitates bad faith by the simple 
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means of selective focusing. Whenever something that might displease 
me about myself begins to call itself to my attention, I can simply avert 
my gaze, focus on something else, and cause this item to melt into the 
relatively undifferentiated ground of my marginal attention. Similarly, 
if I am, perhaps against my will, confronted with clear instances in my 
past of some kind of misconduct, I can still refrain from investigating 
them, inquiring into them, bringing them to full and lucid clarity, and 
asking myself what sort of pattern they suggest. This is surely self-
deception, but it falls short of the kind of full-blooded lie to oneself 
that would entail a contradiction. It relies, instead, on the technique 
of keeping vague things vague, and of exploiting the ambiguities and 
self-divisions of consciousness so as to enable me to emphasize what I 
want to emphasize and to omit what I want to omit. 
The bad faith of selective focusing is further enabled by another 
essential structure of consciousness, that of the pre-reflective/reflective 
duality. Sartre argues that the primary mode of consciousness is pre-
reflective. In this mode consciousness is fired out towards the objects 
in the world with which it is concerned. It does not reflectively focus 
on itself. That is a secondary mode of consciousness, made possible by 
consciousness's non-thetic, or marginal, awareness of its own activi-
ties when it is engaged pre-reflectively with other objects. When I am 
counting, the content of my thought is "1, 2, 3, 4, 5", and so forth. 
However, if someone were suddenly to interrupt me and demand to 
know what I am doing, I would easily be able to shift from the pre-
reflective to the reflective mode and report, "I am counting". This 
pre-reflective/reflective duality facilitates bad faith through selective 
focusing in that it allows me to remain in the pre-reflective mode while 
I am doing despicable things (so that my attention remains riveted to 
the objects with which I am dealing, and takes no notice of me, or of 
issues concerning the meaning or interpretation of my actions, let alone 
what they, in concert with other actions of the same sort, might imply 
about my character), while at the same time allowing me to visit the 
reflective mode, and to return to it often, during the (perhaps much 
rarer) cases when I am doing laudable things. In this way I can become 
skilled at noticing, and basking in, my nobility and virtue, while scarcely 
noticing my vices. 
Handling evidence 
Pr9bably the most important technique of bad faith is simply the ability 
to allow oneself to be persuaded by weak evidence. This is not usually 
accomplished by first noticing that the evidence for a given belief is 
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weak, and then persuading oneself that the evidence is nonetheless 
adequate to support the belief. Rather, the more common progression 
would be something like this: First, I want to believe something. Then, 
rather than engaging in an honest inquiry into the evidence concerning 
it, I search, in a one-sided way, for evidence that will justify my belief. 
Finally, without explicitly focusing on it or formulating the point to 
myself in words, I respond to a dimly perceived vague worry that the 
evidence might not turn out to be good enough by resolving to use a 
low evidentiary standard. As Sartre puts it: 
Bad faith does not hold the norms and criteria of truth as they 
are accepted by the critical thought of good faith. What it decides 
first, in fact, is the nature of truth ... [Bad faith] stands forth in the 
firm resolution not to demand too much, to count itself satisfied 
when it is barely persuaded, to force itself in decisions to adhere 
to uncertain truths. (BN1: 68; BN2: 91) 
An extremely common related technique of bad faith is to employ, in 
an inconsistent and unprincipled way, different standards of evidence 
for different beliefs, so that one adopts a low standard of evidence for 
beliefs one wants to affirm, while simultaneously insisting on a high 
standard for beliefs one wishes to reject. For example, if I wish to 
criticize a head of state, I might accept weak evidence that his policies 
are responsible for high gasoline prices. But if gas prices are high when 
someone I approve of is in office, I find the evidence that the policies 
of a head of state can significantly affect such prices to be inconclusive 
and unconvincing. 
Notice, once again, that these are methods of self-deception that 
do not involve overt lying. With them there is no denying of plain 
facts that one is staring in the face. Rather, they deal with matters of 
judgment in weighing and evaluating evidence, issues that are difficult 
and controversial, making the transgression of valid' norms concern-
ing them often difficult to detect, and impossible to dismiss in a quick 
and principled way. The project of believing something on the basis of 
weak evidence does not impose the sort of psychological barriers that 
would be put in play by an attempt to lie to oneself about an obvious 
truth of which one is lucidly aware. After all, in the former case I do not 
know that the belief I wish to affirm is false. Moreover, there is some 
evidence to support the claim that it is true. Finally, it is unclear how 
much evidence is needed to make a belief defensible in the first place, 
so that it is not obvious that I am doing anything wrong by believing 
this - or so I, perhaps convincingly, tell myself. 
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Bad faith as an explanation of widely held false beliefs 
Ordinarily, false beliefs require no special explanation. Some issues are 
difficult; information regarding them is often lacking; and people can 
make honest mistakes in attempting to reason about them. In addition, 
in this world of advertising, public relations, political propaganda, and 
the like, many false beliefs can be attributed, in part, to successful efforts 
on the part of some to deceive others. Why, then, does Sartre so fre-
quently invoke bad faith as an explanation for false beliefs? 
One reason is that Sartre holds a distinctive conception of conscious-
ness, maintaining that it is always self-aware. In this same vein, he rejects 
any kind of psychoanalytic notion of an unconscious mind in which 
some contents might be hidden from consciousness. Were it not for his 
analysis of bad faith, these positions would render it difficult for him 
to explain why there are, as he also insists, commonly held false beliefs 
about consciousness itself. 
Bad faith emerges as a plausible explanation, however, in light of the 
fact that the false beliefs in question are comforting, and involve deni-
als of truths that would be demanding, disturbing, or threatening. For 
example, as we have seen, Sartre claims that when we are reflectively 
aware of our freedom, we experience it as anguish. One reason why we 
so seldom focus on our freedom and face up to its implications, and why 
so many of us deny it entirely in favour of a deterministic worldview, 
is, for Sartre, precisely that we wish to flee our anguish and to escape 
the irksome obligations it imposes, namely, the obligation to act, and 
to take responsibility for our actions. 
Bad faith in Sartre1s fictional works and biographical studies 
Many of Sartre's stories and plays feature characters in bad faith. For 
example, in his play No Exit (Sartre 1945b, 1955), the character Garcin, 
dead and in hell, attempts to flee from the realization that he had lived 
his life as a coward. His main technique of bad faith is the denial of 
facticity. He desperately attempts to avoid confronting the pattern sug-
gested by his past actions, and seeks instead to identify himself with 
his lofty aims and intentions, which he had not lived long enough to 
fulfil. Because the evidence of his cowardice is so strong, he does not 
go so far as to try to convince himself that he had been a hero. Instead, 
he merely claims that, because of his premature death, the matter "had 
been left in suspense, forever" (Sartre 1955: 39). 
Bad faith also figures strongly in Sartre's biographical works, in 
which he makes use of his "existential psychoanalysis" in an attempt 
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to understand a human life. For example, in his biography of Jean 
Genet, he suggests that the initial course of Genet's life was set in his 
early childhood, when he, in stark contrast to Garcin, identified him-
self solely in terms of his facticity and denied his transcendence. This 
identification sprang from an incident in which he was caught steal-
ing, and heard an adult say of him: "you are a thief". Referring to this 
incident, Sartre comments: 
He who was not yet anyone suddenly becomes Jean Genet ... It 
is revealed to him that he is a thief and he pleads guilty, crushed 
by a fallacy which he is unable to refute; he stole, he is therefore 
a thief ... What he wanted was to steal; what he did, a theft; what 
he was, a thief ... Genet is a thief; that is his truth, his eternal 
essence. And if he is a thief, he must therefore always be one, 
everywhere, not only when he steals, but when he eats, when he 
sleeps, when he kisses his foster mother. (Sartre 1964a: 26-8) 
Bad faith as an instrument of moral criticism 
While in Being and Nothingness Sartre claims to be employing the term 
"bad faith" merely descriptively, with no moral connotation, he drops 
this pretence in his later works. In these writings he criticizes bad faith 
and calls, instead, for "authenticity", which he defines in terms of "hav-
ing a true and lucid consciousness of the situation [and] in assuming the 
responsibilities and risks that it involves" (Sartre 1965b: 90). He adds 
that "there is no doubt that authenticity demands courage and more 
than courage. Thus it is not surprising that one finds it so rarely" (ibid.). 
His reasons for condemning the flight from truth are presented 
most clearly in some of his posthumously published works, such as 
Notebooks for an Ethics (Sartre 1983b, 1992) and Truth and Existence 
(Sartre 1989b, 1995). His main point is that if we do not know the 
truth about the world, we will not know what needs to be changed. 
Nor will we know what means are likely to be effective in changing it. 
Consequently, we will be unable to carry out successfully our moral 
obligation to change the world for the better. 
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Authenticity 
Jonathan Webber 
Introduction 
Sartre's concern with individual authenticity pervades his early phil-
osophical and literary writings. Yet his conception of authenticity is 
somewhat elusive. The only significant point he makes directly about 
authenticity in Being and Nothingness is in a footnote. There, he tells 
us that authenticity is the opposite of bad faith, but goes on to say 
that the description of authenticity "has no place here" (BNl: 70n; 
BN2: 94n). In two immediately subsequent works, Existentialism ls 
a Humanism and Anti-Semite and Jew, Sartre argues that authenticity 
is the fundamental virtue in his ethical outlook and he characterizes 
various examples of authentic and inauthentic ways of living, but in 
neither work does he give a clear explication of the idea of authenticity 
itself. His notes from that period, posthumously published as Notebooks 
for an Ethics (Sartre 1983b, 1992), make it abundantly clear that he 
intended to construct a complete account of ethics on the basis of 
authenticity, but since that project never came to fruition we are left 
without a detailed statement of the idea itself ithat Sartre considered 
worthy of publication. 
Despite this, a commitment to the importance of authenticity drives 
Sartre's existentialism. It does so primarily through an exploration 
of its absence. In plays and novels as well as in Being and Nothing-
ness, Sartre explores the ways in which people fail to be authentic 
and the damage this causes to their own lives and to the lives of those 
they affect. Indeed, one might even view these explorations of bad 
faith as attempts to discern the contours of its negation, his ideal of 
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authenticity. These discussions make it clear, moreover, that for Sartre 
authenticity should not be confused with sincerity or good faith. The 
ideal of sincerity requires us to recognize and accept the motivations 
that drive our behaviour. The ideal of good faith requires us to inspect 
our own motivations honestly with a view to accepting who we are. 
But in Sartre's view, the very idea that we must accept the motivations 
that we have, rather than seek to shape our motivations, is at the very 
core of bad faith. 
The importance of this is brought out well in Charles Larmore's 
recent book, The Practices of the Self. If authenticity is being true to 
the person that you really are, then this need not be understood in 
terms of some set of fixed motivations. Larmore sets this idea up in 
two dimensions. He rejects the idea of authenticity as identifying with 
a fixed or essential self, embracing instead the idea that inauthenticity 
is the denial of the formal structure of human existence. In this respect, 
Larmore agrees with Sartre. The second dimension concerns the rela-
tion between oneself and society. For the idea of being true to one's 
essential motivations has often been seen to require resisting pressure 
to conform to the tastes, goals and values of society. Larmore retains 
this traditional aspect of the idea of authenticity, though he refines it in 
a certain way. Through this aspect of his idea of authenticity, Larmore 
develops a critique of Sartre's ideas that authenticity is the opposite of 
bad faith and is the fundamental virtue. 
In this chapter, I argue that Larmore is mistaken about the nature 
of authenticity and that Sartre's position is preferable. I begin by pre-
senting Larmore's position in more detail. Next, I raise a problem for 
Larmore that reflects a consideration that shapes Sartre's discussion 
of bad faith. I then trace this problem to Larmore's understanding of 
our epistemic access to ourselves through reflection. Larmore bases 
his account on Sartre's theory of pure and impure reflection, but I will 
present a different reading of Sartre here. Finally, I will show how the 
account of reflection that I ascribe to Sartre grounds a conception of 
authenticity in which identifying with the formal structure of oneself 
as a being that undertakes commitments is allied not with absence of 
exter~al influence, but rather with recognition of the motivations to 
which one has already committed oneself. The basic structure of Sar-
tre's account of authenticity is thereby uncovered, and his ideas that 
authenticity is the opposite of bad faith and is the fundamental virtue 
are both shown to survive Larmore's critique. 
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Larmore's account of authenticity 
If authenticity includes being true to the kind of being that you are, 
then to give this idea substance we need an account of the kind of 
being that you are. Larmore (2011) argues that we are essentially 
normative beings, meaning that our identities are determined by the 
commitments we undertake to think, speak and act in certain ways. 
He argues that such commitment is essential to both belief and desire. 
Beliefs "function as standing directives that give the agent the (rational) 
obligation to think and act in accord with their presumed truth", while 
desires likewise consist in "orienting the conduct, intellectual as well 
as practical, of the individual" (ibid.: 81). Larmore presents this as a 
more precise rendering of Sartre's thesis that subjectivity consists in a 
relationship to oneself that is not a matter of introspective knowledge. 
"The intimacy in which the subject necessarily lives with himself and 
that Sartre intended to express", writes Larmore, "is practical in nature, 
consisting in the subject's thinking or acting only by way of committing 
himself" (ibid.). 
Although all thought and action makes such commitment, Larmore 
argues, we sometimes think and act in ways that imply that this is not 
so. Thought and action are authentic only when they do not imply the 
denial that our beliefs, desires and actions consist in undertaking com-
mitments. When we are entirely absorbed in what we are thinking about 
or what we are doing, there is no possibility of such a denial, and hence 
no possibility of inauthenticity: we coincide perfectly with ourselves. 
Larmore calls this "being natural" (for example, ibid.: 27-30, 144-5). 
The possibility of inauthenticity arises only when we are reflectively 
aware of ourselves. 
Larmore divides reflection into two categories, "cognitive reflec-
tion" and "practical reflection" (ibid.: 24). These differ in their basic 
structure: cognitive reflection is a kind of thought, practical reflection 
a kind of action. When directed towards oneself, cognitive reflection is 
the consideration of how one would look to other people (ibid.: 83-8). 
When directed towards the world, cognitive refl<rction is consideration 
of what reasons other people would have for believing, desiring or 
acting in a particular way (ibid.: 68-76). Cognitive reflection, then, is 
thinking about oneself or about the world from the perspective of oth-
ers. These others can be particular people one knows, imaginary people, 
or the impersonal abstraction of society in general. Because this cogni-
tive reflection is concerned with the perspective of others, it is always 
inauthentic: one commits oneself to a particular thought or desire, but 
one does so on the basis that someone else would do so (ibid.: 144). 
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Practical reflection, on the other hand, has authentic and inauthentic 
varieties. Practical reflection is the explicit endorsement of beliefs, feel-
ings or actions (ibid.: 24). "I love wearing my leather jacket!" is one of Lar-
more's examples of such conscious avowal (ibid.: 14 7). This act of avowal 
is not "a judgment about what we should do", but ''an explicit intention 
to do this or that" (ibid.: 71). It is inauthentic when we simultaneously 
distance ourselves from the fact that we are making this commitment. 
Larmore gives two examples. One is avowing an intention as though it 
were merely the effect of an outside force. "Duty compels me to do it!,,, 
one might announce, as though one has not chosen to do it (ibid.: 148). 
The other is Emma Bovary's decision to pursue a love affair, on grounds 
that it would follow from the nature that she likes to see herself as sharing 
with her literary heroines (ibid.: 147-8). In this kind of practical reflec-
tion, as in cognitive reflection, "we assimilate ourselves to another" and so 
"are denying, in effect, the very nature of what we are doing" (ibid.: 15 0). 
Authentic practical reflection is the avowal or endorsement of a 
commitment without this denial. It is authentic because it affirms one's 
status as a normative being, as living by the commitments one under-
takes. This and unreflective absorption in thought, feeling or action are 
the only two kinds of authenticity. Of the two kinds of inauthenticity, 
cognitive reflection and inauthentic practical reflection, only inauthen-
tic practical reflection is a form of bad faith. Only in this case do we 
experience our thoughts, feelings and actions in a way that is "contrary 
to their true tenor" and "disfigure them by clinging to the standpoint 
of an onlooker" (ibid.: 159). In cognitive reflection, we experience 
ourselves as considering ourselves or the world from the standpoint 
of an onlooker, and that is indeed what we are doing. For this reason, 
Larmore rejects Sartre's equation of inauthenticity with bad faith (ibid.: 
149, 159). What is more, argues Larmore, cognitive reflection is essen-
tial to living well, so inauthenticity is not always a bad thing. Thus, 
authenticity cannot be the supreme or fundamental virtue on which 
ethics is founded (ibid.: 145, 153-4, 159). 
Depth of commitment 
Larmore's conceptual framework clarifies part of the structure of Sar-
tre's idea of authenticity. Larmore is right to describe Sartre's account 
of being human in terms of undertaking commitments, and to identify 
authenticity as the recognition of this. But there is a dimension of 
S~rtre's account of human existence that is missing from Larmore's 
reading of Sartre. This is the ongoing effect of commitments once they 
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are made. Sartre thinks that attempts to undertake new commitments 
can run into practical difficulties rooted in other commitments one has 
already undertaken and that now run deep in one's overall psychology. 
Sartre illustrates this in a vignette in his novel The Age of Reason 
(Sartre 1945a, 1986b), published two years after Being and Nothing-
ness. Daniel is aware that others see him as a sentimental person, partly 
on account of the cats he cares for, and he wants to prove to himself 
that they have got him wrong. So he resolves to drown his cats in the 
river. But when he reaches the water's edge, he finds that he cannot 
bring himself to do so (Sartre 1986b: 81-91). Sartre describes inten-
tions like this, which one cannot really go through with, as "cheques 
without funds to meet them" (ibid.: 86). He makes a similar point in 
his discussion of freedom in Being and Nothingness. Freedom does 
not simply consist in the ability to do anything at any time, he argues, 
because one's motives and the reasons one finds in the world reflect 
one's existing projects. Freedom therefore consists in the ability to 
change those underlying projects. For any action of mine, it is indeed 
true that I "could have done otherwise", but the important question 
is, "at what price?" (BN1: 464; BN2: 476). There is a sense in which 
Daniel could have drowned his cats. But he found, when the time came, 
that the price of doing so was one that he would not pay. 
Daniel formed his intention in bad faith. He had not taken into 
account the resistance to carrying out this intention rooted in his love 
of his cats. It was, we might say, an inauthentic intention. He had not 
committed himself, the self constrained by his existing commitments, to 
the goal of drowning the cats (Sartre 198bc: 90). In this regard, Daniel 
resembles a character in Sartre's central discussion of bad faith in Being 
and Nothingness, the man who has had many affairs with men in the 
past but resists the advice of his friend, "the champion of sincerity", 
to identify with his homosexuality. He resists the idea that his actions 
show he has a fixed nature that includes sexual attraction to men and 
not women. Sartre, of course, thinks that he is right to resist this idea. 
But the character goes wrong, Sartre thinks, in taking this as a reason 
to deny his homosexuality altogether. Just as the1champion of sincerity 
is in bad faith because he pretends that we are not normative beings 
whose identity is bestowed by our commitments, his friend is in bad 
faith because his stated intention to settle down with the right woman 
does not take account of the homosexual desires that he does indeed 
have and to which he has committed himself (BN1: 63-4; BN2: 86-7). 
Unless an undertaking is informed by one's existing commitments, 
therefore, whether these are to be respected and preserved through the 
undertaking or are to be overthrown in its nan1e, the undertaking is 
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too shallow to count as an authentic commitment. Yet such a shallow 
undertaking does fit Larmore's account of authentic practical reflection. 
Its lack of depth is not a denial of one's status as a normative being. 
On the contrary, it involves overplaying this status, as though one can 
easily commit to anything at all. 
Larmore comes close to addressing this problem in three passages of 
his book. In one, he argues that the aim of becoming a certain sort of 
person should be understood as undertaking a commitment that then 
constrains our thought and action in general (Larmore 2011: 158). 
The kind of constraint he describes is rational: one rationally ought to 
respect the commitment in thought and action. The difficulty of follow-
ing through on such commitments is due to the fact that they do not, 
of themselves, exert psychological pressure towards respecting them. 
The kind of commitment we are concerned with, on the other hand, 
is one that has been acted on repeatedly and through such habituation 
has come to exert psychological pressure of its own. 
Larmore also comes close to addressing habituated commitment 
when he discusses clarifying commitments one has unreflectively 
undertaken in order to endorse them in practical reflection. "Mary, 
for instance, is convinced that Mark has become the love of her life", 
he writes, "but observing that she feels more tender toward him when 
he is not there than when they are together, she starts to question the 
nature of her attachment" (ibid.: 86). "Before deciding to espouse some 
religious belief", he points out, "we may want to establish whether 
we find it attractive because of its consoling power and not by virtue 
of its apparent truth"; so "in order to know whether we are really a 
believer" he recommends we "undertake to perform all the rituals and 
recite all the prayers in order to observe whether we are carrying them 
out with the sort of conviction that is the proof of faith" (ibid.: 162). 
The observations these characters make about themselves, according 
to Larmore, are instances of cognitive reflection, since only cognitive 
reflection aims at knowledge. Practical reflection is the explicit endorse-
ment of a commitment, but these characters are only aiming to discover 
what their commitments truly are. Cognitive reflection is always a form 
of in~uthenticity, for Larmore, even though in cases like these it is a 
prelude to authentic practical reflection. 
Public behaviour and private experience 
, 
These passages indicate the shape that an account of practical difficulty 
rooted in existing commitments would have to take within Larmore's 
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framework. One can learn of the pressure these commitments exert, 
on Larmore's view, only through cognitive reflection on oneself. Daniel 
should have taken into account what those around him already knew, 
that he loves his cats. The man who will not admit his homosexuality 
is denying something that is obvious to his friend, whether or not his 
friend is mistaken to see it as part of a fixed essence. Larmore holds 
cognitive reflection to be our only form of epistemic access to our own 
motivations: "everything we know about ourselves is founded on the 
fundamentally public procedures of observation and inference" (Lar-
more 2011: 135). He grounds this claim in the failure of successive 
philosophers to make sense of the metaphor of "introspection" as a 
mode of direct access to the contents of our own minds (ibid.: 123-6). 
Sartre sometimes sounds as though he endorses a similar claim. "Con-
sciousness does not know its own character - unless in determining 
itself reflectively from the standpoint of another's point of view", he 
writes (BNl: 349; BN2: 372). 
But if this is the only way in which one can become aware of one's 
own motivations, then it is difficult to see where Daniel or the man 
who will not admit his homosexuality are going wrong. For both of 
these characters have looked at their own past from an external per-
spective. Each has understood that their behaviour can be interpreted 
as manifesting a certain trait, but each insists that it is compatible with 
the absence of that trait. What these characters fail to take into account 
is not behaviour. Daniel fails to take into account the value his cats 
have for him. The man who denies his homosexuality fails to take into 
account his sexual attraction to men. Such values and feelings are not 
directly observable from an external perspective. Indeed, it seems to 
be Sartre's point in these vignettes that the bad faith of these charac-
ters rests on taking up an external perspective in order to conceal this 
crucial information. 
Yet this does not commit Sartre to the view that values and feelings are 
inner mental states that one can become aware of through "introspec-
tion". In his early Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions, Sartre argued that 
an emotion is "a specific manner of apprehend~ng the world" (Sartre 
2002: 35). To be frightened is to experience the world as a fearful place, 
to be angry is to find the object of one's anger hateful (ibid.: 34-61). In 
Being and Nothingness, Sartre generalizes this idea to all feelings. Dis-
gust is experienced as the repulsiveness of disgusting objects (BNl: 605, 
616; BN2: 625-6, 635-6). But he goes further, and applies the idea to 
evaluative attitudes as well as to affectivity. For something to be valuable 
to you, on this account, is for it to be experienced as valuable in everyday 
engagement with the world (BNl: 38-9; BN2: 62-3). This suggests that 
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our knowledge of values and feelings requires neither introspection 
nor inference from behaviour. Rather, awareness of the way the world 
seems to us can furnish knowledge of our values and feelings. Daniel 
should have taken into account the value that he experiences his cats 
as having for him. The man who denies his homosexual desires should 
consider the ways in which men and women feature in his experience. 
What is required is a particular kind of reflection on one's own expe-
rience. In unreflective experience, the world has a particular evaluative 
and affective structure, but this structure is not where one's attention is 
focused. One is attending to the world itself. The evaluative and affec-
tive structure is the way that world appears. To make this structure, 
this mode of presentation, the object of attention is to move to another 
kind of experience. This is reflection on the unreflective experience of 
the world. Such reflection does not simply present the world again, for 
attention is no longer directed towards the objects that make up that 
world. Neither does such reflection involve an external perspective on 
oneself. It is not a form of Larmore's "cognitive reflection". Neither, 
finally, is it aimed at endorsing a commitment. It is not Larmore's "prac-
tical reflection". It is aimed at gathering information, but information 
about how things seem rather than about how they are. That is to say, 
it is concerned with phenomena, or appearances. For this reason, it is 
rightly called "phenomenological reflection". 
Pure and impure reflection 
Because values and feelings are manifested in the way the world appears, 
phenomenological reflection can reveal those values and feelings. Con-
sider again Larmore's examples of cognitive reflection in the service of 
authentic practical reflection. Mary learns something about her rela-
tionship with Mark by reflecting on the difference between the way he 
features in her experience when he is absent and when he is present. 
When one reflects on one's own religious practice to ascertain whether 
one is a genuine believer, one is not reflecting on the motions one goes 
thro~gh but on how one experiences those rituals. These are not really 
cases of cognitive reflection as Larmore defines it. Phenomenological 
reflection is inherently first-personal. Since it is reflection on the way 
the world appears in experience, only the subject of that experience 
can reflect on it in this way. Only you have direct access to the way the 
w9rld seems to you. 
Although phenomenological reflection is required for under-
standing one's existing commitments, Sartre does not hold that all 
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phenomenological reflection is conducive to authenticity. He divides 
such reflection into two categories, "pure reflection" and "impure 
reflection". Pure reflection preserves the sense of oneself as a normative 
being whose identity is conferred by commitments one undertakes and 
that one can revoke. Impure reflection, on the other hand, denies this. 
Sartre does not make this account of the difference between pure and 
impure reflection very dear in Being and Nothingness. The terminology 
in which he describes it is generally ambiguous. Larmore's distinction 
between cognitive reflection and practical reflection is inspired by a 
reading of it. "Pure reflection, according to Being and Nothingness, 
'delivers the reflected-on [i.e. ourselves] to us, not as a given [i.e. an 
object of knowledge] but as the being which we have to be"', writes Lar-
more (2011: 151), quoting Sartre (the notes in brackets are Larmore's). 
This is the basis for Larmore's idea of "practical reflection", in which 
one features as the person undertaking the commitment, in contrast to 
"cognitive reflection" in which one is an object of knowledge. 
Rather than taking the phrase "the reflected-on" to refer to oneself, 
however, we should take it to refer to the experience that is the object 
of phenomenological reflection. For example, if I think about an absent 
friend and then reflect on that experience, the "reflected-on" is my 
thinking about that absent friend. Moreover, rather than take the term 
"given" in an epistemic sense, to denote an object of knowledge, we 
should understand it here in a metaphysical or ontological sense, to 
denote something beyond our control. 
Read in this way, the passage quoted by Larmore claims that pure and 
impure reflection differ not in what they present, which in both cases is 
the way the world appears, but in how they present it. Pure reflection 
presents it, correctly, as a manifestation of my commitments. Impure 
reflection presents it as just a given. From impure reflection, one could 
infer that the way the world seems is the way the world is, or that the 
way the world seems is a result of unchangeable facts about oneself. 
Impure reflection thus supports inauthenticity, since it allows one to 
live as though the evaluative and affective texture of the world is not 
the result of one's commitments. Pure reflection supports authentic-
ity, since it delivers knowledge of that texture as resulting from one's 
commitments. 
Authenticity and bad faith 
Understood in this way, authenticity does not essentially require resist-
ing social pressure. Neither does it essentially require viewing oneself 
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and the world from one's own perspective, rather than taking up the 
perspective of other people. The difference between authenticity and 
inauthenticity, that is to say, is not based on the role that other people 
play in one's life at all. Authenticity is rather the recognition of the 
particular person that you are. This has two dimensions. One is recogni-
tion of what it is to be a person, which is to be a normative being whose 
identity is conferred by their commitments. The other is recognition 
of the particular commitments that one has, as these are manifested in 
the way the world seems in experience. Once we understand Sartre's 
conception of authenticity in this way, we can see that the two criticisms 
that Larmore raises against it are misplaced. 
One of Larmore's criticisms is that Sartre is wrong to identify inau-
thenticity with bad faith. Cognitive reflection, he argues, is a form of 
inauthenticity that does not in itself involve bad faith. One is taking up 
an external perspective, so one is not wholly identified with oneself, 
but one can be perfectly well aware that one is doing so. However, on 
Sartre's account inauthenticity does not consist in taking up an external 
perspective, so cognitive reflection is not in itself an instance of inau-
thenticity. The identification of inauthenticity with bad faith is therefore 
consistent with the claim that cognitive reflection is not a form of bad 
faith. Larmore's other criticism fails for essentially the same reason. 
This is the criticism that authenticity cannot be the fundamental virtue, 
since one cannot live well, indeed one cannot engage in authentic practi-
cal reflection, without engaging in cognitive reflection. Since cognitive 
reflection is not an instance of inauthenticity, on Sartre's view, the role 
of cognitive reflection in living well does not entail that inauthenticity 
can be a good thing. 
Authenticity and inauthenticity, according to Sartre, concern how 
one understands oneself to be. One kind of inauthenticity involves 
affirming one's traits as though they were fixed. Sartre calls this "sin-
cerity", illustrating it with his character "the champion of sincerity", 
who encourages his friend to embrace his homosexual desires. The 
other kind involves denying one's actual traits and pretending to have 
contrary traits that explain one's behaviour. This is what the champion 
of sincerity's friend does when he denies his homosexuality. Sartre calls 
this kind "bad faith", but he also holds that this and sincerity are both 
forms of bad faith in a larger sense (BNl: 66-7; BN2: 89-90). 
Bad faith in this larger sense is asserting a claim about oneself despite 
being aware, to some extent, that this claim is not true. According to 
Sartre, the champion of sincerity is aware that desires are the result of 
c~mmitments just as his friend is aware of his homosexuality (BNl: 
64-5; BN2: 87-8). Larmore's examples of inauthentic practical 
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reflection are indeed both cases of inauthenticity on this account, but 
not for the reason Larmore gives. Undertaking a commitment on the 
pretext that duty requires one to do so is a denial that the values one 
finds in the world are only a function of one's existing commitments. 
Endorsing an affair as following the path of one's heroines is pretending 
that this outcome is determined by traits one shares with those heroines. 
The ethics of authenticity 
Larmore presents one further reason to reject Sartre's claim that 
authenticity is the fundamental virtue that underpins the rest of ethics. 
This is a general scepticism about such monistic approaches to ethical 
value. With respect to authenticity, the objection is "that in certain 
circumstances the pursuit of authenticity can lead to undesirable conse-
quences" (Larmore 2011: 6). More dramatically, is it not possible to be 
perfectly authentic and thoroughly evil? If authenticity is understood in 
the way that Larmore describes it, then this certainly is possible. For if 
authenticity is just coinciding with oneself in a way that does not deny 
one's status as a normative being, then this sets no constraints at all 
on the effects one's actions can have on other people. Understood in 
this way, that is to say, authenticity is an entirely self-regarding virtue. 
Larmore does not see this as a reason to reject the idea that authentic-
ity is valuable. His recommendation is rather that we abandon any 
attempt to cast it as the supreme value, and admit instead that its role 
is tempered by other values. 
Sartre's attempt to cast authenticity as the supreme value need not 
face this problem. This is because Sartre does not think of authenticity 
as coinciding with oneself. It is possible, therefore, that authenticity 
can set constraints on one's attitudes towards others as well as towards 
oneself. If authenticity can be shown to require the recognition that 
people in general are normative beings with ongoing commitments, 
that is to say then this might be argued to set important constraints 
on the ways in which one treats people in generul. It seems clear from 
Existentialism and Humanism (Sartre 1946b, 1973), Anti-Semite and 
few (Sartre 1946a, 1948b) and Notebooks for an Ethics (Sartre 1983b, 
1992) that this is the direction in which Sartre wanted his ethical theory 
to develop. But if it is to be developed in this way, there are two imme-
diate problems that need to be solved. 
One problem stems from Sartre's account of values as rooted in the 
commitments one has already undertaken. This is integral to his idea of 
authenticity, since authenticity requires recognizing the values to which 
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one's existing commitments give rise. How is this compatible with the 
claim that authenticity is objectively valuable, something to which all 
people ought to aspire irrespective of their existing commitments? The 
answer to that meta-ethical question needs to lead either directly or 
indirectly to a form of authenticity that concerns other people as well 
as oneself. If one argues, for example, that inauthenticity necessarily 
frustrates one's own projects, then this could directly support only a 
self-regarding form of authenticity. An argument from here to the need 
to recognize other people as the particular normative beings that they 
are would still need to be provided. Herein lies the second problem, 
one parallel to Larmore's concern about authentic evildoers. For it is 
not at all clear why merely recognizing that somebody is a normative 
being with a particular set of commitments should require one to treat 
that person with any respect or concern for their wellbeing. It might 
constrain the ways in which one can successfully oppress people, for 
example, but it is not at all obvious that it should preclude oppressing 
them. 
These are the problems with the ethics of authenticity that Sartre 
was grappling with in the years following the publication of Being and 
Nothingness. That he never published his promised work on ethics 
could be taken to indicate that he could not resolve them. Alternatively, 
it could be taken to indicate an endorsement of the ethical writings of 
Simone de Beauvoir, which build on this conception of authenticity. 
Either way, it remains an open question whether an account of authen-
ticity of roughly the shape drawn by Sartre could provide the basis of 
ethics. If such an account of authenticity could not answer this perennial 
foundational question, moreover, it does not follow that it could not 
make other substantial contributions to ethical theory. 
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TWELVE 
Knowledge 
Anthony Hatzimoysis 
Introduction 
Knowledge is a notion that occurs throughout Sartre's philosophical 
writings. From his early forays in phenomenology (Sartre 1970: 200a; 
2004c: part A) to his late engagement with dialectical reason (Sartre 
1960b: 30n, 3 ln, 502; 1985b), connaissance is a term that appears in 
almost every twist and turn of Sartrean argumentation. 
Yet discussions of Sartre's conception of knowledge are anything 
but common. How may we best interpret that peculiar phenomenon 
of paucity of references to knowledge in the secondary literature, and 
overabundance of that term in Sartre's own texts? Part of the expla-
nation, in my view, lies in the fact that knowledge for Sartre is what 
we may call a contrastive notion: knowledge is what consciousness -
including one's primary relation to oneself, to one's own body, to other 
beings in a situation, and to the world - is not. 
But what exactly is that notion with which so many other notions 
apparently get mixed up, and with which they ought not to be confused? 
In this chapter I shall sketch an answer to that question by considering a 
section from Being and Nothingness where Sartre sets knowledge itself 
as the focus of his discussion (BN1: 172-80; BN2: 195-203). 
Our discussion will be limited in its focus: it will not address Sartre's 
views on knowledge throughout his voluminous output, nor will it try 
to account for every occurrence of "knowledge" in Being and Nothing-
ness; instead, it will pay dose attention to particular paragraphs of one 
section of that book. However, the discussion will be quite broad in 
its intended implications as it will provide the required background 
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for exploring a general question, which here will be simply stated 
' but not addressed: whether Sartre's positive claims about knowledge 
allow it to fulfil the contrastive role with which it is bestowed in his 
philosophy. 
I begin with a brief statement of Sartre's account of knowledge, for 
the benefit of readers unfamiliar with his philosophy. Sartre's account 
includes some standard philosophical terms, sometimes employed in 
a non-standard way; hence, I clarify the meaning of those terms, by 
showing how it differs from the meaning they carry in the work of 
other philosophers, and by drawing on parts of Sartre's work that are 
relevant to a correct understanding of those terms. In the course of my 
presentation I pose some critical queries and sketch some answers, so 
as to better clarify the Sartrean approach to knowledge. 
Intuition and belief 
Knowledge worthy of its name is intuitive; any non-intuitive relation 
to an object is withdrawn as soon as intuition is attained; and intui-
tion concerns the presence of consciousness to its object. Those are, in 
outline, the three pillars on which Sartre's theory of knowledge stands. 
Let us take a closer look at them. 
Sartre begins his discussion by discriminating genuine from sub-
stitute forms of knowledge: there is only one type of knowledge, 
properly speaking, and that is "intuitive knowledge" (BN1: 172; BN2: 
195). Before we explore the exact meaning of that phrase, it is worth 
noting that Sartre introduces knowledge not in terms of what it is 
about (thus, he does not claim, for instance, that nothing can count 
as knowledge unless it captures Platonic forms) Aristotelian eide, or 
Husserlian essences); nor in terms of how it relates to other doxastic 
phenomena (such as justified belief, or warranted opinion); nor in 
terms of the alternative grammatical constructions of the relevant 
verb ("to know that", ''to know how", or "to know an object"). Yet 
sp!lcific views about each of those matters are entailed by his analysis, 
as we shall soon see. 
Intuitive knowledge, simply put, is knowledge procured by intui· 
tion. But what is intuition? In ordinary parlance, intuition stands 
for the (seemingly) ungrounded but (apparently) indubitable appre· 
hension of some fact. In contemporary epistemology, intuition has 
·been systematically examined under different headings. Take, first, 
a cluster of theories that approach intuition through the notion of 
belief, asserting that intuitions are beliefs (Lewis 1983), or that they 
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are dispositions to believe (Van Inwagen 1997), or that they are 
attitudes in which a proposition seems to be true, as opposed to a 
belief's wholehearted commitment to a proposition being true (Bealer 
1998). Those are all important suggestions but, unfortunately, not 
very helpful in making sense of the Sartrean approach to intuition. 
Sartre does not relate intuition to belief or to a similar kind of propo-
sitional attitude. In the section on knowledge, belief is peculiarly 
absent, and when it does enter the discussion in other parts of Being 
and Nothingness, it is not in order to illuminate intuition, but with 
a view to highlight, for instance, the ontological interplay between 
croyance, on the one hand, and mauvaise or bonne foi, on the other 
(BN1: 69-70; BN2: 93-4). 
Apart from the absence of relevant textual evidence, there is an 
important reason for being reluctant to think of intuition as identical 
to, or otherwise dependent on, belief. If intuition were similar to belief, 
the question would promptly arise as to how, for Sartre, intuition is 
justified. But that question simply does not arise: within the Sartrean 
system, intuition is not in need of justification because intuition itself 
is the ultimate source of justification. 
"Intuition" has also been the name given to a method, according to 
which philosophy advances through an experience of focused sympathy, 
which enables us to move into the inner being of a phenomenon, such 
as duration, or the self (Bergson 1992: 159, 172, 185-8). The influ-
ence of the "method of intuition" is evident in Sartre's aversion to both 
rationalism and empiricism in their dogmatic versions, his emphasis on 
lived experience (le vecu), and his understanding of temporality as an 
"original synthesis" rather than a mere aggregate of unrelated instances. 
However, what is valuable and distinctive in the Bergsonian method 
of intuition is its emphasis on the intellectually demanding and time-
consuming character of meticulously attending to the various aspects 
of an ever-unfolding process - and such emphasis is lacking in Sartre's 
use of intuition, in the current context. As soon as intuition is achieved, 
an object is given effortlessly, and for what it is. This does not commit 
Sartre to the view that all sides of an object are given at once, and in the 
same manner (see chapters 2 and 5 of Hatzimoysis 2011 for a sketch 
of the Sartrean analysis of visual experience, and chapter 6 of the same 
work for the concomitant issues pertaining to Sartre's phenomenologi-
cal account of a thing's essence). 
If we are to identify correctly the theoretical precedents of the Sar-
trean employment of "intuition", we might as well look at the two 
philosophers mentioned in the section on knowledge: one is Husserl, 
and the other is Descartes. 
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Intuition and discourse 
The section on knowledge opens with a distinction between "intui-
tion" and "deduction"; and that distinction appears to be a direct 
descendant of Descartes's view that when we "review all the actions 
of the intellect by means of which we are able to arrive at knowledge", 
we "recognize only two: intuition and deduction". Intuition is "the 
conception which an unclouded and attentive mind gives us", whereas 
deduction denotes "all necessary inference from other facts that are 
known with certainty" (Descartes 1988: rule Ill). The Cartesian view , 
however, could illuminate the Sartrean theory, subject to two impor-
tant qualifications. 
First, the order of intuition and deduction is reversed: for Descartes 
' intuition provides the principles from which deductive reasoning ought 
to proceed; for Sartre, "deduction and discursive argument ... are only 
instruments which lead to intuition"; and when intuition is achieved , 
discourse and deduction "are effaced before it" (BNl: 172; BN2: 195). 
Second, a Cartesian intuition is primarily a means by which we 
acquire secure knowledge of conceptual relations; just by examining 
various concepts, and thus a priori, we can intellectually grasp that one 
includes the other~ for instance, that the concept of God includes the 
notion of eternal existence; Cartesian intuition, in other words, informs 
us primarily about true propositions. In Sartre's discussion, though, 
intuition is not the revealing of a priori, conceptual truths: intuition is 
"of a thing" and pertains to the relation of consciousness to "the being" 
(BN1: 173; BN2: 196). 
It is evident that Sartre subscribes to the traditional distinction 
between "discourse and deduction", on the one hand, and "intuhion" 
on the other. What is perhaps less dear is why exactly he gives priority 
to the latter. It might be suggested that Sartre simply takes for granted 
the ordinary distinction between two French verbs for knowing: con-
naitre, which is of persons or things, and savoir, which is about true 
propositions. Intuition, as we saw above, concerns not propositions but 
things. And since Sartre here examines not savoir, but connaissance, he 
is right to privilege intuition over alternative types of knowledge that 
concern propositions, such as deduction or discourse. 
That suggestion is correct, but it simply elaborates on what Sartre 
is doing, not on the reasons why he is doing it; we are still owed an 
explanation for Sartre's choice of connaitre rather than savoir as the 
focus of his philosophical analysis. Such an explanation can be con-
structed with elements from Sartre's account of knowledge. To correctly 
identify, though, those elements, as well as the pattern in which they 
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are weaved, we need to shift the focus of our discussion from episte-
mology to ontology. 
Intuition and presence 
We have been told so far to what intuition is opposed (discourse and 
deduction) and what it is of (a thing or the being). Sartre completes 
his introduction of intuition by bringing in another notion: presence. 
He writes that "intuition is the presence of consciousness to the thing" 
(BN1: 172; BN2: 196). 
We may understand this definition of intuition by invoking, and 
slightly elaborating upon, an example, offered by Sartre, about the 
different ways in which some one person - call him "Pierre" - is expe-
rientially given to me: as a mental image, through photograph, and in 
a drawing. In imagining Pierre: 
certain details are lacking, others are suspect, the whole is very 
blurred. There is a certain feeling of sympathy and pleasantness 
that I want to restore to the face but which will not come. I grab 
a photograph from a drawer, and that gives me "all the details of 
his face ... but the photograph lacks life; it presents perfectly the 
external traits of Pierre's face; it does not give his expression. I 
then find a caricature where his features are deliberately distorted 
... yet, what is missing in the photograph, vitality, expression, is 
clearly there in the drawing: I "rediscover" Pierre. 
(Sartre 2004a: 40-41) 
In this example an object (Pierre) is given to (Sartre's) consciousness 
through different media: first as a mental image, then through a photo-
graph, and then by a vivid caricature. Despite the differences between 
the cases, aptly captured by Sartre's narrative, there is a common expe-
riential theme: Pierre is given to consciousness as absent. 
Consider now what would happen if, while ~artre was ruminating 
about a recent conversation he had with his friend, Pierre knocked on 
the door and walked into the study: he would no longer be conveyed 
by some medium, through which Sartre would try to capture his friend: 
Pierre would be unmediatedly given to Sartre. Pierre also would no 
longer be well or badly indicated by various (psychological, photo-
graphic, or drawn) pieces of evidence: Pierre himself is not evidence 
about Pierre, or something that indicates Pierre, or from which we 
may deduce Pierre; being in the room, Pierre is no longer re-presented; 
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rather, he is presented to Sartre. This unmediated experience of pres-
ence gives the core meaning of intuition. 
Sartre, to be sure, is not the first philosopher to think of intuition in 
those terms. Husserl, as Sartre is happy to acknowledge, was there well 
before him. Husserl's talk of "originally presentive consciousness" and 
"originally presentive intuitions" purports to convey the kind of con-
scious event from which genuine knowledge originates (Husserl 1983: 
§ 19). Sartre locates the difference between Husserl and himself in what 
might sound like a pedantic point, that is, that whereas Husserl thinks 
that in intuition it is the object that is present to consciousness, for 
Sartre, "being-present-to" is only possible for a being that is conscious 
of itself being in a certain situation: "being-present is an ekstatic mode 
of being of the for-itself", and, therefore, intuition is not the presence 
of the thing to consciousness but "the presence of consciousness to the 
thing~' (BN1: 172; BN2: 195-6). 
Sartre then devotes a section of seven densely written pages in spell-
ing out this sentence (BNl: 172-80; BN2: 196-202). The reader will 
more easily follow that section if she appreciates its basic argumenta-
tive point: Sartre defends his conception of intuition as consciousness's 
presence to an object, by laying out what has to be the case about con~ 
sciousness, so that knowledge of an object be possible. 
Consciousness and knowledge 
Sartre's oft-repeated claim, throughout his writings, that conscience is 
not connaissance, should not make us lose sight of the fact that, prop-
erly speaking, knowledge is one of the many modes of consciousness. 
It would be absurd to claim that while someone is acquiring knowledge 
of an object, her consciousness is switched off, or even that it is directed 
away from the object of knowledge to which she is currently attending. 
In Sartrean terms, we may say that knowledge is first and foremost 
an instance of "being-in-the-world", which is a "synthetic totality of 
which consciousness, like the phenomenon, constitutes only moments" 
(BN1: 3; BN2: 2 7). Hence, to understand knowledge, we need, first, to 
make sense of how consciousness is related to whatever it is conscious 
of; and) second, to see what sets knowing apart from other modes of 
one's conscious relation to the world. 
The former task is what preoccupies Sartre, in the section under 
· consideration. He argues, briefly, as follows: for consciousness to be, it 
has to be consciousness of some thing; but to be conscious of any thing, 
it has, at a minimum, to be conscious of itself as not being the thing of 
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which it is conscious. However, consciousness cannot be conscious of 
itself before being directed to its object, simply because consciousness 
is not a thing - it is itself no thing, but the revealing intuition of things. 
Consciousness's intending of a thing reflects back on itself, rendering 
consciousness the reflection of that thing on which it is reflected; the 
reflection is something of which consdousness is always necessarily 
(non-positionally) aware, while it is (positionally) aware of its object. 
Indeed, consciousness is (nothing but) that (non-positional) presence 
to itself being (positionally) present to its object. The conscious being 
is self-presenting, a being for-itself, directed towards a being in-itself, 
of which it is conscious. 
This line of reasoning effects the transition from discussion of con-
sciousness to an analysis of being. Driven by his view of intentionality as 
a conscious being's transcendence towards the world, Sartre maintains 
that the for-itself is outside itself, in the in-itself, since it defines itself by 
what it is not: "In knowledge, taken as a bond of ontological being, the 
being which I am not represents the absolute plenitude of the in-itself" 
(BNl: 177; BN2: 200). That further entails that in knowledge, "the 
only type of being which can be encountered and which is perpetually 
there is the known. The knower is not ... [in the sense that] he is noth-
ing other than that which brings it about that there is a being-there on 
the part of the known - a presence" (ibid.). 
Sartre puts emphasis on the immediacy of the relation between con-
sciousness and the world. However, immediacy may not be mistaken 
for fusion. The knower cannot disappear in the known, and the known 
can never be absorbed by the knower. The absorption of the known by 
the knower is disallowed by Sartre's forceful critique of idealism: the 
object of knowledge is not an ethereal item locked in a mental box, but 
part of the reality towards which consciousness is directed. And the 
total disappearance of the subject in the object is not possible because 
consciousness never ceases to be (non-positionally) aware of itself being 
(positionally) conscious of its objects. 
Nevertheless, the emphasis on immediacy appears, to me, to jar with 
Sartre's frequent allusions to the unbridgeableA!uality that character-
izes knowledge. If there is one claim about knowledge that readers of 
Being and Nothingness will find repeated in almost every section of that 
book, it is Sartre's warning that conscience ought not to be modelled 
on connaisance, since the latter involves a "subject-object dualism" that 
is destructive of the seamless unity that characterizes consciousness's 
immediate relation to itself (BNl: xxviii; BN2: 8-9; cf. BN1/BN2: part 
I, ch. 1, §V and part II, ch. 1, §§I, V, and most of Sartre 2004c: part 
A). An attempt to render "dualism" compatible with "immediacy" in 
149 
JEAN-PAUL SARTRE: KEY CONCEPTS 
the case of knowledge, should take into account Sartre's ontology of 
negation; but that is a topic for another occasion. 
Concluding remark 
Sartre offers an analysis of knowledge in terms of presence, and unpacks 
that notion by showing the ontological bond that connects conscious-
ness with the world. A careful study of his theory will reward the reader 
both for the rigour of its argumentation, and the richness of its phe-
nomenological detail. Nevertheless, certain conceptual issues remain 
unaddressed by Sartre - and it is not clear to me how they might be 
resolved in the context of his analysis. I shall close on a critical note, 
by briefly articulating one of those issues. 
Let us grant Sartre the view that knowledge of an object is indeed 
a matter of presence. Does this view allow for consciousness being 
present to an object, without acquiring knowledge of it? The question 
arises because it is not unreasonable to claim that you may be present 
to an object, even carefully attend to it, yet fail to know it. 
If Sartre acknowledges that one's being present to an object does not 
entail that one knows it, he should have been more explicit about it. 
He could have specified, for instance, the circumstances under which 
the ontological bond between the for-itself and the in-itself does not 
guarantee knowledge; or, in simpler terms, the cases in which con-
sciousness's attending to a thing, does not deliver knowledge of it. 
However, no indication as to how we may tell the successful from the 
failed cases is given in the section devoted to knowledge. We may dis-
tinguish, here, between two groups of epistemically unsuccessful cases. 
One concerns the main topic of Sartre's discussion, that is, perceptual, 
especially visual knowledge. The relevant cases of illusion and halluci-
nation are not explored in the section on knowledge; and when they are 
discussed by Sartre, it is in a very different context and with a different 
purpose, that is, for illuminating the workings of imagination (Sartre 
2004a: part 3). The other group of cases of epistemic failure concerns 
a type of consciousness's relation to an object, which is, again, not 
addressed by Sartre. Those are cases in which consciousness is present 
to its object, yet one fails to have knowledge of that object, because 
one lacks understanding, as it is evidenced by one's inability to give an 
account of that which one claims to know. But "giving an account" to 
,back one's cognitive claims is a discursive phenomenon, and as such 
lies outside the province of Sartre's, otherwise masterful, analysis of 
intuitive knowledge. 
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THIRTEEN 
The fundamental project 
Paul Crittenden 
Freedom: the free project and action 
"Project" is a basic term in Sartre's ontology, for in its separation 
from in-itself being, the for-itself is at once thrown into the world and 
engaged in a free project. The free project, in his description, is "the 
impulse [elan] by which the for-itself thrusts itself toward its end" (BN1: 
557; BN2: 578). Consciousness is one with freedom and thereby with 
engagement in free projects for "the freedom of the for-itself is always 
engaged; there is no question here of a freedom which could be unde-
termined and which would pre-exist its choice ... freedom is simply the 
fact that this choice is unconditioned" (BN1: 479; BN2: 501). 
This claim relates to particular projects aimed at this or that specific 
end, but embraces more profoundly the idea that all our projects "are 
united in the global project which we are" (BN1: 481; BN2: 503). The 
free project in this sense points to the notion of the fundamental project, 
understood as my being, what I make myself to be in choosing the 
person I am in what I do. Following his account of consciousness and 
freedom earlier in Being and Nothingness, Sartre devotes the concluding 
part 4 'of the work to a study of action and the relations of doing (and 
having) to being. This leads to the claim that "each human reality is at 
the same time a direct project to metamorphose its own for-itself into 
an in-itself-for-itself and a project of the appropriation of the world 
as a totality of being-in-itself" (BN1: 615; BN2: 636). How does he 
arrive at this conclusion? 
Sartre says that "to act is to modify the shape of the world; it is to 
arrange means in view of an end" (BNl: 433: BN2: 455). Tired and 
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hungry, I seek food and rest. On becoming aware of growing social 
inequality, I join a movement for a more just society. An action is on 
principle intentional, directed to an end that is linked in turn with the 
recognition of a lack that is to be made good. Moreover, the desired 
end refers back to reasons and motives. These too must be understood 
as part of the intentional structure of the act as an occurrence outside 
the causal relationships of in-itself being. In these terms, no factual 
state, in the world at large or in one's past, can by itself give rise to 
action for "an act is a projection of the for-itself toward what is not" 
(BN1: 435; BN2: 458). 
In bringing negation to the world, the for-itself is "a being who can 
realize a nihilating rupture with the world and with himself" (BN1: 
439; BN2: 461). This possibility is freedom, and in nihilating itself, the 
for-itself nihilates its own past, constituted by its past acts bearing on 
the present as facticity. Freedom "makes itself an act"; it is "an exist-
ence which perpetually makes itself" (BN1: 438; BN2: 460). What I 
do yields an essence, indicative of past acts: "my essence is what I have 
been" (BN1: 450; BN2: 472). But freedom itself has no essence and 
.cannot be defined. Drawing on Heidegger, Sartre says, "in [freedom], 
existence precedes and commands essence" (BN1: 438; BN2: 460). 
What cannot be defined can nonetheless be described on the basis of 
experience: "I am indeed an existent who learns his freedom through 
his acts." More specifically, "I am an existent whose individual and 
unique existence temporalizes itself as freedom" (carrying one's past 
and always projecting oneself towards what is not yet; BN1: 43 9; BN2: 
461). As such, each for-itself is necessarily aware of its freedom in the 
(self)-consciousness of existing that accompanies all consciousness. Else-
where he appeals to the experience of anguish in the face of freedom. 
In either case, the claim is the same: that, in acting, the for-itself cannot 
avoid the experience of itself as the permanent possibility of putting its 
past out of play and perpetually faced with having to make itself to be. 
Freedom is precisely "the nothingness which is made'-to-be at the heart 
of man and which forces human-reality to make itself instead of to be 
... it is entirely abandoned to the intolerable neeessity of making itself 
be - down to the slightest detail" (BN1: 440-41; BN2: 463). 
For Sartre, freedom is manifested in passion no less than will. He 
therefore rejects the view that will and passion are opposed - that the 
will to do something leads to free action, and passion to causally deter-
mined behaviour. He argues rather that a passion or emotion, such as 
fear, is itself a type of free conduct, a response adapted to the situation 
as a means to pursuing ends posited by freedom. Will, as the choice of 
proceeding in a reflective and deliberative way, differs from passion 
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only as a different means to the end. Will and passion both presuppose 
an original freedom, not as prior to the voluntary or passionate act 
' but rather as "a foundation which is strictly contemporary with the will 
or the passion and which these manifest, each in its own way" (BNl: 
444; BN2: 466). 
Reasons and motives similarly belong to the intentional structure of 
action. A reason for action, as Sartre specifies it, arises when a person 
assesses an objective state of affairs in the light of an end and sees 
that it offers a means to the desired goal. So in seeking the conquest 
of Gaul, Clovis noted the power of the Catholic episcopate and saw 
a reason to convert to Catholicism (BNl: 446; BN2: 468). A motive 
' arising within the subject (and incorporating relevant reasons), is "the 
ensemble of the desires, emotions, and passions which urge me to 
accomplish a certain act" (ibid.). The argument overall is that reason, 
motive and end are all "organized in an indissoluble unity by the very 
upsurge of a freedom which is beyond reasons, motives, and ends" 
(BN1: 450; BN2: 472). 
Freedom and original choice 
The upsurge of freedom "beyond reasons, motives, and ends" appears 
mysterious. Sartre must say of it what he says of consciousness - that it 
comes from itself, that nothing is its cause, that the for-itself is "a being 
which exists by-itself", a (non-substantial) absolute that creates and sup-
ports its essence (BNl: xxxi-xxxii, 80). Freedom makes itself perpetu-
ally and spontaneously. Assuming this as a postulate, why is the upsurge 
a thrust towards this end rather than that? Or if one is always free to 
put the past out of play, may one choose to do anything? Acknowledg-
ing that freedom appears as an unanalysable totality in which reasons, 
motives and ends form a unity within its compass, Sartre asks: 
Does this mean that one must view freedom as a series of capri-
cious jerks comparable to the Epicurean clinamen? Am I free 
to 'wish anything whatsoever at any moment whatsoever? And 
must I at each instant when I wish to explain this or that project 
encounter the irrationality of a free and contingent choice? 
(BN1: 452; BN2: 474) 
Insisting that he does not intend anything arbitrary or capricious, Sartre 
refers to the common understanding that to be free means, not just to 
exercise choice, but also that one's choice "could have been other than 
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what it is" (BN1: 453; BN2: 475). He opens the way to reflection on 
original choice and the fundamental project with an example. 
A hiker on a walk with friends becomes tired; at first he resists, 
but the fatigue increases and suddenly he gives up, throws his pack 
down and slumps beside it. Could he have resisted and walked on with 
the others? Sartre's starting point is that each for-itself is "the organic 
totality of the projects it is". The question then is whether resistance 
would involve no more than a minor behavioural change or whether "it 
could be effected only by means of a radical transformation of [one's] 
being-in-the-world - a transformation, moreover, which is possible". 
Nlowing that the hiker could have done otherwise, the question is "at 
what price?" (BNl: 454; 464; BN2: 476, 486). 
One hiker suffers fatigue and gives up, another who is equally tired 
carries on. Sartre argues that a fully adequate explanation would need 
to situate the act in each case in a framework of each person's past acts, 
how each "exists his body", how each relates to the world. His guiding 
principle is that "every act is integrated in global structures and finally 
in the totality I am" (BNl: 459; BN2: 471). To this end, he supposes 
that a method could be developed that would lead by regressive analysis 
from the act back to the "original relation which the for-itself chooses 
with its facticity and with the world". This, in anticipatory terms, "is 
nothing other than the for-itself 's being in the world inasmuch as this 
being-in-the-world is a choice - that is, we have reached the original 
type of nihilation by which the for-itself has to be its own nothingness" 
(BNl: 457; BN2: 479). In related terms, regressive analysis promises 
to disengage the meaning of the particular act and proceed to "richer 
and more profound meanings until we encounter the meaning which 
does not imply any other meaning and which refers only to itself" 
(BN1: 457; BN2: 479). At this bedrock point no further interpretation 
is possible. 
Every act is comprehensible inasmuch as it offers accessible rational 
content - the hiker drops his pack in order to rest - but fully compre-
hensible only through the regressive analysis that uncovers the "totality 
I am" together with a synthetic progression back to the act in "the total 
form" (BNl: 460; BN2: 482). This is my-being-in-the-world conceived 
as a choice - not a particular choice, but the basic or original choice in 
which I choose myself as a whole in every particular choice, the funda-
mental project which is my total being-in-the world in every particular 
project, the fundamental act of freedom which gives meaning to my 
every act. Sartre describes this choice as a "constantly renewed act 
[which] is not distinct from my being"; we are conscious of it because 
"it is simply one with the consciousness which we have of ourselves" 
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(BNl: 461-2; BN2: 483). Original choice, one with consciousness and 
freedom, unfolds time and being so that I am conscious of the place of 
any particular act "within the compass of what I am", not with analyti-
cal or detailed awareness, but in the consciousness expressed "by the 
twofold 'feeling' of anguish and responsibility" related to myself as a 
whole (BN1: 463-4; BN2: 486). 
The idea of original choice/fundamental project calls for assessment. 
But one can see that it provides Sartre with a formal basis for rejecting 
the view that he portrays a capricious freedom. In addition, he can now 
say that the price of resistance for the tired hiker would be to effect a 
radical change in his fundamental project. Is this possible? The difficulty 
is that original choice creates my reasons and motives and arranges 
my being-in-the-world in terms of possibilities and values. How then 
could I possibly find an effective motive from outside this frame? How 
is radical transformation possible? Sartre proceeds by comparing his 
approach with Leibniz's account of freedom. 
Leibniz says that Adam took the apple. He freely chose to do this 
and his choice was contingent. Could he have refused? Yes, Leibniz 
responds, but only if he were another Adam in another possible world. 
In the world chosen by God, Adam's taking the apple is a contingent 
act, yet part of a necessary complex of events. In this world, therefore, 
Adam did what he wanted to do, but could not have done otherwise. 
Sartre objects that, while Adam chose to take the apple, he did not 
choose to be Adam, for that was settled in God's choice of this world. 
By contrast, he locates the problem of freedom in Adam's choice of 
himself as a whole in the world. He can agree with Leibniz that "another 
gesture of Adam, implying another Adam, implies another world", but 
only in the sense that "another face of the world will correspond with 
another being-in-the-world of Adam" (BN1: 469; BN2: 490-91). For 
Sartre, the Adam who refuses the apple is the same Adam in the same 
world, but an Adam who has changed his being-in-the-world. 
This comparative analysis, he comments, has been purely theoreti-
cal, for reality is more complex and does not follow the order of logic. 
Unc\erstanding an act in terms of freely posited original ends is an exer-
cise of interpretation, and the connection between a secondary possible 
(resisting fatigue or giving in) and the fundamental possible is not a 
logical deduction; it is, rather, "the connection between a totality and 
a partial structure" (BNl: 469; BN2: 491). In interpreting this relation-
ship, he continues, there is no universal system for making connections 
between secondary and fundamental possibles; one must always rely 
on personal criteria provided by the subject (BN1: 471; BN2: 493). 
One must also recognize that various acts are "indifferent" in that they 
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have no bearing on original choice. Moreover, mere voluntary effort to 
overcome fundamental choice will prove ineffectual. Radical change in 
one's fundamental project must occur, not in the will, but at the deeper 
level of freedom. How then does it occur? How can it be explained? 
Sartre appeals to anguish as evidence that I am conscious of the 
choice that I am. Anguish also shows that we are aware that this choice 
cannot bind our future freedom, for, as the basis for all particular 
choices, it is contingent and unjustifiable. Specifically, he insists that 
radical change is possible because, in "temporalizing itself", the for-
itself makes choices that begin a new project in ending a prior one. 
This is a continuous process, not from instant to instant, for there is 
no instant. However, in the continuous recovery of its original choice, 
the freedom of the for-itself "is haunted by the spectre of the instant". 
This is because the for-itself always has the possibility of positing its 
immediate past as object and making a new choice of ends in the unity 
of a single act, causing "the instant to spring forth as the nihilating 
rupture of the temporalization" (BN1: 467; BN2: 489). 
The idea of radical conversion finds support in life and literature. 
But in fixing its occurrence in a moment and basing it on a permanent 
possibility, Sartre fails to explain why it occurs in any particular transi-
tion. Again, how does the for-itself create a new ensemble of reasons, 
motives and ends from within the original choice? He can say of it only 
what he says of original choice: it is incomprehensible; freedom acts by 
itself to create a fundamentally new complex of meaning. The question, 
then, concerns the creation of meaning in (initial) original choice. Must 
we simply accept that this is incomprehensible? 
Sartre makes clear that freedom arises always and only in a situation 
constituted by the for-itself and the facticity of its surrounding world. 
Now, in his discussion of freedom and facticity, he includes the circum-
stances of my being in the midst of others and meeting a world full of 
meanings which are "mine and which I have not given to myself" (BNl: 
510; BN2: 532). His whole focus in this context is on insisting that this 
factor does not limit freedom since the for-itself "must choose itself 
by taking account of these circumstances and n£Jt ad libitum" (BNl: 
520; BN2: 541). But the consideration of my meeting a world full of 
meanings (as in language) could point to a different understanding of 
original choice. For, in taking account of shared meanings in choosing 
itself in its choices, the for-itself must already have these meanings in 
its grasp. They could then appear, not as facticity, but as an enabling 
element of freedom and choice. To lack command of meanings would 
be to lack freedom. Furthermore, their role would confirm that one's 
choice is not an absolute foundation. 
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The claim that freedom creates meaning "by itself" in original choice 
is therefore questionable (and with it the notion of foundational mean-
ing). Nonetheless, the idea that I make myself the person I am and 
that I am responsible for myself as a whole seems entirely plausible. 
This would support an understanding of the human subject as a unity 
engaged in a project of unification in what it does, always bearing its 
past and its way of "existing its body" into the present, and always 
remaining free (within limits) to change the way it relates to its past and 
the world as a whole. But noting that this is not Sartre's own notion of 
original choice and freedom, I will return to consider his views further 
- specifically the proposal that in interpreting behaviour one seeks 
connections between a totality and a partial structure. 
Making connections of this kind seems relatively unproblematic 
when we have access to parts and whole, as with a painting or a piece 
of music, or in grasping an object in seeing aspects of it. The idea of 
interpreting particular acts in terms of the subject as a larger whole 
seems right. But with original choice, the totality always remains in 
question, always subject to change, always out of reach. How might 
typical original choice be indicated? Sartre says "whatever our being 
may be, it is a choice; and it depends on us to choose ourselves as 
'great', or 'noble' or 'base' or 'humiliated"' (BNl: 4 72; BN2: 494). 
Clearly, these choices, or others such as "ambition, the passion to be 
loved, [or] the inferiority complex", do not satisfy the requirement for 
a fundamental project "which can no longer be interpreted in terms of 
any other and which is total" (BNl: 479; BN2: 501). Committed to the 
ideal of bedrock explanation, Sartre returns to the theme of regressive 
analysis, this time in the form of a special phenomenological method 
called existential psychoanalysis. 
Existential psychoanalysis and the fundamental project/desire 
Existential psychoanalysis is "a method destined to bring to light, in a 
strictly objective form, the subjective choice by which each living person 
mak~s himself a person; that is, makes known to himself what he is" 
(BNl: 574; BN2: 595). Since "what the method seeks is a choice of 
being at the same time as a being, it must reduce particular behaviour 
patterns to fundamental relations - not of sexuality or of the will to 
power, but of being - which are expressed in this behaviour" (ibid.). 
Tl]is proposal grows out of his account of action and original choice, 
this time with a focus on the ends of action and desire. The basic prin-
ciple once again is that the human being is a totality, a unity responsible 
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for itself and its world, not a collection. And the aim is to show how 
each tendency, each inclination of a person has a meaning that goes 
beyond itself and which expresses in some way the subject's choice of 
being as a whole. 
Freudian psychoanalysis provides an immediate context for Sar-
tre's proposal, and he seeks common ground with it, especially in the 
emphasis on the symbolic character of behaviour and the search for 
underlying meaning. But he rejects the recourse to mechanistic expla-
nation in Freudian theory and the idea of the unconscious. For similar 
reasons, he is critical of empirical psychology, especially in its failure 
to recognize the significance of the intentional structure of action. He 
objects, for instance, to the treatment of desire as if it were a thing 
in consciousness, rather than consciousness itself in its free project 
towards an end. This does not mean that existential psychoanalysis will 
be any less focused on the subject's empirical existence. Its concern is 
precisely with the subject's empirical tendencies and choices conceived 
as particular expressions of the postulated original choice. The task is 
to compare the various tendencies in the attempt "to discover and dis-
engage the fundamental project which is common to them all" on the 
understanding that each "is the entire person" (BNl: 564; BN2: 585). 
Given an infinite number of possible projects for an infinity of pos-
sible human beings, Sartre says that one would need to begin with 
individual investigations with a view to identifying common charac-
teristics for classification into larger categories. That is a task for the 
future. In the meantime, he is confident that ontology can throw light 
on the ultimate stopping-point of an evident irreducibility. For, what 
could be more basic than the very being of the subject? It is clear then 
that the fundamental project of a for-itself "can aim only at its being" 
(BNl: 564; BN2: 585). Moreover, this desire for being is obviously 
indistinguishable from the being of the for-itself, which has already 
been defined as a lack of being. In short, the self-evident irreducible is 
the project of being or the desire to be. This, it must be understood, is 
not a desire existing in advance of particular concrete desires. Rather, 
"the desire to be exists and manifests itself onlf in and through jeal-
ousy, greed, love of art, cowardice, courage, and a thousand contingent 
empirical expressions" in the life of the particular person (BNl: 565; 
BN2: 586). 
The final step is to recognize that the object of the desire to be can 
only be being-in-itself. What the for-itself lacks, what it desires and 
values is "the ideal of a consciousness that would be the foundation of 
its own being-in-itself by the pure consciousness which it would have 
of itself" (BNl: 566; BN2: 587). This, for Sartre, is the (contradictory) 
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idea of God (as being for-itself-in-itself). Thus, "the best way to conceive 
of the fundamental project of human reality is to say that man is the 
being whose project is to be God ... Or, if you prefer, man fundamen, 
tally is the desire to be God" (BN1: 5 66; BN2: 587). 
What does this mean for freedom? For it appears that the desire 
for being channels all choice into a single possibility and constitutes in 
effect a human "essence". Sartre responds by noting that "while the 
meaning of the desire is ultimately the project of being God, the desire 
isneverconstitutedbythismeaning" (BN1: 566-7; BN2: 587-8). This 
relates to the consideration that the desire of being, which is always a 
desire for a mode of being, ''expresses itself in turn as the meaning of 
the myriads of concrete desires which constitute the web of our con-
scious life" (BN1: 567; BN2: 588). In this connection, he introduces a 
distinction between the concrete fundamental desire of the individual 
subject and an "abstract meaningful structure which is the desire of 
being in general" (ibid.). The free and fundamental desire is the unique 
person, with absolute concreteness and existence as a totality; this is 
everywhere in all the empirical desires of the particular for-itself and is 
never apprehended except through them. At the same time, for every 
for-itself in every situation, the general meaning of its concrete funda-
mental desire and particular choices ]ies in the desire for being. This 
latter, he observes, "must be considered as human reality in the person", 
that is, something one shares with all others, and a truth about human 
beings generaJly (ibid.). But while the ontological desire of being is the 
truth of the concrete fundamental desire, it "'does not exist by virtue 
of reality" and cannot represent "the fundamental human structure of 
the individual; [hence] it cannot be an obstacle to his freedom" (ibid.). 
Sartre's depiction of existential psychoanalysis appears as a bold 
sketch. The first stage, which he sets aside as beyond ontology, is the 
detailed psychological, social, historical and moral study of individuals 
designed to uncover in each case their particular fundamental project. 
(He expresses the hope of writing biographies of Flaubert and Dosto-
evsky on these lines.) The results would then be classified and compared 
as a basis for establishing "general considerations about human reality 
as an empirical choice of its own ends" (BN1: 575; BN2: 595). The 
important point in the meantime, he suggests, is not that existential 
psychoanalysis does not yet exist, but that it is possible. But its pos-
sibility, in the strong form he proposes, is precisely what is in question. 
To provide more groundwork for the psychoanalytic proposal and 
a future work on ethics, Sartre turns finally to the question of what 
ontology can teach us about desire (BNl: 575££; BN2: 595££). In a wide-
ranging discussion of human activities and practices-in art, science, play 
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and endeavour generally - he argues that the meaning of all our striv-
ing lies, as previously announced, in the desire of being, that is, in the 
general project of appropriating the world as a totality of being-in-itself, 
the project of being God. If asked why the individual person chooses to 
possess the world in this way rather than that, he will reply that "here 
we see the peculiar character of freedom" (BNl: 599; BN2: 620). 
Yet in thinking about ethical implications beyond ontology, he revives 
the idea that existential psychoanalysis could throw light on the desire 
for being and even provide an escape from this "futile passion". For 
existential psychoanalysis involves moral description concerned with 
the ethical meaning of what we do; it could have bearing, therefore, 
on the fundamental desire for being and the associated conviction that 
value, as object of desire, lies in things. On this basis he concludes that 
"existential psychoanalysis is going to reveal to man the real goal of 
his pursuit, which is being as a synthetic fusion of the in-itself with the 
for-itself; existential psychoanalysis is going to acquaint man with his 
passion" - and in this way, a person might find in its principles "a means 
of deliverance and salvation" (BNl: 626-7; BN2: 646). 
With an eye to his forthcoming study of ethics, Sartre asks whether 
it is "possible for freedom to take itself for a value as the source of all 
value, or must it necessarily be defined by a transcendent value [the 
in-itself-for-itself] which haunts it" (BNl: 627; BN2: 647). This ques-
tion involves an impossible leap. How, in the terms of his ontology, 
could anyone effect a change of this kind? For the desire for being is a 
truth concerning human reality, arising in the fundamental relation of 
the for-itself to the in-itself. Acquaintance with this passion might lead 
some people to change their particular fundamental project (a radical 
transformation such as Sartre appealed to in his discussion of Leibniz 
on freedom). But the new concrete fundamental project would retain 
the same general meaning uncovered in the ontology. It could only be 
another instance of the peculiar character of freedom, another way 
in which the individual person chooses to appropriate the world as a 
totality of being-in-itself. 
The only escape lies at an entirely different leyel: one would need to 
challenge the ontology itself. Sartre himself followed this path in time, 
not by rejecting his past thought entirely, but by treating consciousness 
in terms of a more nuanced notion of "lived experience" (le vecu), 
and by adopting a diminished conception of freedom and an enlarged 
account of how we live in time. He also developed a much-enhanced, 
but still over-ambitious regressive/progressive method of inquiry, which 
he put to work in the study of individuals - notably Flaubert - and in 
considering moral, social and historical relationships more generally. 
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Self-making and alienation: 
from bad faith to revolution 
Thomas W. Busch 
In the autumn of 1933 Sartre took leave of absence from his teaching 
position at the Lycee Fran~ois Premier in Le Havre and travelled to 
the French Institute (Maison Academique Fran<;;:aise) in Berlin to begin 
a fellowship to study phenomenology. He cut short what was to be a 
year's stay, returning to France in June 1934. This was a politically 
tumultuous time in Germany, as Hitler had taken over nine months 
before Sartre's arrival. It was not, however, the political situation that 
hastened Sartre's departure. Sartre's full-time commitment was to phi-
losophy and literature, reading Husserl on his own, appropriating ideas 
and writing furiously. His biographer, Annie Cohen-Solal, remarks on 
Sartre's lack of concern with politics during this time: 
The students of Le Havre had watched him scribble away, for 
hours, at the cafe, in the public library, between classes; his col-
leagues in Berlin now watch with great astonishment as he bus-
ies himself in his research at bars and in his first-floor bedroom, 
oblivious to the book burnings of 1933 and van Papen's speeches 
in front of Humboldt University. (Coh~n-Solal 1987: 95) 
In an interview, Sartre, looking back on this time, acknowledges his 
former apolitical attitude; 
Before the war I thought of myself simply as an individual. I was 
not aware of any ties between my individual existence and the 
society I was living in. At the time I graduated from the Ecole 
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Normale, I had based an entire theory on that feeling. I was 
"a man alone", an individual who opposes society through the 
independence of his thinking but who owes nothing to society 
and whom society cannot affect, because he is free. 
(Sartre 1977a: 45) 
The centrepiece of Being and Nothingness is this free individual, and 
while it was written during wartime very seldom is the war mentioned. 
A case in point is Sartre's reference to living as a Jew in occupied 
France, which occurs in part 4 during his discussion of possible limits 
on freedom. The Jewish person encounters many apparently restrictive 
"prohibitions", which would seem to curtail his/her freedom. Yet Sartre 
uses the highly charged example only to defend the position of radical 
freedom he has proposed earlier in the book: "In fact according to the 
free possibilities which I choose, I can disobey the prohibition, pay no 
attention to it, or, on the contrary, confer upon it a coercive value which 
it can hold only because of the weight which I attach to it" (BNL 524; 
BN2: 545). This defence exemplifies the ontological claim he made sev-
eral pages earlier that: "The given in no way enters into the constitution 
of freedom since freedom is interiorized as the internal negation of the 
given" (BN1: 487; BN2: 508). No matter what given situation one is 
in, for Sartre, one can always assume various attitudes towards it. His 
concern is to refute determinism and to do this he promotes a strong 
view of the autonomous individual subject. Subjectivity, ontologized 
as being-for-itself, is constituted by a perpetually secreted negativity, 
which precludes identity with itself or its environment, confirming his 
"theory" of the individual "whom society cannot affect, because he 
is free". Absent a stable identity, this volatile subjectivity must choose 
its way in the world, on its own, creating and sustaining, but never 
"being", an identity. 
By the war's end though, Sartre's thinking had begun to change 
course. When looking for a reason to account for "why my outlook 
changed so fundamentally after the Second World War", he claimed 
that:, 
a simple formula would be to say that life taught me la force des 
choses - the power of circumstances. In a way, L:Etre et le neant 
itself should have been the beginning of a discovery of this power 
of circumstances, since I had already been made a soldier, when 
I had not wanted to be one. Thus I had already encountered 
something that was [not] my freedom and which steered me from 
without out. (Sartre 1974b: 33) 
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The discovery of the power of circumstances marks the beginning of 
Sartre's politicization. Right after the war, in his editorial introduc-
tion to the first issue of his journal, Les Temps modernes, Sartre boldly 
proclaims that "our intention is to help effect certain changes in the 
society that surrounds us. By which we do not mean changes in peo-
ple's souls" (Sartre 1988: 255). Ironically, the message of Being and 
Nothingness was none other than a call to change one's attitude, to 
effect a "conversion" of one's life to accept and live out one's radical 
freedom. That is evidently no longer enough. While one is "totally 
free", yet "it is the free man who must be delivered, by enlarging his 
possibilities of choice" (ibid.: 265). While here not taking back his 
ontological claims about total freedom in Being and Nothingness, 
Sartre appears to be conceding that these claims are incomplete. In 
fact, as his attention turns to the issue of "possibilities of choice", his 
hyperbolic claims about free subjectivity in Being and Nothingness are 
marginalized and minimized: 
Thus, in LEtre et le neant, what you could call "subjectivity" is not 
what it is for me now, the small margin in an operation whereby 
an interiorization re-exteriorizes itself in an act. But "subjectiv-
ity" and "objectivity" seem to me entirely useless notions today, 
anyway. (Sartre 1974b: 35) 
To understand what freedom is for Sartre, it is necessary to see his 
understanding of it develop throughout his works. Too often his views 
are identified with Being and Nothingness. He realized this and pro-
tested "that they all stop too soon. I think that a study of my philo-
sophical thought should follow its evolution. But no, they don't do it. 
It's odd" (Sartre 198 lb: 8). One way of bringing out the evolution of 
his thinking, particularly his turn to politics, is to consider what he has 
said about self-making and alienation. 
Self-making: existence precede51essence 
The ground for Sartre's ontology of self-making in Being and Nothing-
ness is found in The Transcendence of the Ego, his "existentialist theory 
of consciousness". Consciousness is a priority for Sartre because for him 
what is distinctively human is a unique awareness of self and world. He 
appropriates Husserl's intentional understanding of consciousness, that 
consciousness is always consciousness of an object, that consciousness 
is relational in nature, while transforming it into his existentialist view 
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that existence precedes essence. For Sartre, consciousness operates on 
two different levels, pre-reflective and reflective. A reflective, or sec-
ondary level of consciousness, intends or posits an object that is another 
act of consciousness, as in Descartes's cogito, whereby he becomes 
aware of his own thinking. Prior to this secondary consciousness, when 
he was actually doing his thinking (and not thinking about his thinking) 
Descartes operated on the pre-reflective level of consciousness. On this 
level, while engaged for example in doubting, Descartes's conscious-
ness was intending or positing a dubious object. Thus, while operating 
on either level, reflective or pre-reflective, consciousness is revealed to 
be intentional, directed toward an object. Now Sartre's adds a crucial 
aspect to his understanding of intentional consciousness. While con-
sciousness, whether pre-reflective or reflective, is intentionally directed 
to an object (and not to itself), Sartre insists that consciousness is not 
unconscious of itself, but is aware of itself. However, this awareness of 
itself is not positional or focal. Rather it is non-positional, tacit and in 
the background. The structure of consciousness is to be intentional or 
positional of an object and simultaneously non-positionally self-aware. 
The reflexivity of non-positional self-awareness marks the creation of 
a "self" that necessarily comprehends its difference from its objects. 
Sartre distinguishes the "ego" from the "self". While the latter is 
integral to the structure of consciousness, the former is constituted 
through acts of reflection. In reflecting on the pre-reflective life of 
consciousness, reflection transforms it through objectifying it with some 
serious consequences. He presents the example of a wife who was 
shaken by the thought of being unfaithful to her husband. Her first line 
of defence was to deflect this possibility as a real possibility, by iden-
tifying herself with her "ego", or objectified representation of herself. 
She considered herself to be a "faithful" person, one thus incapable 
of infidelity. In her eyes, she was not the type of person to engage in 
that sort of behaviour. But this defence collapsed with the vertiginous 
experience that nothing actually prevented her from acting unfaithfully, 
that it was, after all, a real possibility. Sartre comments: "But this vertigo 
is comprehensible only if consciousness suddenly appeared to itself as 
infinitely overflowing in its possibilities the I which ordinarily serves 
as its unity" (Sartre 1957b: 100). Sartre uses this example to argue 
that having a deep identity (nature or essence) is incompatible with 
radical freedom. If the woman had an essence which constituted her 
being and identity, then her actions would arise out of that ground and 
be circumscribed by it. The experience of vertigo or anguish revealed 
her radically free existential self to be beyond fixed identity. Sartre's 
existential lesson from this example is that one must create oneself, 
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ungrounded by essence, by freely choosing, committing, and sustaining 
oneself faithfully or unfaithfully as a way of life. 
In Being and Nothingness, Sartre takes up the structure of conscious-
ness explored in The Transcendence of the Ego in terms of an ontology 
that stresses subjectivity, particularly defending its radical freedom. 
Epistemologically, all human experience, for Sartre, is dichotomized 
into subject/object and ontologically into self/other. The difference 
embedded in and making possible the dichotomy is neant, the break 
or fission in the continuity of being (in non-positional self-awareness) 
that allows for radical freedom. "The being of consciousness qua con-
sciousness is to exist at a distance from itself as presence to itself, and 
this empty distance which being carries in its being is Nothingness" 
(BN1: 78; BN2: 102). The disruption of being from coincidence with 
itself temporalizes the being of consciousness, projecting it into the 
non-being of the future, haunting it with the imaginary. Exiled from 
identity with itself, human reality cannot rest in the stasis of being, but 
exhausts itself in temporalizing action, creating and supporting a way 
of life, projecting meaning and value. "In anguish I apprehend myself 
at once as totally free and as not being able to derive the meaning of the 
world except as coming from myself" (BN1: 40; BN2: 63 ). 
The self as the place of the break with the causal continuity of being is 
radically free, that is, not determined by any factual state of affairs: "No 
factual state whatever it may be (the political and economic structure 
of society, the psychological 'state,' etc.) is capable by itself of motivat-
ing any act whatsoever" (BN1: 435; BN2: 457). Since radical freedom 
is the very being of the self, there is no middle ground, one is either 
determined or radically free: "Either man is wholly determined (which 
is inadmissible, especially because a determined consciousness - i.e., 
a consciousness externally motivated - becomes itself pure exteriority 
and ceases to be consciousness) or else man is wholly free" (BN1: 442; 
BN2: 464). Human actions are not grounded in the foundation of an 
essence of being, but in the choices of a self by definition exiled from 
such a foundation. 
From bad faith to revolution 
Sartre referred to Being and Nothingness as his "eidetic of bad faith", 
and it is crucial to keep this in mind or it is easy to misunderstand 
that "essay on phenomenological ontology". After revealing the radi-
cal freedom of being-for-itself through phenomenological examples 
of questioning, imagining and experiences of anguish, Sartre tells the 
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reader that two paths are possible for such a being, the path of "non-
being", which is the acceptance of radical freedom, and the path of 
"being", which is that of flight or bad faith. The path of "non-being", or 
authenticity, "supposes a special transcendence needing separate study" 
(BN1: 44; BN2: 68) and will not be dealtwith in Being and Nothingness. 
The path of "being" (bad faith) will be taken up, its forms exposed, 
its motivation revealed and its cure suggested. In no way is Being and 
Nothingness a full picture of the possibilities of human existence. 
Two chapters explicitly deal with bad faith: "Bad Faith" and "Con-
crete Relations with Others". Bad faith is presented as a self-deception. 
Deception or lying presupposes a duality of liar and lied to wherein the 
liar hides the truth from the lied to. In the case of self-deception, one 
is hiding from oneself what one thinks to be true. 
I can in fact "not wish to see" a certain aspect of my being only 
if I am acquainted with the aspect which I do not wish to see. 
This means that in my being I must indicate this aspect in order 
to be able to turn myself away from it ... In a word, I flee in 
order not to know, but I cannot avoid knowing that I am fleeing. 
(BN1: 43; BN2: 67) 
This self-deceptive behaviour is applied to the defining aspects of human 
reality, freedom and facticity. The very condition of radical freedom 
is its break in the continuum of being and from essential identity. Yet, 
as a contingent factical being in the world, human reality must choose 
and commit itself in a process of self-making. Sartre expresses this in 
somewhat awkward language: "We have to deal with human reality as 
a being which is what it is not and which is not what it is" (BN1: 58; 
BN2: 82). While human reality is not what it is in the sense of essence, 
it '~is what it is not" in the sense of self-making, a creation and support 
of a mode of life for which it is responsible. A person in bad faith is 
in denial of one of its terms. The waiter who believes himself to be a 
waiter as an essence must not notice how he is producing a way of life 
through choice, while the thief who denies all identity must not notice 
that his or her lifestyle is a committed project, creating a moral identity. 
The ontological mode of being-for-others affords more opportuni-
ties for self-deception. The look of the Other objectifies the for-itself 
revealing a dimension of its reality unknown to the individual for-itself, 
as a factical object in the world. In its objectivity for the Other, the 
£01;-itself apprehends the meaning of its being and world slip from its 
control, producing new tensions between subjectivity and objectiv-
ity. Sartre discusses at length various forms of self-deception that can 
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arise out of the situation introduced by Others. "I can", for example, 
"attempt to deny that being which is conferred on me from outside", by 
making an object of the Other since, "the Other's abjectness destroys 
my abjectness for him". On the other hand, "I can seek to recover that 
freedom and to possess it" (BN1: 363; BN2: 386), thereby reducing 
the Other to instrumentality. Once again, in these forms of bad faith 
(indifference, false love, sadism, masochism) there is a refusal of the 
human condition, a resistance to accepting both freedom and facticity. 
The remaining questions regard the motivation of this resistance and 
its possible cure. 
Sartre offers a motivation for bad faith by considering the "break" in 
being, which he located in the non-positional self-awareness of being-
for-itself, as a lack of self-identity, which provokes a desire for self-
identity. Exiled from the identity of being, dispersed temporally and 
self-divided, being-for-itself seeks to catch up with itself, to recover its 
dispersion and split identity in order to give itself meaning in the form 
of self-identity. Being factical, the for-itself is not its own foundation; 
it has no fundamental justification, no intrinsic meaningfulness. In its 
self-making, the for-itself creates and sustains a meaningful life, but 
cannot actually be that mode of life in self-identity, the mode of being-
in-itself. If being-for-itself could actually be the life that it makes and 
sustains as a project, it would be self-justifying, its own foundation. But, 
of course, if the for-itself were to be, it would no longer exist as a for-
itself, a self-maker. It would lose itself as a self because a self is a "break" 
in the identity of being. Thus, the goal desired "can not be given by 
nature, since it combines in itself the incompatible characteristics of the 
in-itself and the for-itself" (BNl: 90; BN2: 114). Sartre has informed 
us as early as his work on emotion that people are prone, when in an 
untenable situation, one that has no real solution, to attempt magical 
solutions. Thus bad faith is a way to live the impossibility ever fulfill-
ing an always-deferred self-foundation through a belief that one has 
achieved it. But as we have seen this demands that we deceive ourselves 
by denying those aspects of our situation (either our freedom or our 
facticity) that get in the way of sustaining that bctlief. 
From time to time in Being and Nothingness Sartre reminds us that it 
is possible to overcome bad faith, to effect a "conversion" to authentic 
life. While authenticity is reserved for "separate study", the path to it 
is suggested in his treatment of existential psychoanalysis. At the very 
end of Being and Nothingness he tells us that "existential psychoanalysis 
is going to reveal to man the real goal of his pursuit, which is being as 
a synthetic fusion of the in-itself with the for itself" (BNl: 626; BN2: 
646), in order to make use of this revelation as "a means of deliverance 
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and salvation". No longer would one's life be frustrated in attempts 
to achieve the unachievable, but one would accept one's very break in 
being as the worthy life of freedom itself. 
Being and Nothingness is a mix of phenomenological description, 
ontological categorization and metaphysical narrative. Its register is 
highly individual and intensely psychological, while the political seems 
irrelevant to the existential drama. That would soon change. "Every 
man is political. But I did not discover that for myself until the war and 
I did not truly understand it until 1945" (Sartre 1977a: 44). The war 
taught Sartre "the force of circumstances", an awakened sense of his 
implication in history and social structures. "J;Etre et le neant traced an 
interior experience without any co-ordination with the exterior experi-
ence of a petty bourgeois intellectual, which had become catastrophic at 
a certain moment" (Sartre 1974b: 35). Sartre is moved now to explore 
a "concrete" freedom which takes into account the formative influ-
ence on the subject of its situation and in doing so encounter forms of 
alienation absent from the discussion of "abstract" freedom in Being 
and Nothingness. On a number of occasions (e.g. ibid.) he tells us that 
the book where he has best explained what he means by freedom is, in 
fact, Saint Genet. Here, in his attempt to understand Jean Genet's life, 
Sartre is led to speak of "the making of Genet" (Sartre 1963). 
Contrasting with the adult world of Being and Nothingness, Sartre 
emphasizes the pivotal role of Genet's childhood in the development 
of his subjectivity. The vulnerable child, marked by social meanings 
attached to his illegitimacy, is "provided with a monstrous and guilty 
ego" (ibid.: 27). His attempts to be like other children are twisted by 
others into a nightmarish stigma. The child accepts the social verdicts 
levelled at him and, knowing no other recourse, sets out to enact them, 
"progressively internalizing the sentence imposed by adults" (ibid.: 49). 
Being and Nothingness is ill suited to make Genet's situation intelligible, 
for only two options in life were there offered, bad faith and authen-
ticity. However, the child Genet was not running away from a radical 
freedom he did not know. He sees himself through the eyes of others, 
which in turn are conditioned by social structures alienating to him. As 
he inte'rnalizes the definitions and judgments of others, Genet makes 
them his self-definitions and judgments, resulting in his "alienation". 
But alienation cannot happen to things, Sartre argues, only to free 
people. In internalizing the definitions of others Genet can only enact 
them through projects of self-making, even though it is a self-making 
trapped in the definitions of others. As he "lives" the sentences imposed 
by others, Genet begins to express his life in writing, which, according 
to Sartre's reconstruction, ultimately leads Genet to experience his 
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freedom and self-making as he gradually realizes his power to shape 
himself to others. What we learn from Genet is that "in the end one is 
always responsible for what is made of one. Even if one can do nothing 
else besides assuming this responsibility for I believe that a man always 
makes something out of what is made of him" (Sartre 1974b: 34-5). 
In his later work Sartre vigorously delves into the processes by which 
people are "made" by their environment. It is not a question of rejecting 
existential self-making, but of taking into account social processes of 
"making". A concrete appreciation of freedom in this sense provokes a 
"dialectical" understanding of the subject and its world. He drops the 
ontological terminology of for-itself and in-itself in favour of praxis 
and practico-inert, emphatically more actional and material notions 
than ontological and psychological. Praxis, the actional subject, works 
on the world, engraves its projects upon it, and it in turn, modified by 
these imprints, constrains praxis. While ontological freedom stressed 
the "break" with given conditions in the ability to surpass them, con-
crete freedom stresses the situational terms which condition surpassing 
and circumscribe it. 
Every man is defined negatively by the sum total of possibles 
which are impossible for him; that is, by a future more or less 
blocked off. For the underprivileged classes, each cultural, tech-
nical, or material enrichment of society represents a diminution, 
an impoverishment; the future is almost entirely barred. Thus, 
both positively and negatively, the social possibles are lived as 
schematic determinations of the individual future. And the most 
individual possible is only the enrichment of a social possible. 
(Sartre 1958b: 95) 
The tie between individual and social possible is the basis for Sartre's 
understanding of "class", which can be seen not only to constrain lives 
but to mediate them in relation to one another. Class consists of "the 
social Being of man at the fundamental level, that is to say, in so far as 
there are several people within a practical field totalized by the mode 
of production" (Sartre 1976a: 230). When he refers to class, Sartre 
invariably uses Marx's terminology and is concerned with liberating the 
proletariat whose lives are defined by their role in economic produc-
tion. To survive in the present scheme of things the proletariat must 
employ means that recoil against their freedom: "individuals find an 
existence already sketched out for them at birth; they 'have their posi-
tion in life' and their personal development assigned to them by their 
class" (ibid.: 232). The destiny portrayed here is not one grounded in 
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an essence, but rather in the stasis of an entrenched situation that results 
in a repetitious existence as long as the constraining conditions prevail. 
One remains ontologically free under those conditions, one makes 
choices, but the choices are limited by the structural conditions of one's 
situation. The commitment to individual freedom in the overcoming 
of bad faith in Sartre's early writings develops into the commitment, 
in his later writings to overcoming structural forms of alienation in 
the realization "for everyone [of] a margin of real freedom beyond the 
production of life" (Sartre 1958b: 34), the political creation of a "city 
of ends". While overcoming bad faith required a conversion of attitude, 
changing structural forms of alienation requires "material work and 
revolutionary praxis" (ibid.: 13). 
Until his death Sartre continued to do what he could to combat 
colonialism, racism and economic oppression. It is not an exaggeration 
to consider him a major voice of conscience in his age. He died still 
hopeful that a liberated society would materialize, a hope based upon 
his unwavering conviction that human beings are not stuck in the con-
tinuum of being but can always project a future different from the past. 
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FIFTEEN 
Politics and the 
engaged intellectual 
William L. McBride 
Having been relatively apolitical during the early stages of his career- he 
spent a fellowship year in Berlin soon after Hitler's appointment as Ger-
man Chancellor without showing much apparent interest in what was 
beginning to take place in the political realm-Sartre became, in the years 
following the Second World War, the quintessential public intellectual. 
The chronology of his path is well documented, and it is intertwined 
with the evolution of his philosophy. In this chapter, that path will be 
quickly retraced, with brief pauses at some of its most salient markers. 
Sartre's path to political engagement 
Sartre had a fairly strong sense of identification with his generation; he 
was not alone in regarding it, in retrospect, as the "between the wars 
generation". His studies dominated his life in the years immediately 
following the First World War, and he then performed eighteen months 
of military service, compulsory for French males, as a meteorologist. 
His first career appointment was at the lycee i:a Le Havre, where he 
taught philosophy for several years before and after his time in Ger-
many. Meanwhile, he was undertaking various writing ventures, with 
mixed success, including the ongoing rewriting of the novel, eventually 
entitled Nausea, which, when finally published in 1938, brought him 
considerable acclaim. Little by little, political realities began increas-
ingly to impinge on his consciousness and his life. The most important 
of these developments for him was the civil war in Spain, which began 
in 1936; one of Sartre's best friends, the painter Fernando Gerassi, 
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abruptly left Paris to fight against Franco on the Republican side, which 
ultimately suffered defeat. In short order thereafter, despite the Anglo-
French effort at Munich to prevent all-out war by appeasing Hitler, 
there ensued the latter's invasion of Poland and the inevitable declara-
tions of war and military call-ups - a sequence of events that Sartre 
proceeded to translate into personal terms in his fictional trilogy, The 
Roads to Freedom (Sartre 1945a, 1945c, 1949a). He himself was called 
up and spent the period of the so-called "phoney war", at the end of 
which the French Vichy government acceded to the Nazis after rela-
tively little actual combat had occurred, reading and writing at a furi-
ous pace. He was taken prisoner along with his fellow combatants and 
spent nine months in a Stalag before escaping and returning to Paris. It 
was during this period that Sartre's earlier individualistic outlook on 
the world began to give way to a certain sense of human camaraderie 
- the prisoner-of-war camp experience was especially influential in 
this respect - and that he began seriously to reflect, as his friend and 
confidante Simone de Beauvoir affirmed in her memoirs, on the idea 
of commitment, engagement. 
Sartre's post-war commitments 
The time between Sartre's escape from the camp and the liberation of 
Paris from the Nazis in 1944 was comparatively brief- less than three 
and a half years. He participated in a short-lived resistance group that 
took the name "Socialism and Freedom" and resumed his teaching 
career, for the last time, at the Lycee Condorcet in Paris, but above all 
he wrote and published prodigiously. Two of his best plays - The Flies, 
with its veiled anti-Occupation message, and No Exit (Sartre 2005 a) -
were first produced then. Most important of all, his first philosophical 
magnum opus, Being and Nothingness, appeared in print in mid-1943. 
Although Sartre had already published two books on the imagination 
and other essays in philosophy prior to the war {most notably his outline 
of a theory of the emotions), Being and Nothingness was of an entirely 
different order both of magnitude and of importance. 
In light of Sartre's later development it is worth considering to what 
extent, if any, Being and Nothingness may be considered to have politi-
cal significance. The simple answer is, very little. It is above all a work 
of systematic ontology, aspects of which are explored in other essays 
in the present volume, and it contains virtually no text of a sort that 
might have appeared politically provocative to Nazi censors. One heav-
ily veiled possible exception to this is Sartre's critical reference, on the 
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penultimate page of the conclusion, to the "spirit of seriousness" that 
he indicates will be one focus of a future work of his on ethics. To those 
imbued with this spirit, he says, the actions of a solitary drunkard and 
the "vain agitation of the leader of nations [conducteur de peuples ]" 
(BN1: 627; BN2: 647) are on a par with one another, or perhaps 
the former is in a better position. "Conducteur" can be translated as 
"Fuhrer", the title usually given to Hitler. There is also one rather 
dramatic earlier sub-section entitled "Freedom and Responsibility" in 
which Sartre argues that, in a wartime situation, I am responsible for 
whatever stance I take towards the war, whether combat or escape or 
suicide, and so on (BN1: 553; BN2: 574); for anyone familiar with the 
period in which Sartre wrote and published Being and Nothingness, this 
part of the text exudes a sense of contemporaneity, but there is nothing 
obviously subversive about it. The types of interpersonal relationships 
with which much of this work is concerned are for the most part what 
Sartre will later call "dyadic", one-on-one (BNl: 592; BN2: 613), and 
the socio-political realm remains very much in the background. 
Sartre as an "engaged writer" 
This is not to say, however, that Sartre was still mostly ignorant of that 
realm by the time Being and Nothingness appeared. It is clear that, by 
that time, he was already planning to be a principal collaborator in a 
post-war initiative, in the form of an interdisciplinary and politically 
engaged revue that in fact took shape soon after the Liberation and was 
given the name Les Temps modernes. (The name was taken from the 
title of Charlie Chaplin's satirical film Modern Times.) Its original list of 
editorial board members included a number of prominent intellectuals, 
some of whom, such as Raymond Aron, soon left, while others, most 
notably Simone de Beauvoir and for some years Maurice Merleau-
Ponty, formed its working core. Sartre's "Presentatiori" of the journal 
in its inaugural issue announced its intended general line, best charac-
terized as "non-Communist Left" and committec:Vto what it identified 
as a spirit of synthesis, attempting to understand human beings in their 
totality, as opposed to a spirit of analysis. While Les Temps modernes 
contained, over the years, many articles of general interest beyond the 
political realm (literature, psychiatry, history, etc.), the fundamentally 
political nature of its orientation never came into question. 
Among the most notable essays of the early years of Les Temps mod-
ernes, three written by Sartre himself were exceptional both as defin-
ing statements of his own evolving political position and as highly 
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influential in post-war intellectual life: "Reflexions sur la question juive' 
' 
''Materialisme et revolution" and "Qu'est-ce que la litterature?". The first 
(along with a large section that was not part of the original) and the third 
were eventually published in separate volumes (Sartre 1946a, 1948a), 
and the English translation of "Reflexions sur la question juive" was given 
the somewhat misleading title of Anti-Semite andjew (Sartre 1948b). 
Probably the most unforgettable part of the essay on "the Jewish 
question" is Sartre's opening portrait of the anti-Semite; it is forceful 
and devastating, and, of course, particularly poignant given the era in 
which it was written (ibid.: 36). Among Sartre's other achievements in 
this essay is his recognition of the inadequacies of an abstract, universal-
istic form of liberalism that pretends that, since we are all human after 
all, any solution to anti-Semitism does not have to involve coming to 
grips with the reality of it (ibid.: 143). As for "Materialism and Revolu-
tion" (Sartre 1962a, 1946c), it clearly delineates Sartre's philosophical 
distance from the Communist Party dogma that called itself "orthodox 
Marxism" and took a strongly deterministic view of history. Sartre here 
acknowledges the contribution of an uncompromisingly materialistic 
ontology to the morale, so to speak, of the ordinary worker, who is 
thereby reinforced in the conviction that he or she is on the same level 
as the owner of capital, no better or worse; but Sartre insists that the 
desirable goal of emancipation of the working class would ultimately 
be better served by a philosophical doctrine that retained the element 
of human freedom (ibid.: 220). 
It is in "What Is Literature?", more than in any other writing, that Sar-
tre most directly espouses a stance of commitment, engagement. After 
briefly surveying Western literary history of recent decades, with special 
emphasis on the "literature of consumption" (Sartre 1950a: 205), pos-
ing no threat to the dominance of the bourgeois class, that he ascribes 
to the late nineteenth century, he advocates an activist "literature of 
production" to be pursued by contemporary (prose) writers. Only such a 
literature, he maintains, can be taken seriously by today's public. Its ulti-
mate and admittedly somewhat utopian goal should be to bring about 
a cla~sless society. Literature and morality are, of course, not the same 
thing, Sartre acknowledges, and yet the purpose of engaged literature 
as he now conceived it is in the last analysis a moral one (ibid.: 258). 
Sartre as political public intellectual 
"What Is Literature?" was first published in instalments in Les Temps 
modernes throughout 1947. Hence, only four years after the publication 
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of Being and Nothingness and three years after the Liberation of Paris, 
Sartre found himself in the position of public intellectual par excellence, 
a position that he was to occupy, in France and virtually worldwide, for 
some years to come. He was almost constantly called upon to respond 
to world events, the principal foci of which were, above all, the Cold 
War and, secondarily, the often bloody demise of Western colonial 
empires, especially that of France itself. Only for a brief period and 
without success did he play an overtly political role: he joined a short-
lived party called the RD R (Rassemblement Democratique Revolution-
naire ), ostensibly designed to uphold an independent non-Communist 
left-wing position between East and West; but it soon became known 
that one of its leaders was in the pay of certain American interests, and 
this created a sense of disillusionment in Sartre and a number of other 
French intellectuals. 
Equally (or perhaps even more) disillusioning for them was the docu-
mented revelation, within the same period {late 1949 to early 1950), of 
the existence of a network of slave labour camps in the Soviet Union, 
which were denounced in an editorial, written by Merleau-Ponty and 
approved by Sartre, in Les Temps modernes. A fictionalized version of 
some of the tensions surrounding the decision to print this editorial is 
a central part of Simone de Beauvoir's novel The Mandarins, published 
four years later (de Beauvoir 1954). 
Within a few months war broke out on the Korean peninsula, 
exacerbating Cold War tensions even further. The Korean War was 
a major factor, though by no means the only one, in the eventual 
rupture between Sartre and Merleau-Ponty, which culminated in the 
latter's resignation from the editorial board of the journal in 1953, 
and which was slowly being overcome at the time of Merleau-Ponty's 
untimely death ten years later. "Merleau" had been, if anything, 
somewhat more sympathetic than Sartre to the general position of 
the Communist Party in the years prior to 1950; his 1949 book 
Humanism and Terror (Merleau-Ponty [1947] 1969) was such a seri-
ous, even-handed attempt to understand the mentality that had lain 
behind the notorious Moscow Purge Trials of1the 1930s as to lead 
some critics to accuse him, wrongly, of endorsing those trials. But he 
came to regard the North Korean incursion into South Korea as part 
of a Soviet strategy of global dominance, whereas Sartre was more 
inclined to see certain American provocations as having played a sig-
nificant role in precipitating the same event. In any case, by mutual 
agreement neither Sartre nor Merleau-Ponty published much of a 
directly political nature in Les Temps modernes during the ensuing 
period of roughly two years. 
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Breaking with Camus 
During that same period (August 1952), however, one of the best-
known and most controversial episodes in Sartre's life as engaged intel-
lectual occurred with the publication of his famous "Reply to Albert 
Camus". The occasion for this was Camus's ''Letter to the Director of 
Les Temps modernes" - the impersonality and extreme formality of 
this way of addressing him were of course deliberate - in response to a 
review of Camus's book The Rebel (Camus 1951; English translation 
1954) that had been published in a prior issue. The review had been 
written by a younger member of the staff, Francis J eanson, who had 
undertaken a task that all agreed was necessary (since it was a landmark 
work by a very prominent writer) but that they all, in a sense, dreaded. 
In his book, Camus, in effect, through numerous historical and liter-
ary analyses, concluded that, while individual revolt (the French title 
is !:Homme revolte, man in revolt) is often creative and productive, 
political revolutions are doomed to be counter-productive and to fail. 
Jeanson's lengthy critique of this position elicited a Camusian polemic 
that accused Sartre (Camus treated Jeanson as a Sartrean "mouthpiece" 
whom he never mentioned by name) of supporting the excesses of the 
Soviet Union under Stalin and of entertaining an unwarranted convic-
tion concerning the inevitable future movement of history. Sartre, in 
turn, accused Camus of a moralism bordering on preaching and insisted 
that it is we human beings who make history, from which we cannot 
simply stand back as Camus appeared to wish to do. The polemic left 
Camus embittered. He and Sartre were never reconciled. Meanwhile, 
the French government's ultimately failed, sanguinary and very costly 
effort to quell the anti-colonial uprising in Algeria, where Camus had 
been born and his mother still lived (leading to his famous remark to 
the effect that if he had to choose between justice and his mother he 
would choose the latter), contributed even further to a sense of personal 
conflict during the years that followed. Among the French supporters of 
the Algerian revolutionaries, who risked serious consequences because 
of their stance, Francis Jeanson was prominent and active, while it was 
clear th~t Sartre, although not so deeply involved personally, was in 
agreement with him. 
The rearguard military action in which the French government was 
most involved during the early 1950s, before the Algerian War had 
reached its height, was the war in Indochina, in which that government 
was ?ttempting to keep control over Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. A 
French sailor by the name of Henri Martin, who was, like many of his 
fellow citizens, a member of the Communist Party, was imprisoned for 
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speaking out in favour of independence for Vietnam, and this soon 
became a cause celebre. Sartre devoted a considerable amount of time 
and effort (including a visit to the French President) to obtaining Mar-
tin's release, which was granted shortly before the publication of a 
volume that Sartre had written for that purpose. 
Sartre and communism:the need for a 
new Marxian methodology 
Around the same period Sartre wrote a three-part essay, "The Com-
munists and Peace", in which he argued in favour of this conjunction, 
and became involved in a peace movement in which Soviet and other 
Eastern Bloc intellectuals were prominent participants. He also made 
his first trip to the Soviet Union in 1954, returning with a very positive 
"take", which he later realized had been excessive, on what he had seen 
there. This was, in short, the time at which he came closest to being -
to employ an expression of the time - a "fellow traveller"; it did not 
last very long. 
The year 1956 was marked by the so-called "thaw," a partial soften-
ing of the hard-line communism of the USSR and its satellites that came 
about as a result of the acknowledgement of some of Stalin's crimes 
by his successor as Soviet Communist Party Secretary General, Nikita 
Khrushchev. But Khrushchev was apparently unprepared for the explo-
sion of previously suppressed inte11ectual and political dissidence that 
ensued in some of the countries of the Eastern Bloc. He came quite 
close to ordering a military invasion of Poland, then actually did so in 
the case of Hungary. Sartre's strong reaction to this event was reflected 
in an essay entitled "Stalin's Ghost". Within a few months of its appear-
ance in Les Temps modernes, a Polish journal, Tw6rczosc, published 
a translation of Sartre's long essay on Marxism and existentialism, 
the French original of which was published in instalments later in the 
year under the title of "Questions de merhode". Although it had been 
"commissioned", so to speak, by a Polish editQr who wished to avail 
himself of the more open intellectual climate by devoting an entire 
issue to analyses of Marxism in France, and so could be considered a 
piece d'occasion similar to other Sartrean essays on politics of which 
I have highlighted just a few, Search for a Method (as the title of the 
English translation would have it; Sartre 1958b) is different in kind by 
virtue of returning to fundamental issues of political philosophy with 
which Sartre had begun to occupy himself especially in "Materialism 
and Revolution" (Sartre 1946c, 1962a). Indeed, although the English 
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translation was published as a separate book on its own, Sartre even-
tually decided to treat the French original as a long introduction to 
volume one of his even longer Critique of Dialectical Reason (Sartre 
1960c), the philosophical magnum opus of his later years. Search for a 
Method is thus an excellent example of the back-and-forth movement 
between essays in the public intellectual genre and philosophical trea-
tises that Sartre was so successful in effecting. 
The central question of method in Search for a Method is whether we 
have the intellectual tools today to enable us to understand the actions 
of any single individual - for example, the nineteenth-century writer 
Flaubert, who had fascinated Sartre throughout his career and became 
the focus of his last work, the three-volume The Family Idiot (Sartre 
1971-2). Sartre's central premise is that neither Freudian psychoanaly-
sis nor American behavioural science is adequate to this task and that 
Marxism, while it is the dominant worldview of the day and one to 
which he subscribes in principle, had, in its official, so-called "ortho-
dox" version, sclerosed. Dogmatic communists, according to Sartre, 
seem to assume that individuals take on real identities only when they 
begin their first salaried jobs. It is in attending seriously to the problem 
of the human individual, then, that existentialism has a role to play -
parasitic on Marxism, but nevertheless essential (Sartre 1958b: 30). 
The text of Search for a Method does not really resemble very closely 
the far more abstract and systematic account of human social wholes 
that is the first volume of the Critique, which is considered elsewhere 
in the present volume, but it serves as needed background to it - plac-
ing it "in situation", to use a favourite Sartre an term that he used as a 
label for his series, Situations, of published volumes of collected essays 
taken from Les Temps modernes. 
Sartre as internationalist 
Among Sartre's other major international involvements, special men-
tion should be given to his concerns for Africa, Cuba and Israel. Among 
his sharpest works of political polemic is his preface to Franz Fanon's 
The Wretched of the Earth (Fanon 1963 ). Fanon was a French-educated 
Martiniquan psychiatrist who eventually moved to Algeria and became 
a strong proponent of the revolution there; but what Sartre has to say 
in this preface concerning the nature of colonialism and its very bitter 
fruit~ has implications for sub-Saharan Africa and other parts of the 
former French empire as well. Sartre travelied to Cuba in 1960, soon 
after Fidel Castro's revolution, and spent a considerable amount of 
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time in his company. He wrote a series of newspaper articles, generally 
quite enthusiastic, about this experience, but he later became somewhat 
disillusioned with the authoritarian turn that was taken by that regime. 
As for Israel, Sartre remained a defender of it, though certainly not 
always of its government's policies, in the face of the anti-Israel stance 
of a portion of the French left. 
The Algerian conflict having been settled by the dramatic re-entry 
of Charles de Gaulle into French politics and his decision to concede 
independence to Algeria against the wishes of the very "ultras" who had 
helped return him to power, the attention of Sartre and indeed of the 
world at large shifted back to Vietnam, where the United States began 
to undertake its ultimately disastrous military ('escalation". France was 
not drawn back directly into this war, but Sartre wrote very forcefully in 
favour of the Vietnamese Communists' cause and, as an act of protest, 
disinvited himself from a lecture that he had agreed to give at Cornell 
University in the United States in 1965. Two years later, as the Vietnam 
War continued, Sartre accepted to serve as chair of a private Vietnam 
War Crimes Tribunal that was the creation of the elderly British phi-
losopher Bertrand Russell. It was their wish to convene the tribunal in 
France, but President de Gaulle, whom Sartre always despised, refused 
permission for this in a letter addressed to him as "Moncher maitre" 
(Sartre famously commented that no one called him "master" except 
cafe waiters). During this same period Sartre refused to accept the 
Nobel Prize that had been awarded to him. 
Sartre in the 1960s: revolt, repression and 
the "new intellectual" 
The two, virtually simultaneous political climaxes of the 1960s were 
undoubtedly, first, the succession of worldwide student protests that 
began at the new, rather drab suburban university of Nanterre and 
soon spread to Paris proper, where other activities came nearly to a 
standstill and the government seemed at one point to be on the verge of 
falling; and second, the so-called "Prague Spring" in which Czechoslo-
vakia seemed to be moving towards more open and democratic politi-
cal institutions, only to be suppressed by invading Soviet forces. Both 
occurred in 1968. By this time Sartre's star was beginning to wane, as 
new philosophical movements variously labelled "structuralism" and 
"postmodernism" gradually occupied the intellectual scene, replacing 
existentialism at centre stage. Sartre appeared at a student meeting in 
the Sorbonne, but was told to keep his remarks brief. Many students, 
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especially some of those at Sartre's alma mater, the Ecole Normale 
Superieure, who were in the vanguard of the protests, were greatly 
attracted to a Marxist instructor by the name of Louis Althusser, who 
endorsed an anti-humanistic line. But his ascendancy was short-lived, 
as the French Communist Party and he himself refrained from whole-
heartedly supporting the movement, and a sort of normalcy gradually 
returned to Paris and to France as a whole. Meanwhile, the Soviet 
actions in Prague resulted in a final loss of confidence, on Sartre's part, 
that that regime would ever return from its long "detour" on the road 
to socialism; rather, he concluded, it had reached a hopeless impasse. 
He expressed this conviction in a brief preface, entitled "The Social-
ism that Came in from the Cold", to a collection of testimonials to the 
events written by Czech intellectuals and published in 1970 (reprinted 
in Sartre 1972c, 1979). 
Sartre's final decade: ongoing engagement, new directions 
The final decade of Sartre's life was marked by publication of The 
Family Idiot (1971-2); increasing health problems, especially failing 
eyesight; and involvement with a group of mostly younger people who, 
in a sort of aftermath to the failed student efforts of 1968, dedicated 
themselves to ongoing "revolutionary" activity under the name of "the 
Maas". (In fact, this label was intended primarily as a provocation, 
rather than as an expression of deep commitment to the thought of the 
Chinese leader Mao Tse-Tung.) Sartre even briefly assumed the editor-
ship of their newspaper, La Cause du Peuple, as a way of shielding some 
of them from arrest. One member of the group, Benny Levy, eventually 
became Sartre's private secretary and engaged in a series of recorded 
dialogues with him (since Sartre was by this time unable to write), of 
which a small portion was published in a mainstream newspaper under 
the title "Hope, Now" (later published in book form; Sartre 1991b, 
1996). Although Simone de Beauvoir and some other members of the 
Sartrean "family", as they called themselves, opposed having this mate-
rial published, because they considered Levy to have been manipulative 
(and in fact the text appeared in some respects to be in contradiction 
with Sartre's earlier philosophical positions), Sartre himself insisted on 
going ahead with it. Only a few days later he died. The year was 1980; 
Sartre was nearly seventy-five years old. 
Another French Levy, Bernard-Henri, has called the twentieth cen-
tury "Sartre's century" (the title of a book of his), and there is consider-
able merit to this. No other intellectual from that time was as widely 
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known, as widely cited, or - to recall the title of another secondary 
work, this one by John Gerassi, Fernando's son - as widely hated. Some 
of his commitments were misplaced or at least proved to be disap-
pointing to him, but his activism on behalf of those whom he saw as 
oppressed and in favour of enhancing human freedom as he understood 
it was remarkable and on the whole, in my view, positive. At the same 
time, it was generally in conformity with his philosophical principles, 
both early and late. In short, his legacy with respect to political engage-
ment is formidable. 
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SIXTEEN 
Sartre's theory of groups 
Peter Caws 
The existential subject 
Sartre's ontology begins from the situation of the subject, not as an 
abstract category but as embodied and individual. Each of us is such 
a subject, and each of us knows only the subject that he or she is. As a 
subject I exist, that is to say I stand out (the root meaning of "exist") 
into a world that I encounter in its immediacy and its otherness. Objects 
in the world are what they are, but this implies also that they just are, 
that they have being. At first this being is apprehended only in its rela-
tion to me. Let me follow Sartre's example and take a simple case, an 
everyday object such as a letter-opener. The letter-opener presents itself 
to me as existing, that is as standing out into a world of other objects 
(including my physical body), but its being is in the first instance a 
"being-for-me". 
Objects in the world disappear and reappear, and the simplest way of 
accounting for this is to assume that they have a form of being which is 
independent of their "being-for-me". Sartre calls this "being-in-itself". 
When the letter-opener is in my hand it has being-in-itself and being-
for-me;' when it is no longer present to me it has being-in-itself, but 
need not have being-for-me; but if it is lost or destroyed and I think of 
it, it still has being-for-me though it may no longer have being-in-itself. 
But what kind of being do I as a subject have? I exist, but what am 
I? The fact that I can raise this question means at least that - like the 
letter-opener when merely thought of- I have being-for-me: being-for-
mys~lf. This is a new kind of being, and we may call it being-for-itself. 
Note, however, that in attributing this kind of being to myself I remain 
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a subject - I have not turned myself into an object. My body is to be 
sure an object among objects, and like any other object can be taken 
to have being-in-itself, but the fact that I can call it my body suggests 
a difference in kind between the subject I am and the body I inhabit. I 
cannot grasp the subject, because I am it. Being-for-itself is perpetually 
in flight from itself, perpetually ahead of itself. 
The restricted topic of this chapter precludes further development of 
this idea, which would lead us in the direction of the phenomenologists 
and the transcendental subject. I begin in this way because I want to 
trace an ascent from the situation of the bare individual to the ultimate 
collectivity of humanity and its history - or at least to trace this ascent 
as far as Sartre's theoretical insight can take it. 
The Other and the look 
I cannot turn the subject that I am into an object- if I lose my subjectiv-
ity the game is ended before it is begun. But what about other people? 
Courtesy and symmetry require that I attribute subjectivity to them, 
but I have no immediate access to that subjectivity, I can only infer it 
from similarities between their appearance and behaviour and my own. 
There is, however, one situation in which our roles - mine as subject, 
the Other's as object - are reversed. This may happen when I become 
aware that an Other is looking at me, objectifying me in ways which 
are unintelligible except under the hypothesis (which must however 
always remain a hypothesis) that he or she is a subject who sees me as 
an object. This awareness of being looked at may trigger an emotion, in 
Sartre's paradigm case the emotion of shame - he imagines for example 
that I am spying on someone through a keyhole and feel the Other's 
eyes upon me, so that suddenly I am no longer the subject and agent in 
control of the event, but a vulnerable object, at its mercy. This does not 
give me the Other's subjectivity directly-the same emotional response 
may be triggered by the mere suspicion of the presence of an Other, for 
example by a rustling of leaves which I interpreyas bodily movement -
but it makes clear to me that an account of my own situation as that of 
an isolated existential subject standing out into an emotionally neutral 
world must be seriously incomplete. 
Emotions, for Sartre, are ways of being in the world; they colour 
the situation of the existential subject. The fact that he introduces the 
awareness of the Other by way of the emotion of shame is characteris-
tic, but of course shame is only one of a whole spectrum of emotions, 
including fear and envy and desire and love, which may trigger the 
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mutual acknowledgment and recognition, positive or negative, of one 
subject by another. 
The Third 
The look opens up my situation to the presence of Others. Once this 
step is taken from the singular to the plural it might seem that we are 
on the way from an individual to a social ontology, but things are not 
quite that simple. I have an inkling or a foreboding of the existence 
of the Other, but nothing binds us together into any sort of unity. Our 
relation is one of pure interiority, and one-sided interiority at that, 
since I have no access to the other pole of the relation. At this point 
Sartre invokes the concept of the Third (Sartre 1976a: 106, 114) - a 
spectator, perhaps, who sees me, and also the one who is looking at me, 
who sees my furtive apprehension at being observed, who embraces 
me and the Other in a dyad of psychological or philosophical interest. 
Our interior relation now has an exterior embodiment. The activity 
of the Third in constructing this dyad does not, however, depend on 
the interior relation: he or she may observe two individuals who are 
unaware of one another's presence or even existence, and group them 
under some concept for purposes of study or analysis or imagination 
or the like. 
So this step towards the social has two components: on the one 
hand, my recognition that I am linked to Others internally by relations 
of presence or immediacy, as well as by the dialectics of practice (given 
that we can have reciprocal effects on one another - interpersonal 
praxis is for Sartre the domain of the dialectic), on the other, the need 
for the external objectifying regard that forms us into an entity, in the 
dyadic case a couple. The independence of these two elements and the 
contrast between them explain why, for example, a couple can cease 
to exist internally (by a refusal of recognition on the part of one of its 
members) but persist externally (by habits of recognition on the part 
of Others). These two modes of being of the social coexist in the indi-
vidual e'ven in more complex situations, up to and including his or her 
historical understanding - as a member of the human race alongside 
other members, as participating in a moment of a dialectical develop-
ment that began far back in time and will continue far into the future. 
Two things, however, are to be noted here - Sartre's insistence on the 
radical equality of human beings (I could be or have been "just anyone") 
and his eventual rejection of the notion of history as an intelligible 
adventure of humanity. There must always be a Third standing outside 
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in order to lend unity to any social being. Ontologically speaking, there 
is no higher level than the triad of subject, Other and Third; as we shall 
see things can get numerically more complex, but they can always be 
broken down to this elementary level, the crucial component of which 
remains the individual existential subject. 
The series 
The social world comprises very many individuals, some of whom 
know one other or interact with one another in groups of greater or 
lesser extent. One eventual question, to which an answer was suggested 
above, concerns the existence of a total and inclusive group worthy of 
the name of humanity, the subject of world history. This would be the 
outcome of the great dialectic, summing up the contributions of all the 
individuals who ever lived in their reciprocal relations to one another. 
Sartre lived at a time when history seemed to be in the making on a 
world scale - when communism and capitalism, in the wake of the 
Second World War, were in competition for the future of mankind. 
But he was a philosopher first, a politician or historian a distant second 
(though with striking talents in both domains); and philosophy, with its 
constitutive modesty and fierce self-criticism, could not bear the weight 
of that ambition. Nevertheless he started out boldly, in volume 1 of 
his Critique of Dialectical Reason (Sartre 1960b, 1976a), to tackle the 
ascent towards history, and on the way developed the original and very 
powerful theory of groups that is the subject of this chapter. 
One obvious way of beginning the study of groups is to look to 
the external characteristics that mark everyday subdivisions between 
people: ethnicity, nationality, skin colour, gender, language, profes-
sion (etc.). Sartre chooses a quite different starting point. He occupies 
the position of the observing Third, and begins with the situation of a 
number of individuals each separately related to some object of com-
mon concern. The case he chooses is that of people waiting at a bus 
stop (Sartre 1976a: 256ff.). All of them have antinterest in taking the 
bus, but this is not a collective interest; they do not all have the same 
destination or purpose in mind, there is no internal connection between 
them. Such a contingent assembly of unrelated subjects united only by 
a common object Sartre calls a series. Serial relations abound in daily 
life - customers in the market, spectators in the theatre, listeners to 
the radio or watchers of television, voters in an election, drivers on a 
highway, all constitute series whose members share a connection to an 
external object but have no internal connections between themselves. 
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A series may be ordered in such a way as to establish external con-
nections between its members - for example the people waiting at the 
bus stop may form a queue in which relative position is determined 
by time of arrival - but in such cases no subject encounters an Other 
in an existential sense, the others just belong to what Sartre in other 
contexts calls the "practico-inert", the material or cultural context of 
life that, while it is a product of human praxis, is just as much a part of 
the subject's facticity as if it had arisen naturally. And a series may seem 
to behave like a group, as when for example spectators at a sporting 
event or in a theatre all applaud spontaneously at the same time because 
of some feat or performance, but again this does not establish a direct 
connection between the individuals concerned. 
The group in fusion 
True group formation begins when the members of a series become 
aware of one another not merely as accidental neighbours having no 
internal relations to one another, but as sharing a common interest that 
engages a common emotion. I now encounter my fellow bus riders, 
for example, as subjects who experience and suffer the same frustra-
tions and inconveniences as I do when the bus is late or crowded or 
badly driven. We comment on these things while waiting in the queue; 
we resolve, perhaps, to write a joint letter to the directors of the bus 
company. Sartre calls such an informal association, establishing ties of 
sympathy and purpose, a "group in fusion". In Alan Sheridan-Smith's 
English translation of the Critique this is rendered as "fused group" 
(Sartre 1976a: 357), but such a designation is premature - at this point 
Sartre is exploring the process by which the group comes into being. 
His own examples are now drawn not from the business of daily life 
but from a moment in French history when the people, theretofore in 
a serial relation to the landowners and tax gatherers and court nobility 
of the Bourbon monarchy, realized that they could make common cause 
against their oppressors. The group that stormed the Bastille was an 
active group in fusion in Sartre's sense (ibid.: 3 81). 
As that example shows, a group in fusion can be an effective force; 
it acts as if it were a single subject rather than a multiplicity of sub-
jects. However, the introduction of a plural or collective subject poses 
an ontological conundrum - where do we take this subjectivity to be 
lodged? In the individual case the subject's body can be taken (in the 
first instance unproblematically - establishing this point would take 
us beyond the limits of this chapter) as his or her route to agency in 
188 
SARTRE'S THEORY OF GROUPS 
the physical world, but it is one thing to fuse subjects into one group, 
quite another to fuse their bodies into one body. It seems that we have 
not quite succeeded in making an ontological ascent any further than 
the level of the triad of subject, Other and Third, or some purely arith-
metical multiple thereof. On the one hand the group clearly has the 
effect it does because it acts in unison, and yet on the other this united 
action requires the separate participation of each member. Every one 
contributes to the cause; but anyone can betray it. Sartre's answer to 
this puzzle is to have all confer power on each - if I join with ninety-
nine others to attack the Bastille, I do so with the strength of a hundred 
(ibid.: 3 93 ). 
The sworn group 
If I act with the strength of a hundred I can only succeed if the other 
ninety-nine actually play their part. At the stage of the group in fusion 
this principle is implicit- in the excitement of the moment we are car-
ried along together without stopping to formalize our relations to one 
another. But over the longer term something more stable is needed. 
Groups of all kinds begin to form under all kinds of circumstances; 
some are short-lived and dissipate, but some may undergo a metamor-
phosis into something more permanent. Not uncommonly strangers 
who happen to be thrown together by some extraordinary circumstance 
- for example survivors of an accident or a blackout or a storm - organ-
ize themselves spontaneously into a functioning unit, taking care of 
the injured, sharing supplies and so on while waiting for relief. It may 
happen that when help arrives they find that this common experi-
ence has created something of value between them, and perhaps they 
promise to meet on the same day the following year, even every year 
from then on, to commemorate the event. Perhaps they actually do so, 
perhaps not - the point is that the commitment they are making turns 
the momentary group in fusion into something else. Sartre's example 
of this stage of the process is the Tennis Court Oath (Sartre 1976a: 419, 
467), a mutual commitment made by some five hundred commoners 
or members of the Third Estate, who found themselves locked out of 
a meeting of the Estates-General in 1789, to the effect that they would 
meet together and continue to meet together until a new constitution 
had been written. This pledge transformed the group in fusion, which 
came together outside the locked doors and went looking for a place 
to meet, into what Sartre would call a "sworn group". This description 
would also fit, for example, the group of American patriots who had 
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met in Philadelphia thirteen years earlier and pledged their lives, for-
tunes and sacred honour to the foundation of an independent nation. 
The act of swearing or pledging to one another introduces a solem-
nity that may have far-reaching consequences. With some melodramatic 
flair Sartre introduces at this point the concept of "fraternity-terror": 
I promise my brothers that I will be faithful to our cause, and I author-
ize them to kill me if I fail in this commitment (ibid.: 427ff.). Not all 
sworn groups operate under such dire expectations - but at this point 
all that holds the group together is the word of each member. Note 
that the member, even having taken the oath, remains a free individual 
and does not become merely a function of the group, so the vertigo 
of freedom familiar from Being and Nothingness is still operative: the 
group depends on me, but the possibility remains that I may let it down. 
The statutory group (the organization) 
Up to this point the group does not have internal structure. But it seems 
desirable to formalize the mutual commitment of the members, so as to 
guarantee some kind of permanence. This is the stage, then, at which 
statutes may be drawn up and offices created (Sartre 1976a: 446ff). The 
group acquires a name, even a letterhead; members are designated as 
such and not merely self-selected; someone keeps a list, perhaps with 
dates of admission; an annual or other periodic meeting is scheduled, 
notices are sent out, attendance is recorded. The group acquires a stated 
purpose, which is spelled out in a constitution and by-laws. Members 
are recognized by other members with whom they have had no previous 
acquaintance, and by outsiders as belonging to the group, something 
that may arouse expectations or confer prestige. The variety here is end-
less: newsletters, badges, dinners, excursions, fund drives and the like; 
officers are elected to lead policy-making, receive and invest and dis-
burse funds, keep records and archives. Groups may be small or large, 
short-lived or long-lasting, local or regional or national or international. 
What they have in common is the potential for totalization, the uniting 
of multiple individuals into a totality, which from the outside takes on 
solidity and objectivity. On the inside the member has acquired a new 
form of being, a "being-in-the-group"; each member is on the one hand 
a Third for all the others, constituting them as the group they are, and 
on the other at the same time an element of the group constituted by 
all t~e other members as reciprocal Thirds. 
I should note here that the succession of stages is not as simple or as 
sequential in Sartre's own text as I am making it here. In the Critique 
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this development occupies some 600 pages, and the process is far from 
linear. 
The institution 
The statutory group is an organization but not yet an institution - it 
has structure but not standing in a larger context. We might say that 
the development so far applies to self-contained social groups, which 
are not necessarily thought of as rivals, or as claiming dominance with 
respect to other groups, or as having histories other than internal ones 
in a relatively local context. But as has been clear from the beginning 
- given that Sartre' s examples of the group in fusion and the sworn 
group are drawn from the French revolutionary period- group forma-
tion has a potentially political role. The revolutionaries of 1789 were 
up against an entrenched institution and had as their aim the overthrow 
of that institution and its replacement by another. "Politics" so-called 
may be evident even in the petty squabbles among members of small 
local groups of limited scope, but this does not give them institutional 
standing. At the other end of the scale the state itself has the structure of 
an extended, ramified and inclusive statutory group, which is essentially 
institutional. The transition from statutory group to institution is not 
obviously marked by a discrete step - in this case (as indeed in the whole 
development of the theory) the group structure is idealized and does not 
always map neatly on to actual historical situations. What is "political" 
about the state is its claim to dominate and administer the polis. Just as 
in ''state-of-nature" theories of the emergence of moral communities, 
Sartre's group theory would not hold that any actual state has come 
into being by an ascent from singular existential subjects via the vari-
ous stages of group formation outlined above (Sartre 1976a: 635ff.); 
indeed the emergence of revolutionary groups depends on the prior 
existence of a fully formed state against which to engage in a dialectical 
confrontation, a state that is the result of historical processes bearing no 
resemblance to such an ascent. And yet Sartre's analysis would remind 
us that the institution reached by this point irf the development still 
consists of individual subjects whose relations to one another exhibit 
just the features of the interpersonal praxis envisaged in his theory. 
The return of seriality and the dialectic of history 
Remembering that the group, even in its institutionally developed form, 
consists of individuals not wholly defined by their membership in it, 
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prepares us for the next stage of the argument. For the institution, 
which evolves over time into an ossified form of statutory group, carries 
within it the seeds of its own dissolution. The political or administra-
tive leadership becomes remote from the rank and file, whose members 
awaken one day to the realization that they are not in fact true elements 
of the group, but stand in a serial relationship to its leaders. They organ-
ize into a new group in fusion within the institutional structure, and 
by the now familiar development into sworn group and then statutory 
group emerge as a force capable of challenging the leadership. This 
for Sartre is, mutatis mutandis, the pattern of history, the dialectic of 
power. Movements, parties, governments, states, alliances - with time 
individuals and groups follow cycles in which revolutionary groups 
displace sitting governments, if only to become oppressors in their 
turn, and in their turn to be overturned by new revolutionary groups. 
The weakness in this account, as Sartre very well realizes, is that it 
confines the revolutionary process to a relatively narrow domain, which 
is intelligible and even (dialectically) rational, but ignores lateral effects 
arising in other domains. The pattern evolves predictably over time 
until it is disrupted by an incursion from without. In a striking passage 
in the Critique there is a vivid account of a football game, which exhibits 
a pattern of praxis that is at once competition and cooperation between 
the members of the team, and leads to an elegant and satisfactory out-
come - but then Sartre in a footnote reminds us that in a real football 
match everything is complicated by the presence of the opposing team 
(Sartre 1976a: 473, n. 35). There are forces at work in history that do 
not lend themselves easily to clarification by dialectical reason. 
Can we hope, then, to come finally to the history we envisaged 
at the beginning as the culmination of the collective achievement of 
humanity, having followed a rational trajectory from existential aware-
ness to world unity? There turn out to be two serious obstacles to this 
project. If history is to be the history of humanity, then there must be an 
intelligible entity designated by "humanity" as a whole for it to be the 
history of. By the end of his life Sartre had concluded that the history 
of one 111an - in his case Gustave Flaubert - worked out in the most 
painstaking detail, would still remain necessarily incomplete. The life 
of the existential subject, in its relations to its body, its proximate and 
remote Others, its work, its epoch, comprises riches enough to exhaust 
the industry of the most gifted historian. How then to do justice to the 
aggregate of mankind, how to bring it to any sort of focus as an object 
of world history? Sartre's eventual conclusion is that "Humanity is not" 
(Sartre 1993c: 403) - there is nothing unified or integral to constitute 
the subject of history. History is a series of brief sketches, each dealing 
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with a broken-off chain of events whose governing principle is nothing 
more or less than the production of the human by the human, via local 
practice for limited ends. 
The failure of totalization 
To repeat, then - the first obstacle to a totalizing history on a world 
scale is the absence of a subject. The second is the absence of a histo-
rian. We saw how a Third is necessary to unify the couple as seen from 
the outside, and how a project of totalization is a possibility for every 
group. But who is to effect this totalization? A couple may of course 
have an internal history without a Third, and one might imagine this 
to be generalizable, although the degree of common feeling and under-
standing required would be entirely implausible for a group of any size. 
On a higher level of complexity - for example a conflict between two 
nations or classes - one could also imagine a historian emerging from 
within one side or the other, rather than taking the position of the 
Third (or in the case of large-scale historical developments the position 
of a totalizer). But such a historian would run the risk of partiality, or 
would - if able to maintain an impartial distance - become in effect an 
external totalizer after all. Sartre is aware of the difficulty of telling the 
story of the revolution from within, but in order to keep alive the idea 
of a universal history while avoiding the need for an external vantage-
point he sometimes resorts to the concept of a "totalization without a 
totalizer". This conceit however runs into the problem that Kierkegaard 
so long ago commented on with respect to the Hegelian system: there 
was no room in the system for Hegel; totalization means being seen as 
a whole from someone's point of view. 
This does not mean the failure of the group project. In this chapter 
we have followed a trajectory from the individual subject, via various 
group formations, to the recursive pattern of history- and the failure 
to reach unity or totality. This leaves the individual in the sovereign 
position from which he or she began. Sartre sometimes characterizes 
the historical forces that are at work in a given epoch as the objective 
spirit of the times, but he realizes that such an abstraction breaks the 
connection with the real agents of history: "the objective spirit ... exists 
in act only through the activity of men and, more precisely, through 
that of individuals" (Sartre 1993c: 41). The theory of groups was devel-
oped with an eye to a Marxist interpretation of history, but in the end 
even Marx gives way to an existentialist interpretation: "there are only 
human beings and the relations between human beings" (ibid.: 41). 
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Nevertheless the theory throws often-penetrating light on the nature of 
those relations, which is why it counts as one of the enduring elements 
of Sartre's philosophical legacy. 
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Sartre's second or dialectical ethics 
Thomas C. Anderson 
When Jean-Paul Sartre died in 1980, some in the French press called 
him the moral conscience of post-war France. In fact, in an interview he 
gave towards the end of his life, Sartre himself stated that he had always 
been a "moral philosopher" and also that he had attempted to write 
three different ethics in his lifetime. Of course, ethics was just one of 
his many interests. His exceptional talent led him to write plays, novels 
and short stories, works on psychology and political theory, ontology, 
philosophy of history, philosophy of art and philosophical biographies. 
Nevertheless, I believe that his interests in moral philosophy and moral 
values were at the centre of his life and constituted the underlying sub-
structure (to use a Marxian term) of his life and works. One reason I say 
this is because almost from the beginning his ethics was humanistic in 
that he identified the goal of morality and the goal of human existence. 
This chapter is primarily devoted to what Sartre himself designated 
as his second "realistic" ethics, thereby contrasting it with his first "ide-
alistic" ethics. The latter was the one he promised at' the end of Being 
and Nothingness and worked on for well over a decade. He eventually 
came to believe that this ethics, based on the ontological categories set 
forth in that early phenomenological ontology, was too far removed 
from the real world in which human beings existed. Although this 
chapter focuses on his second ethics, the fact is that in the writings of 
Sartre relatively few pages are devoted to it. Almost the only source we 
have is 165 pages of handwritten notes that were a lecture he gave in 
Rome in 1964. But even if we had more, it would still be very important 
that we understand a number of the basic concepts and ontological 
foundations of the first ethics in order to appreciate why he became so 
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dissatisfied with it that he set it aside and attempted the second. As we 
shall see, there are significant and radical differences between these two 
moralities and they are rooted in the fundamentally different ontologies 
on which they are based. 
Ontological foundations 
From his earliest philosophical writings, Sartre sharply divided all real-
ity into just two realms. This culminated in his distinction between 
being-for-itself and being-in-itself, set forth in detail in his major work 
of phenomenological ontology Being and Nothingness in 1943. Being-
for-itself, human consciousness, is described as non-substantial and 
contentless ("total emptiness"; BN1: xxxii; BN2: 12). It is nothing but 
a web of all kinds of intentional conscious acts in relation to objects. It 
is "all activity, all spontaneity" (BN1: xxxv; BN2: 15), "self-determin-
ing", "self-activated", "cause of itself" and, therefore, free (BN1/BN2: 
introduction). Being-in-itself, on the other hand, is described as passive 
and inert. It is thoroughly identical with itself and filled with being. It 
is nothing but a full positivity of being, which contains no nonbeing 
and so "does not enter into any connection with what is not itself". It 
simply "is itself", "glued to itself" and so "isolated in its being". Thus 
being-for-itself and being-in-itself are "absolutely separated regions of 
being", Sartre asserts (BN1: xxxix; BN2: 19). One consequence of their 
separation is that being-for-itself is totally free from any influence of 
being-in-itself. Human consciousness is not affected by the being it is 
aware of; its relation to being is totally negative. 
Sartre implies that his definitions of the characteristics of these two 
regions of being are the result of a phenomenological analysis, that is, 
are conclusions of careful reflection on and descriptions of the phenom-
ena of consciousness and of its objects. I must confess that I consider 
that very implausible. But what is even more problematic in his analysis 
is that throughout Being and Nothingness he often without explanation 
simply equates being-for-itself, human consciousness, with human real-
ity itselt'or "man" and freedom. Accordingly, when we turn to his most 
extensive treatment of freedom and its relation to other things (part 4 ), 
we find Sartre insisting not only on the total freedom of consciousness 
but also of human reality! He argues that consciousness/human reality 
is free because it can always transcend what is and grasp what is not, for 
exa~ple, non-existent goals or ideals. Every conscious act, he says, "is 
a projection of the for-itself towards what is not, and what is can in no 
way determine by itself what is not" (BNl: 435-6; BN2: 457). And he 
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proceeds to identify this freedom with the freedom of human reality: 
my freedom "is very exactly the stuff of my being ... freedom is not a 
being; it is the being of man" (BNl: 439). He minimizes to the point of 
denial any limitations of human freedom referring to it as "absolute", 
"total", "infinite", and "without limits" (BNl: 435-41, 530-31, 549). 
"Man can not be sometimes slave and sometimes free", he asserts, "he is 
wholly and forever free or he is not free at all" (BNl: 441; BN2: 463). 
Such a view of human reality and human freedom is for the later 
Sartre, the author of Critique of Dialectical Reason volume 1 (1960b, 
1976a), far too "abstract" and "irreal" (his words). It is not the real free-
dom of concrete human beings who are thoroughly immersed in and 
conditioned by the natural and social worlds, which worlds inevitably 
restrict them to "a strictly limited field of possibilities". A major reason 
Sartre labels his second ethics "realistic" is because it accurately recog-
nizes the dialectical character of human relations to the world. That 
is, there is mutual interaction and causation between humans and the 
world. This occurs because in the Critique and later works, human real-
ity is described not simply as a free consciousness (or being-for-itself) 
separate from nature or the things of the world but as a completely 
material organism. Sartre characterizes his position in the Critique as 
a "monism of materiality" and a "realistic materialism" (Sartre 1976a: 
29, 181). What distinguishes the human organism from all others, he 
says, is its consciousness, which, however, he no longer describes as 
non-substantial or pure spontaneous self-determining activity. Rather 
man is "wholly matter", he insists (ibid.: 180). We are made up of the 
very same physical atoms and molecules as any other material thing. 
Like any organism the human is a synthesis of parts that is threatened by 
all the things in the world which can dissolve or destroy it. Furthermore, 
the organism's maintenance and growth is thoroughly dependent on 
and dialectically conditioned by the material world and other material 
organisms to satisfy its many needs. Indeed, it is the organism's urge 
to satisfy its needs that initiates all of its actions on its environment. 
Yet human consciousness is still considered by Sartre to be free 
because of its ability to go beyond or transcend ~very situation. It can 
in his words "negate", "deny", "wrench itself from" what is present in 
any given situation towards what is not - such as a not now existing 
goal or imaginary ideal (ibid.: 70-71, 83-8, 97, 422, 549). As we noted, 
however, human freedom is restricted by the natural and social milieu 
in which it exists, sometimes severely. 
To conclude this section, let us note that since Sartre's early and his 
later ontologies have such fundamentally different conceptions of the 
nature of human reality and its relations to the world, it will not be 
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surprising that Sartre's first and second moralities which are based on 
these respective ontologies will themselves differ significantly. As a first 
step toward grasping these differences, I turn next to consider what 
each ethics takes to be the ultimate foundation of human values and 
goals. After all every ethics, whatever its ontological base, is concerned 
with values (BN1: 626; BN2: 646). 
The nature and source of values 
In Being and Nothingness Sartre states unequivocally that the human 
being "is the being by whom values exist" and more precisely that "his 
freedom [is] ... the unique source of values" (BN1: 627; BN2: 647). He 
is equally clear on the devastating impact this position has on ethics. If 
human freedom makes values exist, then this "paralyses" and "relatives" 
ethics, for it means that no values exit objectively or apart from human 
freedom. Rather, whatever one freely chooses to value, whether love 
or hate, freedom or slavery, torture or kindness, will be of value. "My 
freedom is the sole foundation of values", he writes, and so "nothing, 
absolutely nothing justifies me in adopting this or that particular value, 
this or that particular scale of values" (BN1: 38; BN2: 62). I cannot 
appeal to any objective values to justify my actions for there are none 
and any morality which tries to set forth objective norms of human 
conduct is doomed from the start. 
Sartre's argument for this position is as follows. Values are expe-
rienced as imperatives or norms. As such they are not being but are 
"beyond being"; they are not something that is but something which 
should be brought into being. As imperatives and norms, values are 
experienced not as something real but as requirements and demands to 
be made real. Since values are beyond what is, their reality can be due 
only to a being that is able to transcend what is and posit what is not. 
Such a being is, of course, human reality and values are precisely that 
towards which every human being surpasses what is. 
As in the first ethics, Sartre in his second or dialectical ethics consid-
ers values to be imperatives or norms or obligations that we experience 
as requiring our adherence. They are not descriptions of facts but pre-
scriptions for conduct (Sartre 1964b: 41, 65, 69, 72). In contrast to his 
first ethics, however, in his dialectical ethics Sartre insists that there is 
a "given", "assigned", even "imposed" (his words: ibid.: 67, 98, 145) 
character to moral values and goals. That is because he now believes that 
"the ~oot of morality is in need" (ibid.: 100; see also 87-98). Needs, he 
explains, are not just a lack of something, they are felt exigencies, felt 
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(at least obscurely) demands to be satisfied. Because we have various 
needs which demand their satisfaction, we experience certain objects 
(for example, food, health, knowledge and love) to be valuable and thus 
to be things we feel we should obtain. In other words, because we are 
specific kinds of organisms with specific needs, certain kinds of objects 
are necessary to satisfy these needs. Since we do not freely choose the 
needs we have, we cannot freely choose the kind of things that fulfil 
those needs. It is not up to an individual's free choice, for example, 
whether oxygen or knowledge or love fulfil his or her needs and are 
thereby of value for them. Thus, by making human needs rather than 
human freedom the source of moral values, Sartre's second dialectical 
ethics grants them a certain objectivity, that is, an independence from 
human freedom - for it can neither create nor remove their value. 
Oxygen and love have value for me whether I choose them to have 
it or not. And, again, because they are of value I experience them as 
something that should be attained. 
The goal of ethics 
The foregoing considerations naturally lead to a consideration of the 
primary value or ultimate goal Sartre posits for each of his two morali-
ties. In this section we will also discuss the reasons (in other words, 
the justification) he offers in each ethics for proposing the respective 
goal he does. 
The goal of Sartre's first ethics is freedom. He speaks of it as "the 
reign of human freedom" (Sartre 1988: 198), which is also the city of 
ends where each person treats the other as an end. This city is identi-
fied with a socialist, classless society "where freedom is valued as such 
and willed as such" (Sartre 1992: 418; 1988: 192). In one sense this is 
perfectly straightforward because, as we have seen, at this time Sartre 
often identified human reality with freedom. To propose freedom as 
our highest value is simply to propose human existence as our highest 
value. There is a serious problem with doing so, however, namely, Sar-
tre's total subjectivism when it comes to values. If all values are human 
creations why not propose that humans value power or pleasure or, for 
that matter, world domination or destruction as their supreme goal/ 
value? Why single out freedom? 
Sartre's cryptic argument in his lecture Existentialism and Human-
ism involves an appeal to "strict consistency" (Sartre 1973: 51), both 
logical consistency and consistency with reality. Since human freedom is 
the only source of value in Sartre's universe, it is logical and consistent 
199 
JEAN-PAUL SARTRE: KEY CONCEPTS 
with the way things are that it be chosen as one's primary value. Once I 
realize that any value I confer on anything (such as my and others' lives 
' socialism, pleasure) comes from my freedom, the rational thing to do 
is to first and foremost value that freedom. It would be both logically 
inconsistent and inconsistent with the way things are not to do so. I 
must say that I believe Sartre's argument is a good one - but only if one 
first chooses to confer value on logical consistency and consistency with 
reality. Since in his early ontology, nothing possesses any intrinsic or 
objective value, there can be no logical or moral requirement for one 
to choose to value consistency. That choice simply cannot be justified 
without begging the question. 
Even if one overlooks that problem, it remains very unclear what 
exactly it means to choose freedom as one's highest value and goal. 
Removing obstacles and limitations to freedom is one thing but what 
is liberated freedom for - for more freedom - for who or what? Surely 
not for just anyone and anything. Sartre clearly supports the oppressed 
and wretched of the earth, not their oppressors. But his justification for 
that preference remains unclear. Actually, this criticism is Sartre's own 
complaint that his first ethics was too abstract and irreal (idealistic). 
The goal of the second, dialectical ethics is significantly more real 
and richer in content. Recall that in this ethics Sartre maintains that all 
values arise not from human freedom but from human needs. Given 
this connection it is not surprising that the ultimate value and goal of 
this ethics is not a vague freedom but human fulfilment, that is, the 
satisfaction of human needs, also called "human plenitude ... the ful1y 
alive organism" and "integral man" (Sartre 1964b: 55, 95). Of course, 
human fulfilment does demand the attainment of freedom, our need for 
freedom is certainly one of our most fundamental needs, but a human 
organism has many other important needs. Sartre mentions our basic 
needs for protein, for vitamins, for life itself. He especially emphasizes 
our needs for knowledge, for culture, and for the love and valuation of 
others, as well as for a meaningful life (ibid.: 63, 66, 77, 81, 97-101, 
132-5, 164). Because the goal of his dialectical ethics has far more con-
tent than the abstract freedom of his first ethics, it is, he suggests, able to 
be more specific about the type of acts or policies that are morally desir-
able - namely, those which promote the fulfilment of the varied needs of 
the human organism. Accordingly, in the second ethics Sartre states that 
he is attempting to set forth not an abstract morality but one that is also 
a praxis in the world, that is, a moral theory that can put forward both 
the;; ultimate value which human beings should seek (namely, human 
fulfilment) and also suggest, at least in general, what should be done to 
our particular capitalistic social, economic and political structures to 
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achieve that end. Morality is something lived, he asserts, and at bottom 
it may be that morality and politics are one and the same. 
In works after the Rome lecture, especially those after the French 
student and worker uprisings of 1968, Sartre argues for a society with-
out hierarchies or classes, that is, one without power concentrated in 
an elite few. Instead of a ruling class, or state, he wants complete equal-
ity, a government by the people in the fullest sense. This will require 
the abolition of the division of labour, which, he believes, gives rise 
to narrow specialization and class distinctions. All people should have 
the right to participate in the economic, social and political govern-
ance of their country through "organs of decentralized power in work 
and in the entire social domain" (Sartre 1974c: 108). In the economic 
sphere these organs would involve collective ownership and manage-
ment of the means of production, such as, the factories, mines, media, 
banks and other social-economic institutions. In the political sphere, 
Sartre advocates direct democracy, a society where the masses unite 
to express their wishes effectively. Even if a direct democracy takes a 
representative form, he wants a new system in which, for example, a 
representative elected by 5 ,000 people would be "nothing other than 
5,000 persons; he must find the means for himself to be these 5,000 
people" (ibid.: 307). Direct democracy would involve "popular" courts, 
that is, a judiciary chosen by the people, similar to those that arose in 
France in the late 1960s. At that time workers in factories and mines set 
up people's courts and publicly staged trials of their bosses and owners 
(Sartre participated in some of those courts). 
Even in a direct democracy the implementation of policies may be 
the task of a smaller number of experts. But those experts must always 
be guided by the masses and return to them to make certain of their 
support. Even though he continues to refer to his ideal as socialism 
during this period, it is clearly a decentralized, debureaucratized and 
democratized version. And, the major advice Sartre offers to achieve 
this socialism is that one must join with the oppressed masses in their 
moral fight for liberation. 
Finally, let me point out that what Sartre wants for his dialectical 
ethics, an ethics that is also a politics, would require detailed study 
of the socio-economic-political structures of the society in which we 
live - a gigantic task that would take the collaboration of many disci-
plines. That is the kind of thing he himself attempted to some degree 
in his analyses of French colonialism in Algiers, the Soviet Union and 
Stalinism in the twentieth century, French history in the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries, the French Indochina and Vietnam wars, and the 
Czechoslovakian spring to mention just a few. 
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We still need to address the justification Sartre offers for proposing 
the fulfilment of human needs or integral man as the ultimate value and 
goal of his second ethics. The answer lies in the ontological structure, 
the needs, of the human organism: "Need posits man as his own end" 
(Sartre 1964b: 100), he writes. In the Rome lecture Sartre cryptically 
cites Marx who, he says, states that "need does not necessitate any justi-
fication" (ibid.: 98). The very fact that our needs demand to be satisfied 
makes their satisfaction our primary value and goal. We do not need 
to come up with reasons to justify seeking that goal which is required 
by our needs. Indeed, we are not free to decide what our ultimate end 
and primary value is. We are organisms with needs and so our ultimate 
end/value, human fulfilment, is "given", "assigned", even "imposed" 
on us, Sartre states (ibid.: 97-8). We do not need, nor can we find, any 
reason for valuing this goal other than the fact our needs require it. I 
believe this is what Sartre means when he cites another statement of 
Marx, "need is its own reason for its satisfaction" (ibid.: 97). It simply 
does not make sense to ask for reasons why we should choose human 
fulfilment as our ultimate value/goal. To demand such reasons is to seek 
what cannot be given, since there is no value/goal more fundamental 
than human fulfilment to which one could appeal to justify choosing it. 
Human relations 
One of the most important human needs that Sartre cites - especially 
in his last major work, The Family Idiot (Sartre 1971-2) - is for the 
affection and approval of other people. His early view of human rela-
tionships, he complained, was far too negative and too individualistic. 
In Being and Nothingness he minimized the power of human beings 
to affect each other and stressed instead the complete responsibility of 
each individual for his or her life. He also looked upon other people 
primarily as dangers to one's individual freedom and in conflict or 
potentially in conflict with me. "The essence of the relations between 
consciousnesses", he wrote, "is conflict". He also insisted that one can 
relate to another only as a free subject to an alienated object or vice 
versa: ''one must either transcend [objectify] the other or allow oneself 
to be transcended [objectified] by him" (BN1: 429; BN2: 451). 
I must hasten to add, however, that his early, posthumously published 
Notebooks for an Ethics (Sartre 1983b, 199 2) shows clearly that Sartre 
moved very quickly beyond this negative position even in his first eth-
ics. I_n Notebooks, which were written in the late 1940s, he stresses the 
importance of intersubjective relations of "authentic" love, friendship 
and generosity and makes it clear that the conflictual relations presented 
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in Being and Nothingness were never meant to be taken as the only pos-
sible human relationships. In an explicit reference to that early work 
he asserts that one is able to transform the "hell" of human relations 
described there (Sartre 1992: 9, 20, 499) and that human beings can 
relate to each other primarily as subject to subject (ibid.: 418, 500). 
Furthermore, as we have already pointed out, Sartre's later work, the 
Critique of Dialectical Reason (and even the somewhat earlier Saint 
Genet) provide ample testimony to his recognition of the dialectic in 
history, in this case the tremendous impact human beings and their 
social structures have on each other. In fact, he admits that others 
through the social structures they build may limit the concrete free-
dom of many humans to almost zero - as in colonialization or slavery. 
Accordingly, Sartre repeatedly urges human beings to join together in 
groups in order to most effectively control the socio-economic-political 
systems they create so that they can be directed to the fulfilment of all, 
that is, the satisfaction of the needs of all. 
Sartre's emphasis on human interdependency is used in another work 
of his first ethics, Existentialism and Humanism, to advance an argu-
ment that the freedom we should choose as our primary value is not 
just our own individual freedom but the freedom of all. "I am obliged 
to will the freedom of others at the same time as mine", he states. This 
is because, "In willing freedom, we discover that it depends entirely on 
the freedom of others and that the freedom of others depends on our 
own" (Sartre 1973: 51-2). In the practical order, it is obvious that both 
the range of options available to our free choice as well as our freedom 
to attain the goals we choose are heavily dependent on the choices 
and actions of others. Sartre focuses especially on the psychological 
interdependency of human beings. Only humans can confer value on 
my life. For me to obtain the fullest possible meaning and value for my 
life, then, I need other free subjects to freely confer positive value on 
me. Of course, each person can choose to value his/her life and that is 
important. Still that is value from only one freedom and, Sartre suggests, 
I both desire and can attain far more meaning if others also positively 
value me (Sartre 1992: 282-4, 499-500). Now i~I positively value their 
freedom, instead of ignoring or oppressing it, it is more likely that they 
will reciprocate with a favourable evaluation of mine. Another sugges-
tion (and it is only that) that Sartre offers is that I particularly want 
meaning and value given to me by those who freely choose to affirm 
me. Recognition from a vassal or slave is not worth nearly as much as 
authentic love freely bestowed. Thus I should will others' freedoms so 
that the value and meaning they freely give to me and my life will be 
favourable and will be from a source that I myself consider valuable. 
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I personally think these are solid arguments but I must point out 
that once again they require that one value logical consistency and 
consistency with reality, the reality that all value and meaning come 
from human freedoms. Simply put, Sartre's argument, even though 
he doesn't say so explicitly, appears to be that it is "inconsistent" for 
me to desire a fully meaningful life and at the same time not value the 
many freedoms which are the only sources of meaning and value for 
my life. But, to repeat my earlier objection, consistency itself possesses 
no intrinsic or objective value in the early Sartre's ontology. Further-
more, it still remains vague just what it means in the practical order 
to value the freedom of others. Surely I am not to value the freedom 
of everyone (including Hitler and Stalin) and support whatever goals 
they freely choose. 
As for the second ethics, although neither in the Rome lecture nor 
any other later work does Sartre explicitly construct an argument to 
demonstrate that we should seek the fulfilment of others, not just of 
ourselves, the notion of human interdependency remains central to 
his thought. In his last major work, The Family Idiot, which he says 
contains "concrete morality", he emphasizes the needs human beings 
have for each other, in particular their needs for love. 
If an infant is loved by his mother, Sartre generalizes from his study 
of Gustave Flaubert, he experiences himself to be of value and becomes 
valuable to himself. "The first interest he [the infant] attaches to his 
person is derived from the care whose object he is", Sartre writes; "If 
the mother loves him, in other words, he gradually discovers his being-
an-object as his being-loved ... [and] he becomes a value in his own 
eyes" (Sartre 1987: 129, n. 2). 
Even a human being's awareness that he or she is a free agent capable 
of acting on the world to fulfil his or her needs is totally dependent on 
others, Sartre says. We also need the love of others to assure us that 
we have something worth doing, a mission in life, a reason for being: 
"Briefly, the love of the Other is the foundation and guarantee of the 
objectivity of the individual's value and his mission" (ibid.: 135). More 
than any other work of his, The Family Idiot describes in great detail the 
overwhelming need human beings have to be valued and loved by others 
and thus their complete dependence on each other to achieve human 
fulfilment. And in no other work did Sartre push human dependency 
and conditioning so deep, into infancy. In its own way his last major 
work demonstrates the need to liberate human beings from human 
relationships and structures that prevent them from becoming fully 
human - beginning in infancy. Towards the end of his study of Flaubert, 
Sartre refers to what he calls "true humanism" which he says involves 
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human beings working together to "institute a new order that is proper 
to man". "True humanism", which is apparently the morality of the 
second ethics, "should take these [needs] as its starting point and never 
deviate from them" (Sartre 199la: 263-4). Such humanism, he states, 
can only be built upon our mutual recognition of our common human 
needs and our common "right" to their satisfaction (Sartre 1987: 413 ). 
Conclusion 
I have tried to set forth the characteristics of Sartre's second (dialec-
tical) ethics by contrasting it with his first attempt at ethics. I have 
argued that Sartre is correct in believing that the second ethics makes 
significant improvements over the first. Its goal - humans with needs 
fulfilled- contains far more content than the freedom of all of the first. 
Also, by rooting human values in human needs it provides them with 
a more objective character and so overcomes the radically subjective 
nature that values have in the first. The second ethics also provides a 
much more solid justification for making human fulfilment its primary 
value and goal by rooting all values in human needs. The first ethics 
cannot ultimately justify making the freedom of all (or anything else) 
its primary value. Finally by its deep account of the human need for 
love, the second ethics offers a greater understanding of the thorough 
dependence of human beings on each other and, consequently, their 
need to seek the fulfilment of the needs of all. 
In one of his last interviews, he expressed himself especially force-
fully on this point. We must create a society, he states, "in which we can 
live for others and for ourselves", which requires that we "try to learn 
that one can only seek his being, his life, in living for others" (Anderson 
1993: 172). "In that lies the truth", he adds, "there is no other" (ibid.). 
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Hope and affirmation: 
an ethics of reciprocity 
Marguerite La Caze 
Jean-Paul Sartre's final ethics of the "we" (or reciprocity) remains con-
troversial and less developed than his other ethics. Scholars have gener-
ally accepted the periodization of his ethics into three, as Sartre himself 
described them: the first ethics of authenticity, the second Marxist or 
dialectical ethics, and this final ethics, that considers the ontological 
basis of ethics, based primarily on the 1980 interviews in Hope Now 
(I:Espoir maintenant; Sartre 1991b, 1996). It has been suggested that 
Hope Now is not worth discussing as Sartre is expressing his interviewer 
Benny Levy's ideas, not his own, and Simone de Beauvoir's distress at 
their content is well known. However, as Ronald Aronson argues in 
the introduction to Hope Now, we should take Sartre's contribution 
here seriously and compare it with his other works, in spite of Levy's 
insistent questioning based on readings of Sartre's work that are not 
entirely accurate or charitable. I will focus on Sartre's responses in the 
interviews, rather than contributions of his interlocutor so that I can 
reconstruct the lines of his thought. Sartre's comments in these inter-
views are also consonant with that in other earlier interviews, such as 
that with Michel Sicard (Sartre & Sicard 1979) and Leo Fretz (Fretz 
1980).'This article aims to show both the continuity with Sartre's earlier 
ethics in his responses to Levy and the potential of the original ideas 
of the final ethics. My interpretation is that Sartre draws ideas from 
his earlier ethics, introduces some new ideas, and makes some startling 
formulations in suggesting the form of an ethics of reciprocity. I will 
discuss first the basis of the ethics of reciprocity, then the concepts of 
fraternity and democracy, and finally, Sartre's account of hope and 
messiamsm. 
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The ethics of reciprocity 
Reciprocity in Hope Now concerns each human being's link to the 
other, a link that was difficult to envisage in the apparently conflictual 
conception of human relations in Being and Nothingness, where Sar-
tre began from the isolated individual subject. Sartre makes clear that 
the ethics he is conceiving is different from the spirit of seriousness, 
criticized in Being and Nothingness, which desires being one's own 
foundation or cause (Sartre 1996: 59). Sartre's ethics of reciprocity 
provides an alternative to bad faith and conflict between human beings, 
an alternative that Sartre gestured to and struggled to describe through-
out his writings. That conflict arose from incompatible and paradoxi-
cal projects to become one's own foundation. Nevertheless, as early 
as the Notebooks for an Ethics (Sartre 1983b, 1992), written in 1947 
to 1948, the concept of reciprocity was important because it indicates 
the recognition of the freedom in situation of the other (Sartre 1992: 
285). When Sartre returns to reciprocity in Hope Now, he expresses a 
fuller idea of being together, incorporating the concept of need from his 
dialectical ethics, where "what I have is yours, what you have is mine; 
if I am in need, you give to me, and if you are in need I give to you" 
(Sartre 1996: 91). Reciprocity is the ideal of an ethics where no-one 
is in lack because of the ethical relation shared with all others and the 
scarcity of resources has been overcome. 
The source of this ethical relation, Sartre argues in Hope Now, is an 
ethical imperative, demand or obligation in our actions. This is an idea 
familiar from his dialectical ethics, including work then unpublished, 
such as "Morale et histoire", also known as the Cornell lectures (Sartre 
1996: 70; 2005b). Ethics begins from this imperative or requirement. 
The imperative is seen as an "inner constraint" of our consciousness in 
everything we do, a must that is an ethical must. The constraint comes 
from striving to achieve something that goes beyond our present reality. 
Nonetheless this constraint is not a determining one;·we can choose to 
follow it or not. Sartre sees this imperative as ethical because it involves 
a sense that things can and should be differenv from what they are, 
which motivates us to act. Such a motivation is only the beginning of 
an ethics, to be sure, but it contains a concept of normativity that can 
be linked to the ethical, or to our relations with others. In "Morale et 
histoire" Sartre had linked an unconditional imperative to the norms 
inherent in every imperative to act; what he describes in Hope Now 
is a link between the imperative and a fundamental bond between 
consc10usnesses. 
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According to Sartre, ethics is "a matter of one person's relationships 
to another" (Sartre 1996: 68). In that way, ethics is distinguished from 
a political or purely communal link that concerns how our relation-
ships are organized or how we form groups. He ties our consciousness 
with the existence of the other to define the moral conscience. This is 
what he means by considering the ontological sources of ethics (Sartre 
& Sicard 1979: 15), a change in his thinking attributed to the indirect 
influence of Emmanuel Levinas's ethics. We are always in the presence 
of the other and Sartre lyrically evokes scenes of co-presence in spite of 
absence: "in the form of an object when I'm alone in my room, in the 
form of some reminder, a letter lying on the desk, a lamp that someone 
made, a painting that someone else painted" (Sartre 1996: 71). Our 
response to this presence, he argues, is ethical because it concerns our 
relationship with the other. Sartre concedes that this way of thinking 
is a shift from the relative independence of individuals in Being and 
Nothingness to a concern with the interdependence of human beings, 
although he had begun to hint at this interdependence even then. None-
theless, making the primary focus the necessary and basic relation with 
the other entails a conception of ethics where rather than competing 
with the other I am fulfilling myself in being ethical. In doing so I have 
given up pretensions to absolute being, or the desire to be God or 
my own foundation, and recognized the importance of the other and 
their bond with me. This change in our projects is the idea of ethical 
conversion or transformation that Sartre first refers to in Being and 
Nothingness and discusses in more detail in Notebooks for an Ethics. 
While ethics is distinguished from politics, ethics provides the basis 
for a revolutionary transformation of society instead of a political or 
economic theory such as Marxism. This idea is expressed as the dis-
covery of the "true social ends" of ethics that would provide "a guiding 
principle for the left as it exists today" (ibid.: 60), that is, a left that 
is exhausted and demoralized. The ethical desire is what Sartre calls 
a desire for society, and not a society with a Marxist economy or the 
democracy of the French Fifth Republic (ibid.: 60). The relations of 
such a, society would be characterized by trust, justice, and generosity, a 
generosity that cannot be the craze to destroy and possess of Being and 
Nothingness nor the alienated generosity of Notebooks for an Ethics. 
It is rather a pure generosity that is not appropriative or economic and 
involves a recognition of freedom that comes after the ethical conver-
sion of the Notebooks. This ethical society would be one "without 
power" "because a new form of freedom is established, which is the 
freedom of reciprocal relations of persons in the form of a we" (Fretz 
1980: 233). His claim here articulates the sharp distinction between an 
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ethics concerned with class struggle and an ethics of reciprocity where 
each person helps the others. 
In recognition of the difficulties in reaching the final ethics, Sartre 
suggests that compromises will be needed, where the context of action 
and intention is taken into account and we may have to choose different 
means to our ends (Sartre 1996: 80). This compromise is one way of 
incorporating the political, yet what he is working towards is an eth-
ics and a situation in which such compromise would not be necessary. 
The ethical imperative, which is conceived as leading to a situation 
where all will be generous to others in need, is juxtaposed with our 
simultaneous struggle against scarcity where there is not enough for 
everyone. In this sense, we currently have to live the tension between 
ethics and competition and lack. Sartre also concedes that "violence in 
certain circumstances is both necessary and justified" although it is the 
opposite of fraternity, as he understands it here (ibid.: 79). In extreme 
situations, such as that of the colonized in Algeria, violence may be 
necessary to become an active citizen, even though that is still far from 
becoming genuinely or totally human. Being an active citizen is only 
a step along the way to becoming ethical. Here we can see how Sartre 
is moving away from his dialectical ethics to articulate a more positive 
picture of human relations than one solely based on scarcity. A clearer 
picture of the ethics of reciprocity is drawn through Sartre's discussion 
of the concepts of fraternity and democracy. 
Fraternity and democracy 
Fraternity in the ethics of reciprocity involves solidarity and depend-
ence. It expresses the ontological connection between human beings 
that distinguishes the ethics of the we. In this account, unlike in the 
dialectical ethics, Sartre accepts an understanding of fraJernity without 
terror or uniting against a common enemy. Furthermore, he argues 
that fraternity must be thought in relation to democracy, as a principle 
behind democracy. It can be theorized while remaihing open about the 
nature of democracy, although he connects democracy to the idea of 
mutual freedom (Fretz 1980: 233). Strikingly, Sartre states that "democ-
racy seems to be not only a form of government, or a way of granting 
power, but a life, away of life. One lives democratically, and in my view, 
human beings should live in that way and no other" (Sartre 1996: 83). 
This focus on democracy continues his concern with radicalizing it as a 
concept, gives some content to the ethics of reciprocity, and prefigures 
Jacques Derrida's stress on the same concept and his openness about 
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what democracy means. Earlier, in "Elections: A Trap for Fools" (Sartre 
1977b), Sartre argued for direct democracy on the grounds that indirect 
democracy rendered voters powerless to effect political change. 
An important idea Sartre raises in relation to democracy is that 
we are conditioned by others and so when we vote there is a fun-
damental relationship that underlies how we think about voting and 
the vote itself. This relation is one of belonging to a single family in 
some sense. In a surprising and rather masculinist turn, Sartre refers 
to an essential relationship of fraternity or unity of human beings, an 
original "relationship of being born of the same mother" (Sartre 1996: 
8 7). He does not mean this claim literally or biologically but as a way 
of describing the relationship of fraternity that exists between human 
beings, an aspect of the human condition. He says it is a truth we feel 
that is described in myths of a single origin of humanity, such as that in 
Plato's Republic. Sartre distinguishes this idea from equality and also 
from a principle, contending that "It's the relationship in which the 
motivations for an act come from the affective realm, while the action 
itself is in the practical domain" (ibid.: 89). In addition to fraternity 
relating to a common origin, he argues that it concerns a common end. 
Sartre modifies his claim that fraternity exists by saying that this 
feeling will not come about until what he calls humanity, or a truly 
ethical state, is achieved: 
At that moment it will be possible to say that men are all the 
products of a common origin, derived not from their father's seed 
or their mother's womb but from a total series of measures taken 
over thousands of years that finally result in humanity. Then there 
will be true fraternity. (Ibid.: 90) 
Thus, fraternity begins from a feeling and origin, and then is linked 
to a future goal of total or integral humanity, a goal that is signalled 
by the ethical imperative. Humanity will be achieved when all our 
needs, both basic and material, and for meaningful communication and 
friendly relationships, are fulfilled. This idea of a fulfilled humanity is 
one S~rtre was concerned with for decades, referring to it in the first 
editorial for Les Temps modernes. Given that fraternity and democracy 
are linked, democracy cannot be genuine without the conditions of 
fraternity being realized either. The gap between the present situation 
and an ethical future, a vital issue for understanding his vision of ethics, 
is ope that Sartre theorizes through his uptake of Jewish messianism as 
a particular expression of hope. This focus on messianism is one of the 
most controversial features of the interviews with Benny Levy, yet my 
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judgement is that Sartre transforms the idea of messianism for his own 
ends and anticipates much contemporary interest in messianism as an 
articulation of a concept of history distinct from the Enlightenment 
notion of history as simply gradual progress. 
Hope and affirmation 
Sartre discusses the question of hope at the beginning of the interviews, 
stating he believes that hope is part of what it means to be human and 
inherent in the nature of action in that action "always aims at a future 
object from the present in which we conceive of the action and try to 
realize it" (Sartre 1996: 53). Hope concerns our attempt to reach an 
end, and any particular practical end is meaningful in connection to a 
transcendent or absolute goal (ibid.: 56). This view is one that we can 
see in Sartre's concept of the fundamental project through which all 
our smaller projects make sense in Being and Nothingness. The further 
point Sartre makes is that hope survives the non-achievement of our 
goals, so is not necessarily connected with success. We may fail and still 
hope, fail and still go on acting. As in Immanuel Kant's work, hope for 
Sartre is intimately linked with progress, with our gradual awareness 
through history of the importance of other human beings (ibid.: 61). 
As we become more aware of others, the proper nature of value and of 
what should be affirmed becomes clear to us. Also similarly to Kant, 
Sartre conceived of progress as something that could be happening 
without our being entirely aware of it through fragmentary, limited, 
positive achievements growing from the midst of our failures (ibid.: 
66). This possibility is what inspires hope. The end he has in mind is 
transhistorical and is dependent on finding what is truly human and 
a way to be and live together as human beings. At present, we are in a 
kind of less than human state, yet there are elements that could lead 
towards a more human future. These elements are demonstrated by 
our best acts (ibid.: 69). Sartre does not spell out what he means by our 
best acts, yet they must be connected with the generosity, justice and 
trust he mentions elsewhere in the interviews. These are intimations of 
the future if not inevitable progress. Sartre's affirmation comes from 
the idea that our relationships with each other will improve and will 
be important even in that better future. 
Nevertheless, unlike Kant, Sartre appears to reject any gradual pro-
gression into the future when he discusses what he finds interesting 
about Jewish messianism. For him, the idea of Jewish messianism is 
a way of thinking about the future that is not tied to simple progress 
211 
JEAN-PAUL SARTRE: KEY CONCEPTS 
from the current situation. It suggests a possibility of a different, ethical 
' future for Jewish people and non-Jewish people alike (ibid.: 106). This 
way of understanding messianism is one that is not tied to a specific 
religious faith; rather, he is taking the form of the idea of a different 
future that does not simply extend from our present. The future is 
surprising, not inevitable, and not predictable. In that future state 
' ethics will not be concerned with rules and prescriptions, but with the 
way people "form their thoughts, their feelings" (ibid.: 107). Sartre 
ends with the thought and feeling of hope for the future, a hope that 
he would like to ground. This image of hope frames his ethical think-
ing and appears to be what motivated him to continue his struggle to 
develop an ethics. Sartre died not long after these interviews and so 
his thoughts concerning the ethics of reciprocity, planned as a book on 
"power and freedom", remain to be developed by others. 
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Sartre's legacy 
Steven Churchill and Jack Reynolds 
Shaping and contesting Sartre's legacy 
The shaping of Sartre's legacy began while he was still alive. In part, this 
was due to a concerted effort from Sartre himself, and from Simone de 
Beauvoir along with others in his inner circle, to pre-empt posthumous 
evaluations, both positive and negative. In an extended interview with 
Pierre Vicary and de Beauvoir that was broadcast in early 1975 on ABC 
radio in Australia, Sartre was asked by Vicary: "How do you want to 
be remembered? What would you like your epitaph to be? How do 
you want people to remember the name Jean-Paul Sartre?". Sartre 
responded in the following terms: 
I would like them to remember [my novel] Nausea, [my plays] No 
Exit and The Devil and the Good Lord, and then my two philo-
sophical works, more particularly the second one, Critique of 
Dialectical Reason. Then my essay on Genet, Saint Genet, which I 
wrote quite a long time ago. If these are remembered, that would 
be quite an achievement, and I don't ask for1more. As a man, if 
a certain Jean-Paul Sartre is remembered, I would like people to 
remember the milieu or historical situation in which I lived, how 
I lived in it, in terms of all the aspirations which I tried to gather 
up within myself. This is how I would like to be remembered. 
(Charlesworth 1975: 154) 
One may take issue with Sartre's selection of the literary and philo-
sophical works that he chose in this case to define his legacy; while few 
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Sartre scholars would dispute the quality of the works cited here by 
Sartre, some might wonder why he chose these works as definitive of 
his career and not others. 
Yet it is the second part of Sartre's answer that is far more telling. 
Sartre explicitly asked that if he was to be remembered, he should first 
be situated within a particular historical, social and political context, 
and be understood as having pursued the possibilities open to him, 
through concrete action in situ. This suggests that Sartre regarded his 
philosophical legacy as consisting primarily in a philosophy of existence 
driven by his conceptions of human freedom and of self-creation, and 
grounded in a concrete situation, to be understood and interpreted at 
the level of lived experience. Arguably, these themes persisted in one 
form or another throughout Sartre's philosophical trajectory, although, 
of course, one may nevertheless distinguish between these ideas as they 
appear in Sartre's earlier existentialist works, and his later politically 
driven (and sometimes explicitly Marxist) works. 
Given that Sartre gave this interview late in life, we may further infer 
from his request to be situated in a particular historico-political context, 
that Sartre hoped his legacy would be understood in explicitly dialecti-
cal terms; after all, it was just such a dialectical methodology (combined 
with insights from psychoanalysis and sociology) that came to define 
his later thought. Just as Sartre had sought to enmesh his biographi-
cal portraits of great French writers (for example, Gustave Flaubert, 
Charles Baudelaire and Jean Genet) in the broad sweep of history, so 
too may Sartre be understood here as requesting that the study of his 
legacy be historically enmeshed in this way. 
As for the specific aspirations Sartre tried to ''gather up within him-
self", to use his phrase, we may infer that Sartre hoped his legacy would 
be defined in terms of his aspirations for a world free of hierarchies 
and class distinctions, his aspirations for a world unencumbered by 
self-deception or "bad faith", and so on. 
Of course, Sartre understood that in order to concretely situate his 
philosophical, political and literary legacy, he would have to project a 
certain personal image for posterity, as well. Sartre wanted those who 
encountered him to take away the message that he was serene, but nev-
ertheJess active, in the face of declining health and the looming spectre 
of death; he was almost totally blind by the time he turned seventy in 
1975, after suffering haemorrhages behind his left eye, having been 
blind in his right eye since three years of age. This meant Sartre could 
rio longer read or write as he had previously, such that he was effectively 
forced to rest from these activities, a state of mind that went entirely 
against his ferocious work ethic; he also had considerable difficulty 
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walking, even over short distances, and suffered from high blood pres-
sure and heart problems, as well as from the debilitating effects of sev-
eral strokes. These health woes in later years were primarily caused by 
Sartre's decades of heavy smoking and drinking, a diet high in saturated 
fat, and his extreme overuse of Corydrane tablets; these tablets were 
a once legally available mixture of aspirin and amphetamine (banned 
as toxic in 1971.), which Sartre used both to ward off drowsiness, and 
to increase the speed of his writing rhythm. The impression that Sartre 
wanted to give, though, was that the loss of his occupation as a writer, 
and of his health more generally, did not trouble him too much. In an 
interview to mark his seventieth birthday in 1975, Sartre had this to 
say: "I should feel very defeated, but for some unknown reason I feel 
quite good: I am never sad, nor do I have any moments of melancholy 
in thinking of what I have lost" (Sartre 1977a). 
Certainly, this image of contentedness that was presented to the pub-
lic by Sartre and his inner circle had some truth to it; Sartre continued to 
work industriously on various projects right up until his final hospitali-
zation in March of 1980, particularly on a planned book entitled Power 
and Freedom, which he had been formulating for some years. Sartre 
hoped this book would arise out of taped dialogues between himself and 
his young secretary, a former Maoist militant turned Talmud scholar by 
the name of Benny Levy (also known as Pierre Victor), since he could no 
longer write such a book on his own. Sartre had far-reaching ambitions 
for this ultimately never-completed work, describing it as the potential 
summa of all of his prior attempts at an ethics, and at a theory of politi-
cal engagement. Sartre also continued to participate directly in political 
affairs until the end of his life, appearing at various rallies with other 
prominent French intellectuals, including Michel Foucault; Sartre also 
readily gave his support (both moral and financial) to various groups 
and causes, with one of his final political interventions being to support 
a boycott of the Moscow Olympic Games, set to take place over July 
and August of 1980. Aside from his philosophical and political work, 
Sartre continued to enjoy the company of others and he took holidays 
to picturesque locations. All of this suggests tha~for a good deal of this 
time, at least, life remained tolerable, and even pleasant, for Sartre. 
In short, one is left with the impression of a man seeking to make the 
best of a deteriorating situation, seeking to maximize his possibilities 
as they began to diminish in ways that were simply beyond his control; 
arguably, this is the very definition of an existentialist response to the 
"force of circumstance". 
Despite the veracity of much of Sartre's stoic self-image in his final 
years, however, there was also a good deal of concealment, and even 
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outright deception involved in sustaining this image. Simone de Beau-
voir recounts in her memoir of her final decade with Sartre, entitled The 
Farewell Ceremony (alternatively titled Adieux: A Farewell to Sartre), 
that Sartre would frequently lapse into depression, agitation, and even 
anger at the thought of the loss of his health and his occupation as a 
writer (de Beauvoir 1988). This picture of Sartre appears at odds with 
his statements in interviews such as those we have just now considered. 
In fact, de Beauvoir writes that Sartre would often refer to himself as 
a "living corpse" (ibid.: 74), and that when he moved to a large new 
apartment with a view of the Eiffel Tower in the mid-1970s, he referred 
to it as "this dead man's house" (ibid.: 73). Adding to Sartre's distress in 
his final days was the reaction to the release in March 1980 of excerpts 
of his taped dialogues with Benny Levy, under the title Hope Now. 
Although Sartre himself was pleased with the excerpts as they were 
published, those in Sartre's inner circle (and de Beauvoir in particular) 
were not at all impressed. In Hope Now, the views Levy attributes to 
Sartre often appear at odds with views that he held throughout his 
career. For instance, Levy has Sartre agreeing with the view that Sartre's 
conceptualization of existential despair was simply a '~fashionable'' view 
that he followed because others around him were interested in similar 
themes, especially readers of Kierkegaard (Sartre 1996: 55). Towards 
the conclusion of these excerpts, Levy attributes to Sartre a complete 
re-orientation in his philosophical perspective, guided by a newfound 
appreciation for messianic notions. At one point in the dialogue, Levy 
exclaims "you are beginning all over again at the age of seventy-five" 
(ibid.: 108). In The Farewell Ceremony, de Beauvoir was scathing of 
Levy's involvement with Sartre, accusing him of having effectively 
"abducted" the Sartre she had known and loved, and more generally of 
having harassed Sartre, forcing him to accept Levy's ideas as his own (de 
Beauvoir 1988: 119). For Levy's part, he continued to insist throughout 
his remaining years (he died in late 2003) that he never bullied Sartre 
into accepting a particular position, and that any new developments 
in Sartre's thought expressed in Hope Now were entirely his own. Just 
as Sartre had shifted from his early existentialism to concrete political 
engagement, so too, Levy argued, Sartre had shifted late in life to yet 
another way of thinking (Cohen-Sola! 1987: 519). 
However, de Beauvoir simply never accepted Levy's version of 
events. So strongly did she object to the views attributed to Sartre by 
Levy that, according to Sartre's adopted daughter Arlette Elkai'm-Sartre, 
de-Beauvoir broke down screaming and crying at Sartre in his apartment 
over his collaboration with Levy, even throwing the manuscript of the 
dialogues across the room (ibid.: 514 ). Elka:im-Sartre recalls that Sartre 
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was visibly shaken by this incident, declaring that he did not understand 
de Beauvoir; he is also said to have remarked to Elkai'.m-Sartre that de 
Beauvoir - along with other Sartreans -were treating him "like a dead 
man who has the gall to appear in public" (ibid.: 516). For the first 
time in their lives, Sartre and de Beauvoir were in an apparently severe 
rupture. So stressful was this episode for Sartre that he spoke with 
increasing urgency of his next planned vacation over Easter of 1980 to 
Belle-Ile, a French island off the coast of Brittany; presumably, Sartre 
hoped that the conflict would ultimately "blow over", so to speak. Of 
course, Sartre never made it to Belle-Ile, and the controversy he was 
engulfed in followed him to the intensive care unit at Broussais Hospi-
tal, where he would ultimately die in April 1980. He repeatedly asked 
his visitors in hospital for news of the reception of Hope Now, seeking 
positive feedback on the text in contrast to the views of de Beauvoir 
and others (ibid.: 519). 
In fairness to de Beauvoir, it is not hard to see why Sartre's collabo-
ration with Levy may have caused her such distress. By undertaking 
the taping of these dialogues with Levy, Sartre was wilfully operating 
outside of the "truth" about his life and works that he and de Beauvoir 
(along with others) had worked hard over many decades to create. If 
these divergent views now being attributed to Sartre by Levy were to 
gain widespread notoriety, or even acceptance, then the perspective 
on Sartre and his thought put forward by de Beauvoir in her memoirs, 
her biographies and so on would no doubt be placed under pressure. 
As well as the "professional" motives de Beauvoir may have had in 
seeking to protect her investment in helping to shape Sartre's image 
(as well as her own), there is the personal aspect of this conflict to be 
considered. Previously, when Sartre had sought to put forward his views 
on his life and works for posterity, he had typically involved de Beauvoir 
in one way or another. For example, in 1974, Sartre had taped a long 
series of interviews with her, excerpts from which de Beauvoir point-
edly included as an addendum to The Farewell Ceremony, as if to say 
that these interviews, and not those recorded by Levy, reflected Sartre's 
"real" voice, his true convictions and intentions. )artre's choice of Levy 
as his final interlocutor, though, effectively left de Beauvoir shut out 
of this final phase in Sartre's life. Moreover, since Sartre and de Beau-
voir had always pledged total transparency to one another regarding 
their relations with others, it must have come as a considerable shock 
to de Beauvoir to find views so utterly foreign to the enduring image 
of Sartre she had in mind attributed to him in his dialogues with Levy. 
Of course, de Beauvoir records in The Farewell Ceremony that Sartre 
expressed love and affection towards her on his deathbed in hospital, 
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and there seems no reason to doubt her version of events in this regard 
(de Beauvoir 1988: 123). Yet it is not clear that Sartre and de Beauvoir 
ever truly reconciled over their opposing views regarding Sartre's rela-
tionship with Levy; certainly, de Beauvoir never spoke to Levy again. 
In any case, the distinction at issue between Sartre's "public" image 
as presented in interviews and through other media, and the "private" 
image of him as presented through the accounts of those closest to 
him, demonstrates that Sartre's efforts (and those of his inner-circle) 
to position him in a particular light both professionally and personally, 
were never a matter of seamless consensus-building; rather, there was a 
constant tension between the "public" and "private" images of Sartre, 
and in the case of the Levy affair, these tensions were exposed and 
strained in ways that threatened the very sense of identity of all those 
involved. Sartre's legacy, then, was not merely collaboratively shaped, 
but actively contested by both Sartre himself and those closest to him. 
Indeed, Sartre's legacy is still being contested in various ways; he has 
been variously described as the moral conscience of his age, a supporter 
of murder and tyranny under Communist regimes, a womanizer, a 
fighter, a coward, and countless other things besides. For this reason, 
it is crucial that Sartre's legacy not be regarded as an evaluation of his 
life and deeds set in stone for all time, but rather as a "Jive" proposition, 
that continues to develop in new, and often unexpected directions. 
The reaction against Sartre's legacy 
The contest over Sartre's legacy, however, meant little (if anything) to 
the generation of philosophers that succeeded Sartre as the defining 
"voices" of French philosophy. Rather, the primary concern for Michel 
Foucault, Jacques Derrida,Jean-Fran~ois Lyotard and others, in relation 
to Sartre, was to demonstrate conclusively that they were not like Sartre. 
Foucault, for example, gave eloquent (if devastating) expression to 
a negative view of Sartre and his intellectual legacy, the basic conten-
tion of which was no doubt held in common with many intellectuals 
of Foucaules generation, and indeed those of subsequent generations. 
Foucault characterized the Critique of Dialectical Reason (1960b, 
1960c), the work that Sartre treasured the most of all his philosophical 
treatises, in the following terms: "The Critique of Dialectical Reason is 
the magnificent and pathetic attempt of a man of the nineteenth century 
to think the twentieth century" (Foucault 2001: 541-2). 
By attacking the Hegelian-Marxist project underpinning Sartre's 
Critique of Dialectical Reason, Foucault was not simply criticizing a 
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particular work of Sartre's, considered in isolation. Rather, Foucault 
was attacking the Critique as representative of a particular type of 
philosophical work, written by a particular type of intellectual - a type 
which Foucault wanted to confine forever to the nineteenth century. 
The "type" that Foucault had in mind was that of the "universal intel-
lectual": that is, an intellectual who critiques society and human affairs 
with recourse to transcendent or otherwise ahistorical principles, such 
as "freedom", "justice", "authenticity", and so on. For Foucault, any 
philosophical enterprise underpinned by such transcendental or other-
wise ahistorical concepts was fatally undermined by a lack of analysis 
of the localized forces (relations of power, knowledge, etc.) involved 
in constituting concepts like "freedom", "justice" and "authenticity" 
as they appear in a particular historical context. In short, Sartre rep-
resented an outmoded conception of the intellectual on Foucault's 
account, who, like a builder trying to create modern housing using 
old-fashioned tools and materials, could never hope to create a frame-
work capable of addressing the present epoch, Jet alone the intellectual's 
place within it. 
Derrida, meanwhile, mentioned Sartre only sparingly, particularly in 
his earlier writings, with "The Ends of Man" (Derrida 1969) and Glas 
(Derrida 1986, first published in 1974) serving as notable examples. 
Despite the relative scarcity of direct references to Sartre, the negativity 
of Derrida's polemic against Sartre was no less apparent. In "The Ends 
of Man", for instance, Derrida criticized Sartre's claim that nothing 
human is strange to him, because all subjectivities are expressions of 
freedom; Derrida argued that Sartre had simply substituted one pre-
supposed universal (namely "humanity") for another (namely "free 
subjectivities'') (Derrida 1969: 34-5). 
Another criticism of Sartre's methodology that is certainly evoked 
by Derrida's claim regarding the presupposition of universals, is that by 
positioning human subjectivity as central to his philosophy, Sartre had 
constructed the very object of his inquiry, by undertaking to investigate 
it; every account of the subject already constitutes its construction, 
on this view, meaning that the only productiv<r way to proceed is to 
rigorously deconstruct subjectivity, along with all other such universal 
presuppositions. In Glas, Derrida's intertwined study of Hegel and 
Genet, Derrida dismissed Sartre's phenomenology as a "misontology", 
a perspective that allowed Sartre only superficial access to Genet's writ-
ing; Derrida instead championed his deconstructionist perspective as 
allowing for a genuine immersion in Genet's texts (Derrida 1986: 28b). 
Derrida also discussed Sartre's influence on him in several interviews. 
In an extended interview in 1983 with Catherine David, for example, 
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Derrida acknowledged that Sartre had "played a major role" for him 
in his early philosophical development; however, he then immediately 
followed this acknowledgement with the assertion that he had since 
judged Sartre to have been a "nefarious and catastrophic" influence 
(Derrida 1995: 122). Pressed by David to elaborate, Derrida posed 
the following question: 
What must a society such as ours be if a man [that is Sartre], who 
in his own way, rejected or misunderstood so many theoretical 
and literary events of his time - let's say, to go quickly, psychoa-
nalysis, Marxism, structuralism, Joyce, Artaud, Bataille, Blanchot 
- who accumulated and disseminated incredible misreadings of 
Heidegger and sometimes of Husserl, could come to dominate 
the cultural scene to the point of becoming a great popular figure? 
(Ibid.) 
Derrida's contention was that Sartre, a man who had made so many 
mistakes, in his view, had attained the status of a cultura1 phenomenon 
in France - a status that could not be explained in terms of genuine 
philosophical or literary ability (notwithstanding that Derrida does 
praise Nausea, in passing, in a footnote in "Ends of Man": Derrida 
1969: 35). 
In other words, a deconstruction of Sartre's enduring cultural popu-
larity in spite of his intellectual mediocrity (from Derrida's perspective) 
was of far more interest to Derrida than Sartre's works themselves. 
These were strong words indeed from Derrida, such that David felt 
moved to ask him: "So you see in Sartre the perfect example of what 
an intellectual should not be ... ?"(Derrida 1995: 123). At this point, 
Derrida resisted going down Foucault's path of explicitly character-
izing Sartre as a negative model of all that was wrong with a certain 
generation or "type" of public intellectual; "I didn't say that", he 
replied (ibid.). 
Nevertheless, it seems dear from his earlier remarks that Derrida 
viewed Sartre as a vexing, indeed, bemusing example of popularity 
(or perhaps more accurately, notoriety) without substance, and there-
fore as a negative reflection on a tendency in French cultural life to 
embrace such superficiality. Derrida's own early investment in Sartre 
is detailed at length in Edward Earing's (2011) The Young Derrida and 
French Philosophy, and Christina Howells also argues that Derrida's 
mature work also retains some surprising proximities with dimensions 
of Sartre's thought (Howells 1991), perhaps suggesting something like 
an anxiety of influence on Derrida's behalf. 
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Whereas Foucault had dismissed Sartre as outmoded, and Derrida 
had regarded him as symptomatic of a culture of rewarding intellectual 
superficiality, Lyotard turned to irony in critiquing Sartre. In ''A Suc-
cess of Sartre's", Lyotard largely devoted himself to what he regarded 
as having been Sartre's failures (Lyotard 1986). The titular "success" 
at issue for Lyotard was Sartre's belated acknowledgement of the role 
of language in his multi-volume biography of Flaubert, The Family 
Idiot (1971-2). According to Lyotard, Sartre realized in the course of 
formulating this work, that human subjects (or "transcendences", in 
Sartre's earlier existentialist terminology) do not simply originate mean-
ing and then communicate it transparently with others. Rather, on this 
view, language has the power to constitute meanings, and to condition 
subjects in various ways (Lyotard 1986: xx). Although Sartre had by no 
means explicitly endorsed a structuralist, or indeed, post-structuralist 
perspective according to Lyotard, he had in fact arrived at a position 
closely related to these perspectives. On Lyotard's account, Sartre had 
recognized the "thickness" of words in an ontological sense, and there-
fore, their power over the subject (ibid.: xxii). In other words, Sartre's 
one real success, in Lyotard's view, was realizing that his existentialist 
perspective had been wrong. 
So then, it may seem that Sartre's only significance for subsequent 
generations of French philosophers was to act as a kind of springboard, 
as it were, propelling them in new directions. Yet, this view ignores a 
very important aspect of many post-Sartrean philosophers' intellectual 
development, alluded to by Derrida in the interview with Catherine 
David; that is, the fact that many of these philosophers who would later 
seek to consign Sartre to irrelevance had, at one time or another, been 
card-carrying Sartreans themselves. 
Another prominent example of this journey from Sartrean to Sartre-
critic, is Gilles Deleuze. In the 1964 essay ''He Was My Master", pub-
lished in the wake of Sartre's refusal of the Nobel Prize for literature, 
Deleuze declares that Sartre was his "master" up until Sartre's turn 
toward a Kantian-inspired humanism in the 1940s (Deleuze 2004: 77). 
Deleuze writes approvingly of Sartre's Being ancJ, Nothingness, particu-
larly with regard to the emphasis on conflict and violence in human 
relations that pervades this work. Deleuze also praises Sartre's earlier 
work The Transcendence of the Ego (1936-7, 1957a), asserting that 
Sartre's critique of Husserl's conception of the ego as transcendental 
yields a "pure immanence" of the transcendental field (Deleuze 2004: 
102). Deleuze began to move away from Sartre, though, when Sartre 
attempted to reconcile his existentialist perspective with a humanist 
ethics of respect for the Other's freedom, a respect which Sartre had 
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previously denounced in Being and Nothingness, as an empty platitude. 
In sum, Deleuze regarded Sartre's earlier existentialism as tough and 
uncompromising, while regarding Sartre's humanistic existentialism as 
an insipid attempt to compromise with those who decried Sartre as an 
"immoralist". Deleuze regarded Sartre as having needlessly re-animated 
the Kantian "Kingdom of Ends", to the detriment of his renowned 
radicalism. 
Given that Deleuze was by no means alone in his trajectory in rela-
tion to Sartre, it would seem reasonable to reassess claims that Sartre's 
influence on subsequent generations was purely negative; the ways in 
which subsequent generations of philosophers have been positively 
influenced by Sartre's philosophy, ought to be taken more fully into 
account. 
Returning to Sartre 
In considering Sartre's positive influence on philosophy today, we might 
begin by acknowledging that central elements of Sartre's existential 
phenomenology in Being and Nothingness, The Transcendence of the 
Ego and elsewhere have been an important indirect influence on vari-
ous interdisciplinary fields concerned with embodied agency and the 
perception of others. That is because Sartre's early work on the emo-
tions and his chapter on the body in Being and Nothingness were a 
profound influence upon Maurice Merleau-Ponty's own philosophy 
of the body, which, for a variety of reasons, has become increasingly 
embraced in regard to debates concerning, for example, embodied and 
enactive cognition (see Varela et al. 1991), as well as J. J. Gibson's work 
on affordances (Gibson 1977); a negative evaluation of the prospects 
for projects in artificial intelligence realizing their aims and ambitions 
on an information-processing or computational model of the mind (see 
Dreyfus 1997); the extent to which our access to the minds of others 
(and to particular mental states, like anger) is predominantly inferential 
or perc~ptual in nature (Gallagher 2006; Overgaard 2012). In these 
regards (which are far from exhausting the contemporary interest) it 
is Merleau-Ponty who has been the phenomenological philosopher 
whose thought has received the most attention. But not only were 
many of Merleau-Ponty's insights developed contemporaneously with 
Sartre in relations of reciprocal influence, but Sartre also offers new 
resources for all of these debates that have not yet been as influential 
as they might soon become. While for a long time phenomenological 
work on embodied agency that affirmed the direct perception of others 
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without intermediary appeared to many Anglo-American philosophers 
as an outmoded continental reinvention of Ry lean-style behaviourism, 
the kind of anti-representational view proffered differently by Sartre 
and Merleau-Ponty is now back on the agenda in philosophical psychol-
ogy and philosophy of mind, as well as associated sciences. Indebted 
to aspects of Gestalt psychology, their phenomenological accounts of 
hodological space, embodied motility and agency, the priority of the 
pre-reflective cogito, the primacy of perception, and so on, have played 
a significant role in transforming many of the intellectualist, empiricist 
and Cartesian biases that were dominant for a long time in these fields. 
Without being able to detail all of the contributions that Sartre's phi-
losophy has already made to such fields, in what follows, the focus will 
be on the contribution that his theories of intersubjectivity are poised 
to make, given that developmental psychology and some of the cogni-
tive sciences are under some internal pressure to find and develop new 
theoretical models. 
Of course, it is true that Sartre's work on intersubjectivity is often 
the subject of premature dismissal. The hyperbolic dimension of his 
writings on the look of the Other and the pessimism of his later chapter 
on concrete relations with others, which is essentially a restatement of 
the "master-slave" stage of Hegel's struggle for recognition without the 
possibility of its sublation, are frequently treated as if they were nothing 
but the product of a certain sort of mind - a kind of adolescent paranoia 
or hysteria about the Other. To some extent this was apparent even in 
the earliest assessments of Being and Nothingness, including a review 
published by Herbert Marcuse (1948) and in Merleau-Ponty's chapter 
on other minds in Phenomenology of Perception (Merleau-Ponty [1945] 
1962). What this has meant, however, is that the significance of Sartre's 
work on intersubjectivity, both within phenomenological circles and 
more broadly in regard to philosophy of mind and social cognition, 
has tended to be downplayed. Not only has Sartre's work been impor-
tant within the phenomenological tradition, especially in highlighting 
issues with Husserl and Heidegger's treatments of intersubjectivity 
(Heidegger himself agreed with Sartre's criticisms of his treatment of 
Mitsein - see Zahavi 2001, fn 7), but even today it promises to make 
some important contributions in regard to contemporary interdisci-
plinary work on intersubjectivity. Building on the insights of Hegel, 
Husserl and Heidegger, Sartre proposes a set of necessary and sufficient 
conditions for any theory of the other, which are far from trivial. If 
correct, they would appear to be not only an obstacle dissipating solu-
tion to the epistemic problem of other minds, rather than an obstacle 
overcoming solution (see Cassam 2007: 2; Overgaard 2012), but also 
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offer some important new insights for contemporary approaches to 
issues concerning social cognition. 
In Being and Nothingness, Sartre suggests that various philosophi-
cal positions have been shipwrecked, often unawares, on the "reef of 
solipsism". His own obstacle dissipating solution to the problem of 
other minds consists, first and foremost, in his evocative descriptions 
of being subject to the look of another and the manner in which in such 
an experience we become a "transcendence transcended". On his famous 
description, we are asked to imagine that we are peeping through a key-
hole, pre-reflectively immersed and absorbed in the captivating scene 
on the other side of the door. Maybe we would be nervous engaging in 
such activities for a little, given the socio-cultural associations of being 
a '(Peeping Tom", but after a period of time we would be given over to 
the scene with self-reflection and self-awareness limited to merely the 
minimal (tacit or non-thetic) understanding that we are not what we are 
perceiving. Suddenly, though, we hear footsteps, and we have an invol-
untary apprehension of ourselves as an object in the eyes of another; a 
"pre-moral" experience of shame; a shudder of recognition that we are 
the object that the other sees, without room for any sort of inferential 
theorizing or cognizing. This ontological shift, Sartre says, has another 
person as its condition, notwithstanding whether or not one is in error 
on a particular occasion of such an experience (for example, the floor 
creaks, but there is no-one actually literally present). Our identity is 
hence experienced as transcending our own self-knowledge, or, to put 
it differently, one form of self-knowledge depends in a quasi-Hegelian 
manner on the recognition of the other. While many other phenomeno-
logical accounts emphasize empathy or direct perception of mental states 
(for example, Scheler and Merleau-Ponty), Sartre thus adds something 
significant to these accounts that seem to focus on our experience of 
the other person as an object (albeit of a special kind) rather than as a 
subject. Dan Zahavi suggests that Sartre's approach is distinctive in that: 
The other is exactly the being for whom I can appear as an object. 
Thµs, rather than focussing upon the other as a specific object of 
empathy, Sartre argues that foreign subjectivity is revealed to me 
through my awareness of myself qua being-an-object for another. 
It is when I experience my own objectivity (for and before a for-
eign subject), that I have experiential evidence for the presence 
of an other-as-subject. (Zahavi 2001: 158) 
In common with other phenomenologists like Merleau-Ponty and 
Scheler, Sartre also maintains that it is a mistake to view our relations 
224 
SARTRE'S LEGACY 
with the other as one characterized by a radical separation that we can 
bridge with inferential reasoning. Any argument by analogy, either 
to establish the existence of others in general, or particular mental 
states, is problematic, begging the question and having insufficient 
warrant (could Mother Teresa, say, argue by analogy to the mental 
states of Adolf Hitler?). Does this suggest, then, that Sartre must 
be a quite radical sceptic about our relations with others? Can we 
merely deduce the structure of being-for-other from the first-personal 
experience of shame with little else to go on in our interactions with 
others? Does Sartre's philosophy leave us haunted by the unknow-
able other, leaving us with a kind of agnosticism about the other, 
as Merleau-Ponty says in The Visible and the Invisible (Merleau-
Ponty (1964] 1968: 79), reprising themes from Phenomenology of 
Perception. 
This, however, is not an entirely fair reading of Sartre's philoso-
phy. Notwithstanding the sense in which for Sartre we are perennially 
"transcended" by the other who eludes our cognitive grasp in important 
respects, Sartre is actually not a sceptic about our knowledge of other's 
mental states tout court. We can, in fact, viscerally perceive bad faith, 
on his account. It is nothing other than its expression. This should 
not surprise us unduly, given that Sartre maintains that the body is a 
synthetic totality of life and action (BN1: 346; BN2: 370). While bad 
faith is admittedly a complex form of behaviour, there are other simpler 
situations in which direct embodied perception is also argued by him 
to be sufficient for understanding the emotions of others. Indeed, he 
adds a comment of clear resonance to Merleau-Ponty's own work and 
that of other phenomenologists who emphasize bodily expressivity and 
direct perception of others: 
Of course there is a psychic cryptography; certain phenomena 
are "hidden". But this certainly does not mean that the meanings 
refer to something "beyond the body" ... These frowns, this red-
ness, this stammering, this slight trembling of the hands, these 
downcast looks which seem at once timid anc}threatening - these 
do not express anger; they are the anger. But this point must be 
clearly understood. In itself a clenched fist is nothing and means 
nothing. But we also never perceive a clenched fist. We perceive 
a man who in a certain situation clenches his fist. This meaningful 
act considered in connection with the past and with possibles and 
understood in terms of the synthetic totality "body in situation" is 
the anger. It refers to nothing other than to actions in the world 
(to strike, to insult, etc.). (BNl: 346; BN2: 370) 
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Basically, Sartre maintains there is direct perceptual access to others 
in emotions like anger, albeit of a different nature to our access to our 
own anger. Inferential models of our knowledge of others obscure this 
apparent descriptive fact (it seems that we don't infer, theorize, simu-
late, etc., when we see the raised and tense fist of an opposing supporter 
at a football game) and they also make various epistemic assumptions if 
they purport to show what a justification for our knowledge of others 
ought to consist in. After all, they tend to assume without argument 
that all mental states are necessarily hidden and inaccessible, and thus 
buy into a Cartesian perspective that both Sartre and Merleau-Ponty 
differently challenge. Moreover, any such inferential and theoretical 
considerations can only give us the other as a probability or a hypoth-
esis as Sartre suggests, and thus seem peculiarly unable to deal with 
the apparent epistemic certainty we have in witnessing a given form 
of anger in context. 
Now, it might be thought that any such direct perception view fits 
uneasily with other aspects of Sartre's work. After all, it is Sartre for 
whom the perspective of the other eludes and frustrates us in our con-
crete relations with them, whether that be in regard to love, desire, or 
anything else. But perhaps there is no incompatibility here. For Sartre, 
our relations with other people are not conflictual because we are stuck 
with hypothesizing about others, inferring what it is they are up to in 
an intellectualist's horror scenario that appears closely related to the 
actual experience of autism. While the other is given to us directly in 
their embodiment, for Sartre, their constitutive freedom also means 
that when we seize on this, or attempt to pin it down as a basis for our 
own self-knowledge, it is inevitably the other as they were rather than 
currently are that we grasp. We may even frame some of Sartre's insights 
in this respect in a more positive way; there is dynamic interaction, a 
structural coupling, in which self and other solicit each other in a free 
and unfolding expression that cannot be anticipated or predicted. What 
we are, and what the other is, is not what we (or they) will be. As he 
puts it, "The body-for-others is the magic object par excellence. Thus 
the Oth,er's body is always a 'body more than body' because the Other is 
given to me totally and without intermediary in the perpetual surpassing 
of its facticity" (BNl: 351; BN2: 3 74 ). Whether this sort of position 
about the body-for-others should attract the sort of negative valence 
that Sartre gives it, admittedly quite often, is a question worth asking, 
but it is arguable that Sartre's necessary and sufficient conditions for a 
theory of intersubjectivity do not directly entail such a view (indeed, 
his abandoned Notebooks for an Ethics were one notable attempt to 
show this; Sartre 1983b, 1992). 
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While phenomenology alone may not be sufficient for a theory of 
inter-subjectivity as Sartre seemed to maintain, since other resources of 
a more empirical nature demand to be considered (for example, findings 
of developmental psychology, cognitive science, etc.), one of the reasons 
why Sartre's view promises to help contribute to contemporary debates 
is precisely because his work strongly challenges many of the basic pre-
suppositions of the philosophical and psychological literature regarding 
social understanding that has dominated since the 1980s. Without sum-
marizing the various psychological results concerning false-belief tests 
here, it suffices to say that the two dominant approaches in this field 
and within analytic philosophy - theory theory and simulation theory 
- remain mentalistic approaches to social cognition that emphasize the 
importance of mind-reading, as opposed to what we might call body-
reading, notwithstanding the behaviourist connotations of such a term. 
Shaun Gallagher suggests that theory theory and simulation theory, and 
hybrid versions of them, have four basic assumptions: 
1. Hidden minds 
... Since we cannot directly perceive the other's beliefs, desires, 
feelings, or intentions, we need some extra-perceptual cognitive 
process (inference or simulation) to understand their mental states. 
2. Mindreading as default 
These mindreading processes constitute our primary, pervasive, 
or default way of understanding others. 
3. Observational stance 
Our normal everyday stance towards the other person is a third 
personal, observational stance. We observe their behaviours in 
order to explain and predict their actions. 
4. Methodological individualism 
Our understanding of others depends primarily on cognitive capa-
bilities or mechanisms located in an individual subject. 
(Gallagher 2012: 194) 
As would be apparent, Sartre's necessary and sl}fficient criteria for an 
adequate theory of intersubjectivity contest all of these views. Moreo-
ver, pressure has also come on these commitments from within the 
relevant sciences themselves, perhaps especially in developmental psy-
chology, given the capacity of early neonates to interact and understand 
intentions, emotions and so on prior to the acquisition of language and 
the passing of the false-belief test at the age of four or five. 
Nonetheless, the standard approach has been to create hybrid ver-
sions of these two dominant perspectives, thus remaining largely guided 
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by the above four basic assumptions. Much more needs to be said about 
this, but we hope to have done enough in this short discussion to sug-
gest that there are important resources within the phenomenological 
tradition, and in Sartre's work in particular, for motivating more radical 
revisions within contemporary work on social cognition, helping to 
induce something like a paradigm shift in which the theoretical con-
tributions of existential phenomenology has an important role to play. 
Of course, the jury is still out in regard to just how fertile such a theo-
retical pairing might be. It would depend on the dialectical relationship 
between the given philosophical theory and what is revealed by new 
empirical investigations that have been shorn of some (arguably) faulty 
assumptions with which they have laboured. Yet there is at least some 
evidence that, in regard to embodiment and intersubjectivity, Sartre's 
early work may well be proved to have been right at the wrong time 
(which is what Sartre said of Cornelius Castoriadis on certain political 
questions). Perhaps now, however, it is also the right time for a return 
to Sartre on these and other issues. 
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